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Freedom in the World 2018

Democracy in Crisis

by Michael J. Abramowitz, Freedom House, 2018

PDF Download: FH_FITW_Report_2018

Political rights and civil liberties around the world deteriorated to their lowest point in more than a decade in 2017, extending a period characterized by emboldened autocrats, beleaguered democracies, and the United States’ withdrawal from its leadership role in the global struggle for human freedom.

Democracy is in crisis. The values it embodies — particularly the right to choose leaders in free and fair elections, freedom of the press, and the rule of law — are under assault and in retreat globally.

A quarter-century ago, at the end of the Cold War, it appeared that totalitarianism had at last been vanquished and liberal democracy had won the great ideological battle of the 20th century.

Today, it is democracy that finds itself battered and weakened. For the 12th consecutive year, according to Freedom in the World, countries that suffered democratic setbacks outnumbered those that registered gains. States that a decade ago seemed like promising success stories—Turkey and Hungary, for example—are sliding into authoritarian rule. The military in Myanmar, which began a limited democratic opening in 2010, executed a shocking campaign of ethnic cleansing in 2017 and rebuffed international criticism of its actions. Meanwhile, the world’s most powerul democracies are mired in seemingly intractable problems at home, including social and economic disparities, partisan fragmentation, terrorist attacks, and an influx of refugees that has strained alliances and increased fears of the “other.”

The challenges within democratic states have fueled the rise of populist leaders who appeal to anti-immigrant sentiment and give short shrift to fundamental civil and political liberties. Right-wing populists gained votes and parliamentary seats in France, the Nether- lands, Germany, and Austria during 2017. While they were kept out of government in all but Austria, their success at the polls helped to weaken established parties on both the right and left. Centrist newcomer Emmanuel Macron handily won the French presidency, but in Germany and the Netherlands, mainstream parties struggled to create stable governing coalitions.

Perhaps worst of all, and most worrisome for the future, young people, who have little memory of the long struggles against fascism and communism, may be losing faith and interest in the democratic project. The very idea of democracy and its promotion has been tarnished among many, contributing to a dangerous apathy.

The retreat of democracies is troubling enough. Yet at the same time, the world’s leading autocracies, China and Russia, have seized the opportunity not only to step up internal repression but also to export their malign influence to other countries, which are increasingly copying their behavior and adopting their disdain for democracy. A confident Chinese president Xi Jinping recently proclaimed that China is “blazing a new trail” for developing countries to follow. It is a path that includes politicized courts, intolerance for dissent, and predetermined elections.

The spread of antidemocratic practices around the world is not merely a setback for fundamental freedoms. It poses economic and security risks. When more countries are free, all countries—including the United States—are safer and more prosperous. When more countries are autocratic and repressive, treaties and alliances crumble, nations and entire regions become unstable, and violent extremists have greater room to operate.

Democratic governments allow people to help set the rules to which all must adhere, and have a say in the direction of their lives and work. This fosters a broader respect for peace, fair play, and compromise. Autocrats impose arbitrary rules on their citizens whille ignoring all constraints themselves, spurring a vicious circle of abuse and radicalization.

The United States accelerates its withdrawal from the democracy struggle

A long list of troubling developments around the world contributed to the global decline in 2017, but perhaps most striking was the accelerating withdrawal of the United States from its historical commitment to promoting and supporting democracy. The potent challenge from authoritarian regimes made the United States’ abdication of its traditional role all the more important.

Despite the U.S. government’s mistakes—and there have been many—the American people and their leaders have generally understood that standing up for the rights of others is both a moral imperative and beneficial to themselves. But two long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and a global recession soured the public on extensive international engagement, and the perceived link between democracy promotion on the one hand and military interventions and financial costs on the other has had a lasting impact.

The Obama administration continued to defend democratic ideals in its foreign policy statements, but its actions often fell short, reflecting a reduced estimation of the United States’ ability to influence world events and of the American public’s willingness to back such efforts.

In 2017, however, the Trump administration made explicit—in both words and actions—its intention to cast off principles that have guided U.S. policy and formed the basis for American leadership over the past seven decades.

President Trump’s “America First” slogan, originally coined by isolationists seeking to block U.S. involvement in the war against fascism, targeted traditional notions of collective global security and mutually beneficial trade. The administration’s hostility and skepticism toward binding international agreements on the environment, arms control, and other topics confirmed that a reorientation was taking shape.

Even when he chose to acknowledge America’s treaty alliances with fellow democracies, the president spoke of cultural or civilizational ties rather than shared recognition of universal rights; his trips abroad rarely featured any mention of the word “democracy.” Indeed, the American leader expressed feelings of admiration and even personal friendship for some of the world’s most loathsome strongmen and dictators.

This marks a sharp break from other U.S. presidents in the postwar period, who cooperated with certain authoritarian regimes for strategic reasons but never wavered from a commitment to democracy as the best form of government and the animating force behind American foreign policy. It also reflects an inability—or unwillingness—by the United States to lead democracies in effectively confronting the growing threat from Russia and China, and from the other states that have come to emulate their authoritarian approach.

Democratic norms erode within the United States

The past year brought further, faster erosion of America’s own democratic standards than at any other time in memory, damaging its international credibility as a champion of good governance and human rights.

The United States has experienced a series of set-backs in the conduct of elections and criminal justice over the past decade—under leadership from both major political parties—but in 2017 its core institutions were attacked by an administration that rejects established norms of ethical conduct across many fields of activity. President Trump himself has mingled the concerns of his business empire with his role as president, appointed family members to his senior staff, filled other high positions with lobbyists and representatives of special interests, and refused to abide by disclosure and transparency practices observed by his predecessors.

The president has also lambasted and threatened the media—including sharp jabs at individual journalists—for challenging his routinely false statements, spoken disdainfully of judges who blocked his decisions, and attacked the professional staff of law enforcement and intelligence agencies. He signals contempt for Muslims and Latin American immigrants and singles out some African Americans for vitriolic criticism. He pardoned a sheriff convicted of ignoring federal court orders to halt racially discriminatory policies and issued an executive order restricting travel to the United States from a group of Muslim-majority countries after making a campaign promise to ban all foreign Muslims from the United States. And at a time when millions around the world have been forced to flee war, terrorism, and ethnic cleansing, President Trump moved to implement major reductions in the number of legal immigrants and refugees that the United States would accept.

The president’s behavior stems in part from a frustration with the country’s democratic checks and balances, including the independent courts, a coequal legislative branch, the free press, and an active civil society. These institutions remained fairly resilient in 2017, but the administration’s statements and actions could ultimately leave them weakened, with serious consequences for the health of U.S. democracy and America’s role in the world.

China and Russia expand their antidemocratic influence

While the United States and other democratic powers grappled with domestic problems and argued about foreign policy priorities, the world’s leading autocracies—Russia and China—continued to make headway. Moscow and Beijing are single-minded in their identification of democracy as a threat to their oppressive regimes, and they work relentlessly, with increasing sophistication, to undermine its institutions and cripple its principal advocates.

The eventual outcome of these trends, if unchecked, is obvious. The replacement of global democratic norms with authoritarian practices will mean more elections in which the incumbent’s victory is a foregone conclusion. It will mean a media landscape dominated by propaganda mouthpieces that marginalize the opposition while presenting the leader as omniscient, strong, and devoted to national aggrandizement. It will mean state control over the internet and social media through both censorship and active manipulation that promotes the regime’s message while confusing users with lies and fakery. And it will mean more corruption, injustice, and impunity for state abuses.

Already, Vladimir Putin’s Russia has carried out disinformation campaigns before elections in countries including the United States, France, and Germany, cultivated ties to xenophobic political parties across Europe, threatened or invaded its closest neighbors, and served as an alternative source of military aid for Middle Eastern dictatorships. Its chief goal is to disrupt democratic states and fracture the institutions—such as the European Union—that bind them together.

Beijing has even greater ambitions—and the resources to achieve them. It has built up a propaganda and censorship apparatus with global reach, used economic and other ties to influence democracies like Australia and New Zealand, compelled various countries to repatriate Chinese citizens seeking refuge abroad, and provided diplomatic and material support to repressive governments from Southeast Asia to Africa. Moscow often plays the role of spoiler, bolstering its position by undercutting its adversaries, but the scope and depth of Beijing’s activities show that the Chinese regime aspires to truly global leadership.

Corrupt and repressive states threaten global stability

The past year provided ample evidence that undemocratic rule itself can be catastrophic for regional and global stability, with or without active interference from major powers like Russia and China.

In Myanmar, the politically dominant military conducted a brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Muslim Rohingya minority, enabled by diplomatic cover from China and an impotent response from the rest of the international community. Some 600,000 people have been pushed out, while thousands of others are thought to have been killed. The refugees have strained the resources of an already fragile Bangladesh, and Islamist militants have sought to adopt the Rohingya cause as a new rallying point for violent struggle.

Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan broadened and intensified the crackdown on his perceived opponents that began after a failed 2016 coup attempt. In addition to its dire consequences for detained Turkish citizens, shuttered media outlets, and seized businesses, the chaotic purge has become intertwined with an offensive against the Kurdish minority, which in turn has fueled Turkey’s diplomatic and military interventions in neighboring Syria and Iraq.

Elsewhere in the Middle East, authoritarian rulers in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt asserted their interests in reckless ways that perpetuated long-running conflicts in Libya and Yemen and initiated a sudden attempt to blockade Qatar, a hub of international trade and transportation. Their similarly repressive archrival, Iran, played its own part in the region’s conflicts, overseeing militia networks that stretched from Lebanon to Afghanistan. Promises of reform from a powerful new crown prince in Saudi Arabia added an unexpected variable in a region that has long resisted greater openness, though his nascent social and economic changes were accompanied by hundreds of arbitrary arrests and aggressive moves against potential rivals, and he showed no inclination to open the political system.

The humanitarian crisis produced in Venezuela by President Nicolás Maduro’s determination to stay in power continued to drive residents to seek refuge in neighboring countries. But other Latin American states also proved problematic: Brazil’s sprawling corruption investigations implicated leaders across the region. Mexico’s embattled administration resisted reforms that would help address rampant graft, organized crime, and a crumbling justice system.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi, incumbent rulers’ ongoing use of violence to flout term limits helped to generate internal displacement and refugees. A deeply flawed electoral process in Kenya contributed to political violence there, while South Sudan’s leaders chose to press on with a bloody civil war rather than make peace and face a long-overdue reckoning with voters.

North Korea presented one of the most glaring threats to world peace, aggressively building up its nuclear arsenal in an attempt to fortify an exceptionally oppressive and criminal regime.

Freedom in one country depends on freedom for all

Democracies generally remain the world’s wealthiest societies, the most open to new ideas and opportunities, the least corrupt, and the most protective of individual liberties. When people around the globe are asked about their preferred political conditions, they embrace democracy’s ideals: honest elections, free speech, accountable government, and effective legal constraints on the police, military, and other institutions of authority.

In the 21st century, however, it is increasingly difficult to create and sustain these conditions in one country while ignoring them in another. The autocratic regimes in Russia and China clearly recognize that to maintain power at home, they must squelch open debate, pursue dissidents, and compromise rules-based institutions beyond their borders. The citizens and leaders of democracies must now recognize that the reverse is also true: To maintain their own freedoms, they must defend the rights of their counterparts in all countries. The reality of globalization is that our fates are interlinked.

In August 1968, when Soviet tanks entered Czechoslovakia to put down the Prague Spring, a small group of dissidents gathered in Red Square in Moscow and unfurled a banner that read, “For your freedom and ours.” Almost 50 years later, it is this spirit of transnational democratic solidarity and defiance in the face of autocracy that we must summon and revive.

RANKING FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2018

Country or Territory Freedom Status PR CL Freedom Rating Aggregate Score
Abkhazia * Partly Free 4 5 4.5 41
Afghanistan Not Free 5 6 5.5 26
Albania Partly Free 3 3 3.0 68
Algeria Not Free 6 5 5.5 35
Andorra Free 1 1 1.0 96
Angola Not Free 6 6 6.0 26
Antigua and Barbuda Free 2 2 2.0 83
Argentina Free 2 2 2.0 83
Armenia Partly Free 5 4 4.5 45
Australia Free 1 1 1.0 98
Austria Free 1 1 1.0 94
Azerbaijan Not Free 7 6 6.5 12
Bahamas Free 1 1 1.0 91
Bahrain Not Free 7 6 6.5 12
Bangladesh Partly Free 4 4 4.0 45
Barbados Free 1 1 1.0 96
Belarus Not Free 6 6 6.0 21
Belgium Free 1 1 1.0 95
Belize Free 1 2 1.5 86
Benin Free 2 2 2.0 82
Bhutan Partly Free 3 4 3.5 55
Bolivia Partly Free 3 3 3.0 67
Bosnia and Herzegovina Partly Free 4 4 4.0 55
Botswana Free 3 2 2.5 72
Brazil Free 2 2 2.0 78
Brunei Not Free 6 5 5.5 28
Bulgaria Free 2 2 2.0 80
Burkina Faso Partly Free 4 3 3.5 60
Burundi Not Free 7 6 6.5 18
Cambodia Not Free 6 5 5.5 30
Cameroon Not Free 6 6 6.0 22
Canada Free 1 1 1.0 99
Cape Verde Free 1 1 1.0 90
Central African Republic Not Free 7 7 7.0 9
Chad Not Free 7 6 6.5 18
Chile Free 1 1 1.0 94
China Not Free 7 6 6.5 14
Colombia Partly Free 3 3 3.0 65
Comoros Partly Free 3 4 3.5 55
Congo, Democratic Republic of (Kinshasa) Not Free 7 6 6.5 17
Congo, Republic of (Brazzaville) Not Free 7 5 6.0 21
Costa Rica Free 1 1 1.0 91
Crimea * Not Free 7 6 6.5 9
Croatia Free 1 2 1.5 86
Cuba Not Free 7 6 6.5 14
Cyprus Free 1 1 1.0 94
Czech Republic Free 1 1 1.0 93
Côte d’Ivoire Partly Free 4 4 4.0 51
Denmark Free 1 1 1.0 97
Djibouti Not Free 6 5 5.5 26
Dominica Free 1 1 1.0 93
Dominican Republic Partly Free 3 3 3.0 67
Ecuador Partly Free 3 3 3.0 60
Egypt Not Free 6 6 6.0 26
El Salvador Free 2 3 2.5 70
Equatorial Guinea Not Free 7 7 7.0 7
Eritrea Not Free 7 7 7.0 3
Estonia Free 1 1 1.0 94
Ethiopia Not Free 7 6 6.5 12
Fiji Partly Free 3 3 3.0 59
Finland Free 1 1 1.0 100
France Free 1 2 1.5 90
Gabon Not Free 7 5 6.0 23
Gambia, The Partly Free 4 5 4.5 41
Gaza Strip * Not Free 7 6 6.5 12
Georgia Partly Free 3 3 3.0 64
Germany Free 1 1 1.0 94
Ghana Free 1 2 1.5 83
Greece Free 2 2 2.0 85
Grenada Free 1 2 1.5 88
Guatemala Partly Free 4 4 4.0 56
Guinea Partly Free 5 5 5.0 41
Guinea-Bissau Partly Free 5 5 5.0 41
Guyana Free 2 3 2.5 74
Haiti Partly Free 5 5 5.0 41
Honduras Partly Free 4 4 4.0 46
Hong Kong * Partly Free 5 2 3.5 59
Hungary Free 3 2 2.5 72
Iceland Free 1 1 1.0 95
India Free 2 3 2.5 77
Indian Kashmir * Partly Free 4 4 4.0 49
Indonesia Partly Free 2 4 3.0 64
Iran Not Free 6 6 6.0 18
Iraq Not Free 5 6 5.5 31
Ireland Free 1 1 1.0 96
Israel Free 1 3 2.0 79
Italy Free 1 1 1.0 89
Jamaica Free 2 3 2.5 77
Japan Free 1 1 1.0 96
Jordan Partly Free 5 5 5.0 37
Kazakhstan Not Free 7 5 6.0 22
Kenya Partly Free 4 4 4.0 48
Kiribati Free 1 1 1.0 93
Kosovo Partly Free 3 4 3.5 52
Kuwait Partly Free 5 5 5.0 36
Kyrgyzstan Partly Free 5 5 5.0 37
Laos Not Free 7 6 6.5 12
Latvia Free 2 2 2.0 87
Lebanon Partly Free 6 4 5.0 43
Lesotho Partly Free 3 3 3.0 64
Liberia Partly Free 3 3 3.0 62
Libya Not Free 7 6 6.5 9
Liechtenstein Free 2 1 1.5 90
Lithuania Free 1 1 1.0 91
Luxembourg Free 1 1 1.0 98
Macedonia Partly Free 4 3 3.5 58
Madagascar Partly Free 3 4 3.5 56
Malawi Partly Free 3 3 3.0 63
Malaysia Partly Free 4 4 4.0 45
Maldives Partly Free 5 5 5.0 35
Mali Partly Free 5 4 4.5 44
Malta Free 1 1 1.0 92
Marshall Islands Free 1 1 1.0 92
Mauritania Not Free 6 5 5.5 30
Mauritius Free 1 2 1.5 89
Mexico Partly Free 3 3 3.0 62
Micronesia Free 1 1 1.0 93
Moldova Partly Free 3 3 3.0 61
Monaco Free 3 1 2.0 82
Mongolia Free 1 2 1.5 85
Montenegro Partly Free 3 3 3.0 67
Morocco Partly Free 5 5 5.0 39
Mozambique Partly Free 4 4 4.0 52
Myanmar Partly Free 5 5 5.0 31
Nagorno-Karabakh * Partly Free 5 5 5.0 30
Namibia Free 2 2 2.0 77
Nauru Free 2 2 2.0 81
Nepal Partly Free 3 4 3.5 55
Netherlands Free 1 1 1.0 99
New Zealand Free 1 1 1.0 98
Nicaragua Partly Free 5 4 4.5 44
Niger Partly Free 4 4 4.0 49
Nigeria Partly Free 3 5 4.0 50
North Korea Not Free 7 7 7.0 3
Northern Cyprus * Free 2 2 2.0 81
Norway Free 1 1 1.0 100
Oman Not Free 6 5 5.5 23
Pakistan Partly Free 4 5 4.5 43
Pakistani Kashmir * Not Free 6 5 5.5 28
Palau Free 1 1 1.0 92
Panama Free 2 2 2.0 83
Papua New Guinea Partly Free 3 3 3.0 63
Paraguay Partly Free 3 3 3.0 64
Peru Free 2 3 2.5 73
Philippines Partly Free 3 3 3.0 62
Poland Free 1 2 1.5 85
Portugal Free 1 1 1.0 97
Qatar Not Free 6 5 5.5 24
Romania Free 2 2 2.0 84
Russia Not Free 7 6 6.5 20
Rwanda Not Free 6 6 6.0 23
Samoa Free 2 2 2.0 80
San Marino Free 1 1 1.0 97
Saudi Arabia Not Free 7 7 7.0 7
Senegal Free 2 2 2.0 75
Serbia Free 3 2 2.5 73
Seychelles Partly Free 3 3 3.0 71
Sierra Leone Partly Free 3 3 3.0 66
Singapore Partly Free 4 4 4.0 52
Slovakia Free 1 1 1.0 89
Slovenia Free 1 1 1.0 93
Solomon Islands Free 3 2 2.5 72
Somalia Not Free 7 7 7.0 7
Somaliland * Partly Free 4 5 4.5 44
South Africa Free 2 2 2.0 78
South Korea Free 2 2 2.0 84
South Ossetia * Not Free 7 6 6.5 10
South Sudan Not Free 7 7 7.0 2
Spain Free 1 1 1.0 94
Sri Lanka Partly Free 3 4 3.5 55
St. Kitts and Nevis Free 1 1 1.0 89
St. Lucia Free 1 1 1.0 91
St. Vincent and Grenadines Free 1 1 1.0 90
Sudan Not Free 7 7 7.0 8
Suriname Free 2 2 2.0 78
Swaziland Not Free 7 6 6.5 16
Sweden Free 1 1 1.0 100
Switzerland Free 1 1 1.0 96
Syria Not Free 7 7 7.0 -1
São Tomé and Príncipe Free 2 2 2.0 82
Taiwan Free 1 1 1.0 93
Tajikistan Not Free 7 6 6.5 11
Tanzania Partly Free 4 4 4.0 52
Thailand Not Free 6 5 5.5 31
Tibet* Not Free 7 7 7.0 1
Timor-Leste Free 2 3 2.5 69
Togo Partly Free 4 4 4.0 47
Tonga Free 2 2 2.0 75
Transnistria * Not Free 6 6 6.0 24
Trinidad and Tobago Free 2 2 2.0 81
Tunisia Free 2 3 2.5 70
Turkey Not Free 5 6 5.5 32
Turkmenistan Not Free 7 7 7.0 4
Tuvalu Free 1 1 1.0 94
Uganda Partly Free 6 4 5.0 37
Ukraine Partly Free 3 3 3.0 62
Ukraine Україна Translation Частково вільна 3 3 3.0 62
United Arab Emirates Not Free 7 6 6.5 17
United Kingdom Free 1 1 1.0 94
United States Free 2 1 1.5 86
Uruguay Free 1 1 1.0 98
Uzbekistan Not Free 7 7 7.0 7
Vanuatu Free 2 2 2.0 81
Venezuela Not Free 6 5 5.5 26
Vietnam Not Free 7 5 6.0 20
West Bank * Not Free 7 5 6.0 28
Western Sahara* Not Free 7 7 7.0 4
Yemen Not Free 7 6 6.5 13
Zambia Partly Free 4 4 4.0 55
Zimbabwe Not Free 6 5 5.5 30

ORDENAÇÃO PELO AGGREGATE SCORE

A tabela abaixo reordena os regimes: do mais democrático para o menos democrático:

Country or Territory Freedom Status PR CL Freedom Rating Aggregate Score
Finland Free 1 1 1.0 100
Norway Free 1 1 1.0 100
Sweden Free 1 1 1.0 100
Canada Free 1 1 1.0 99
Netherlands Free 1 1 1.0 99
Australia Free 1 1 1.0 98
Luxembourg Free 1 1 1.0 98
New Zealand Free 1 1 1.0 98
Uruguay Free 1 1 1.0 98
Denmark Free 1 1 1.0 97
Portugal Free 1 1 1.0 97
San Marino Free 1 1 1.0 97
Andorra Free 1 1 1.0 96
Barbados Free 1 1 1.0 96
Ireland Free 1 1 1.0 96
Japan Free 1 1 1.0 96
Switzerland Free 1 1 1.0 96
Belgium Free 1 1 1.0 95
Iceland Free 1 1 1.0 95
Austria Free 1 1 1.0 94
Chile Free 1 1 1.0 94
Cyprus Free 1 1 1.0 94
Estonia Free 1 1 1.0 94
Germany Free 1 1 1.0 94
Spain Free 1 1 1.0 94
Tuvalu Free 1 1 1.0 94
United Kingdom Free 1 1 1.0 94
Czech Republic Free 1 1 1.0 93
Dominica Free 1 1 1.0 93
Kiribati Free 1 1 1.0 93
Micronesia Free 1 1 1.0 93
Slovenia Free 1 1 1.0 93
Taiwan Free 1 1 1.0 93
Malta Free 1 1 1.0 92
Marshall Islands Free 1 1 1.0 92
Palau Free 1 1 1.0 92
Bahamas Free 1 1 1.0 91
Costa Rica Free 1 1 1.0 91
Lithuania Free 1 1 1.0 91
St. Lucia Free 1 1 1.0 91
Cape Verde Free 1 1 1.0 90
France Free 1 2 1.5 90
Liechtenstein Free 2 1 1.5 90
St. Vincent and Grenadines Free 1 1 1.0 90
Italy Free 1 1 1.0 89
Mauritius Free 1 2 1.5 89
Slovakia Free 1 1 1.0 89
St. Kitts and Nevis Free 1 1 1.0 89
Grenada Free 1 2 1.5 88
Latvia Free 2 2 2.0 87
Belize Free 1 2 1.5 86
Croatia Free 1 2 1.5 86
United States Free 2 1 1.5 86
Greece Free 2 2 2.0 85
Mongolia Free 1 2 1.5 85
Poland Free 1 2 1.5 85
Romania Free 2 2 2.0 84
South Korea Free 2 2 2.0 84
Antigua and Barbuda Free 2 2 2.0 83
Argentina Free 2 2 2.0 83
Ghana Free 1 2 1.5 83
Panama Free 2 2 2.0 83
Benin Free 2 2 2.0 82
Monaco Free 3 1 2.0 82
São Tomé and Príncipe Free 2 2 2.0 82
Nauru Free 2 2 2.0 81
Northern Cyprus * Free 2 2 2.0 81
Trinidad and Tobago Free 2 2 2.0 81
Vanuatu Free 2 2 2.0 81
Bulgaria Free 2 2 2.0 80
Samoa Free 2 2 2.0 80
Israel Free 1 3 2.0 79
Brazil Free 2 2 2.0 78
South Africa Free 2 2 2.0 78
Suriname Free 2 2 2.0 78
India Free 2 3 2.5 77
Jamaica Free 2 3 2.5 77
Namibia Free 2 2 2.0 77
Senegal Free 2 2 2.0 75
Tonga Free 2 2 2.0 75
Guyana Free 2 3 2.5 74
Peru Free 2 3 2.5 73
Serbia Free 3 2 2.5 73
Botswana Free 3 2 2.5 72
Hungary Free 3 2 2.5 72
Solomon Islands Free 3 2 2.5 72
Seychelles Partly Free 3 3 3.0 71
El Salvador Free 2 3 2.5 70
Tunisia Free 2 3 2.5 70
Timor-Leste Free 2 3 2.5 69
Albania Partly Free 3 3 3.0 68
Bolivia Partly Free 3 3 3.0 67
Dominican Republic Partly Free 3 3 3.0 67
Montenegro Partly Free 3 3 3.0 67
Sierra Leone Partly Free 3 3 3.0 66
Colombia Partly Free 3 3 3.0 65
Georgia Partly Free 3 3 3.0 64
Indonesia Partly Free 2 4 3.0 64
Lesotho Partly Free 3 3 3.0 64
Paraguay Partly Free 3 3 3.0 64
Malawi Partly Free 3 3 3.0 63
Papua New Guinea Partly Free 3 3 3.0 63
Liberia Partly Free 3 3 3.0 62
Mexico Partly Free 3 3 3.0 62
Philippines Partly Free 3 3 3.0 62
Ukraine Partly Free 3 3 3.0 62
Ukraine Україна Translation Частково вільна 3 3 3.0 62
Moldova Partly Free 3 3 3.0 61
Burkina Faso Partly Free 4 3 3.5 60
Ecuador Partly Free 3 3 3.0 60
Fiji Partly Free 3 3 3.0 59
Hong Kong * Partly Free 5 2 3.5 59
Macedonia Partly Free 4 3 3.5 58
Guatemala Partly Free 4 4 4.0 56
Madagascar Partly Free 3 4 3.5 56
Bhutan Partly Free 3 4 3.5 55
Bosnia and Herzegovina Partly Free 4 4 4.0 55
Comoros Partly Free 3 4 3.5 55
Nepal Partly Free 3 4 3.5 55
Sri Lanka Partly Free 3 4 3.5 55
Zambia Partly Free 4 4 4.0 55
Kosovo Partly Free 3 4 3.5 52
Mozambique Partly Free 4 4 4.0 52
Singapore Partly Free 4 4 4.0 52
Tanzania Partly Free 4 4 4.0 52
Côte d’Ivoire Partly Free 4 4 4.0 51
Nigeria Partly Free 3 5 4.0 50
Indian Kashmir * Partly Free 4 4 4.0 49
Niger Partly Free 4 4 4.0 49
Kenya Partly Free 4 4 4.0 48
Togo Partly Free 4 4 4.0 47
Honduras Partly Free 4 4 4.0 46
Armenia Partly Free 5 4 4.5 45
Bangladesh Partly Free 4 4 4.0 45
Malaysia Partly Free 4 4 4.0 45
Mali Partly Free 5 4 4.5 44
Nicaragua Partly Free 5 4 4.5 44
Somaliland * Partly Free 4 5 4.5 44
Lebanon Partly Free 6 4 5.0 43
Pakistan Partly Free 4 5 4.5 43
Abkhazia * Partly Free 4 5 4.5 41
Gambia, The Partly Free 4 5 4.5 41
Guinea Partly Free 5 5 5.0 41
Guinea-Bissau Partly Free 5 5 5.0 41
Haiti Partly Free 5 5 5.0 41
Morocco Partly Free 5 5 5.0 39
Jordan Partly Free 5 5 5.0 37
Kyrgyzstan Partly Free 5 5 5.0 37
Uganda Partly Free 6 4 5.0 37
Kuwait Partly Free 5 5 5.0 36
Algeria Not Free 6 5 5.5 35
Maldives Partly Free 5 5 5.0 35
Turkey Not Free 5 6 5.5 32
Iraq Not Free 5 6 5.5 31
Myanmar Partly Free 5 5 5.0 31
Thailand Not Free 6 5 5.5 31
Cambodia Not Free 6 5 5.5 30
Mauritania Not Free 6 5 5.5 30
Nagorno-Karabakh * Partly Free 5 5 5.0 30
Zimbabwe Not Free 6 5 5.5 30
Brunei Not Free 6 5 5.5 28
Pakistani Kashmir * Not Free 6 5 5.5 28
West Bank * Not Free 7 5 6.0 28
Afghanistan Not Free 5 6 5.5 26
Angola Not Free 6 6 6.0 26
Djibouti Not Free 6 5 5.5 26
Egypt Not Free 6 6 6.0 26
Venezuela Not Free 6 5 5.5 26
Qatar Not Free 6 5 5.5 24
Transnistria * Not Free 6 6 6.0 24
Gabon Not Free 7 5 6.0 23
Oman Not Free 6 5 5.5 23
Rwanda Not Free 6 6 6.0 23
Cameroon Not Free 6 6 6.0 22
Kazakhstan Not Free 7 5 6.0 22
Belarus Not Free 6 6 6.0 21
Congo, Republic of (Brazzaville) Not Free 7 5 6.0 21
Russia Not Free 7 6 6.5 20
Vietnam Not Free 7 5 6.0 20
Burundi Not Free 7 6 6.5 18
Chad Not Free 7 6 6.5 18
Iran Not Free 6 6 6.0 18
Congo, Democratic Republic of (Kinshasa) Not Free 7 6 6.5 17
United Arab Emirates Not Free 7 6 6.5 17
Swaziland Not Free 7 6 6.5 16
China Not Free 7 6 6.5 14
Cuba Not Free 7 6 6.5 14
Yemen Not Free 7 6 6.5 13
Azerbaijan Not Free 7 6 6.5 12
Bahrain Not Free 7 6 6.5 12
Ethiopia Not Free 7 6 6.5 12
Gaza Strip * Not Free 7 6 6.5 12
Laos Not Free 7 6 6.5 12
Tajikistan Not Free 7 6 6.5 11
South Ossetia * Not Free 7 6 6.5 10
Central African Republic Not Free 7 7 7.0 09
Crimea * Not Free 7 6 6.5 09
Libya Not Free 7 6 6.5 09
Sudan Not Free 7 7 7.0 08
Equatorial Guinea Not Free 7 7 7.0 07
Saudi Arabia Not Free 7 7 7.0 07
Somalia Not Free 7 7 7.0 07
Uzbekistan Not Free 7 7 7.0 07
Turkmenistan Not Free 7 7 7.0 04
Western Sahara* Not Free 7 7 7.0 04
Eritrea Not Free 7 7 7.0 03
North Korea Not Free 7 7 7.0 03
South Sudan Not Free 7 7 7.0 02
Tibet* Not Free 7 7 7.0 01
Syria Not Free 7 7 7.0 -1

Democracy Unschool é um ambiente de livre investigação-aprendizagem sobre democracia, composto por vários itinerários. O primeiro itinerário é um programa de introdução à democracia chamado SEM DOUTRINA. Para saber mais clique aqui

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Democracy Index 2017

Critérios, indicadores e metodologias para avaliar a democracia em países