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EDUARD C. LINDEMAN

THE DEMOCRATIC WAY OF LIFE



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"Liberty is indeed doing as one pleases; but all hope for a democratic way of life arises from the fact that through proper training, men may increasingly desire to share their joys with one another."

". . . a forebearing attitude toward the minority on the part of the majority . . . is indispensable for the democratic way."

EDUARD C. LINDEMAN, the late professor, author and leader in American adult education, said:

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The Democratic Way of Life

An American Interpretation

A New Edition of a Famous Book
Completely Revised and Expanded

by T. V. SMITH and
EDUARD C. LINDEMAN

A MENTOR BOOK
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The Democratic Way of Life by T. V. Smith was first published by The University of Chicago Press in 1926. Though this Mentor edition includes part of the original, it is now virtually a new book. T. V. Smith has revised and rewritten much of the original and Eduard C. Lindeman has contributed a substantial new section.

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Book Two by EDUARD C. LINDEMAN

BOOK ONE by T. V. Smith

Introduction

Democracy is more than a form of government. It is also a way of life, variegated and full of growth. Like every manifestation of vitality, democracy is many-dimensional. Its leeways are legion. The floor under it is food and clothing and shelter. Men well cared for of body are not looking for pied-pipers whose music is the minstrelsy of doom. Yet no men live by comforts or conveniences alone. Men are spirits and they are as surely oriented upward as bodies are solidly implemented downward. While we as children of Antaeus tread the earth with our feet, we fill our lungs with the ozone of imagination. What we see when we look aloft is ideality pluralizing itself into patterns for the improvement of all things here below. Nothing that exists is really as good as it might be, and even men who think they are as good as they ought to be, are in reality not as good as they ought to be.

If motivation were all push from beneath, men would be but links in a cosmic chain of plasm in a biological succession. Men are indeed units, but they are also essences, with a mission that is upward. Ideals are glints in darkness which light up the sky; and their luminosity pulls men upward as bodily wants push men along. To be pulled by vision is more pleasant than to be pushed by animal urgencies. It is indeed the pleasant pull of ideals which can transform necessity into opportunity and can make a vocation of what otherwise were but the dour face of doom. Beauty alone redeems duty from the tight-lipped desperation of fanaticism.

Ideals are many in form, even if unitary in direction. None are more precious than the trinity of ideals which has become associated with our democratic way of life. Covering all ideals with one, we speak of Justice. But delineating justice, there are Liberty, Equality, Fraternity; and most crucial of these is Equality. The easiest way, for instance, to prevent destruction of liberty by an undertow of license, is to implement liberty with equality for all. The surest way, again, to keep brotherhood from the loving kindness of liquidation, now practiced in all non-democratic lands, is to insist upon fraternity for men who are equally free. This golden mean of ideals will thus safeguard both the liberty-ideal and the fraternity-ideal. As Justice projects these ideals to

the skies of aspiration, so sportsmanship deflects them toward the solid earth of action. Such, at any rate, is the theme to which you are now introduced as the ideological aspect of the democratic way.

This upward thrust of beauty is magnificent but not enough. There is a return impetus of duty.

Downward the voices of duty call,
Downward to toil and be mixed with the main.

I am fortunate to have here the aid of a peer to transform into something more practical a book which in earlier editions was exclusively theoretical. It is, without doubt, a thrilling story, the narrative of what goes on in the minds of men, the story of ideals as such. And it is no unworthy aim for a man to be a good shepherd of his own thoughts. Thrilling as theory is, it is also a throbbing story when thoughts find residence in the deeds of men. I but gesture you toward practice, but Eduard C. Lindeman, in Book II, will show you how to cultivate, as the cultural gardener he is, the goodly land to which Book I points the way.

Together we have hoped to re-vivify, in the face of growing danger, the vision of life which for centuries has brightened the prospects of Western man. It is something to dignify common life with the noble qualities which in death have made men heroic. That men will die for what they will not live for, we have often enough observed at war. That men will live for what they do not think worth dying for, is an inescapable observation today. But that men may become so unified of energies and so disciplined of character that they will both gladly live and nobly die—this is a faith in the light of which we both have labored and for the sake of which we do here and now offer you this book.

July 4, 1950 T.V.S.

CHAPTER ONE

Democracy as a State of Mind

I once was state senator in the General Assembly of Illinois from a Chicago district half Negro in numbers and much more so in preoccupation. The season was at the depth of the Depression of the 1930's. I was invited to attend a meeting one night devoted to a public discussion of this subject: "The 49th State." There was widespread agitation in Harlem and Chicago for adding to the Union another political unit

for the benefit of the Negroes alone. A magazine was being published to promote the Cause, taking its title from the project itself, *The 49th State*. The editor of the magazine presided at the rally in question, introducing various Negro speakers to explain different aspects of the utopian enterprise.

I was pressed eventually as to my own disposition toward the proposal. Seeking, as is politically characteristic in America, to keep myself on the popular side, I was pushed from strategic obfuscation to ambivalence of attitude, and from that into the admission that I was actually against the scheme, not seeing (as I said apologetically) where the land was to come from for the new State. "Illinois," I said, "will not vote it to you. I think my native state of Texas cannot be counted upon, however oversized it may appear. And I hardly believe that you expect land from Mississippi."

After deprecating such objection as trivial, the presiding officer raised himself above "irrevelancies," as he would have it, and announced that I had missed altogether the point of the meeting. "We have not mentioned land," said he, "and for a very good reason. So long as the prevailing attitude of the majority toward the Negro minority continues, no amount of land would do the minority any good. If a spirit of justice arose, no more land would be needed. The new state has, for a fact, nothing whatsoever to do with land. The 49th state," he concluded with finality, looking at me, "is *a state of mind!*"

I commend now to others the lesson my Negro constituent then taught me.

Democracy itself is, in truth, "a state of mind." It is a state of mind, first, of and toward the majority. It is a state of mind, second, toward and of the minority. It is a state of mind, finally and fundamentally, by and for the individual.

For the sake of proper perspective, let us approach the amplification of this threefold thesis by making clear that every form of government is, likewise, a state of mind. An English woman was once asked the date of an important event in British imperial history. She replied that she did not know the exact year but that it was the time "the prince had the measles." A monarchy is possible when men have minds for it, and the depth of its solidity is, as in England, equal to the attachment men and women feel for its persons and symbolism. What men set their clocks by, so to say, has become important in if not organic to the total life of that people.

The world wondered once how Hitler had become and could remain the leader of the German people. His doctrines were clearly absurd, his techniques unquestionably bizarre, and

his morals literally diabolical. How could such a man become a leader and constitute himself the operative symbol of a powerful state and of a great people? Only let enough people believe the same thing at the same time, and this belief becomes the bedrock fact of their lives. When men's minds become sufficiently polluted, or purified, their polity follows in its train. As the typical citizen thinketh in his heart, so is the State.

Communism is the continuing example of a political power founded in the minds of men. How can the State be systematically treated as an instrument of violence? By having men with violence in their minds possess and operate its machinery. If nothing of justice can arise save through struggle—and the worst kind of struggle at that, *class* struggle —then you have a government founded in enmity and devoted to violence. Such a government will stir enmity up where it finds it not, in order that outer forms (of power) may match the inner festering of morbid minds.

Majority Will as the Democratic Way

The easiest conception of democracy is political: that of a government, namely, in which the majority has its way. This is not only easy but is also sound. It is sound, first, because no society is possible without government and it is sound, second, because since a government cannot be *of* all (though it may be *for* all), it is better for it to be of as many as possible. So complicated, however, is the subject, even when made as easy of meaning as may be, that for a government to be sound, this majority aspect of it must go along with certain other characteristics that invest its logical soundness with human safety. Having planted this position as one to which we may return, let us now proceed to see how majority right is indispensable to the democratic way of life. In doing this we shall also see how much more than politics is involved in the democratic way, though how politics also is indispensable.

It would require a most cavalier attitude indeed not to count a majority as indispensable for democracy; for the very word itself organizes thought around "demos" (the people). But democracy is not merely something *with reference to* the majority of people; it is *the operation of* the majority will, subject to such limitations as we shall adduce. It is necessary to make this point once more clear because the Communists are trying in our generation to monopolize the very terminology of freedom while destroying, and in order to destroy, the fact of freedom. The way they seek a monopoly here in the field of definition, is to claim

that they also are for the majority. They prostitute the ideal involved by making it *for* as distinguished from "by" or even "of." Hiding under the sacred and sound notion of majority rule, they subvert the notion while professing to honor it. Government with them cannot be *of* the majority because to them the majority of men are either corrupt or incompetent or both. By what genesis then—that of Lysenko?—is the ruling elite—the negligible percentage of party members—uncorrupt and competent? That they are indeed corrupted by power appears from the fact that they have strengthened the State and have no present thought of letting it "wither away," which alone by their own theory would justify the original seizure of power.

The democratic way implies the conviction on the part of both the majority and the minority that the majority has the right to rule, but also the acceptance by the majority of the duty to exercise this right, and to exercise it circumspectly.

Governing is a pain as well as a privilege. There are people who want the prestige which comes from a conspicuous place but who do not want its pains. To have the governmental symbol used merely for display, however, degrades it for everybody. Those who accept the right to rule must accept the responsibility which attends the right. Or, to put the matter in general perspective, danger to freedom can flow from weak government as well as from strong government. There are friends of democracy who think the greater danger to reside in weakness. Without taking sides, we must register the view that for democracy to fulfil its mission those who have the prestige must be of a mind to suffer its pains as well as to enjoy its benefits.

As touching the majority, then, democracy is the state of mind which leads it to accept the duty of formulating public policy. Somebody has to do this. Why not the majority? It is perhaps enough at this place to say that the majority has the right to rule simply because there are more people in than out of it. Individuals, as we shall see, are what count; and so more of them count for more than do less of them. So much for the right, at a most elementary level. The state of mind which enables the majority to accept this, and the minority to award it, is the double democratic mentality. What the majority claims, the minority concedes, and that is sufficient. It is a state of mind of, and a state of mind toward, the majority.

But this is not enough, not even in its doubled aspect. If it were enough, there would not be a succession of friends of the democratic way, from John Stuart Mill to Lord Bryce, who fear "the tyranny of the majority" hardly less than the

tyranny of a dictator. In a pinch and as a matter of sheer brute strength, the majority makes a strong bid for first place, even in a mechanized age. Not even tyrants can overlook quantity in bidding for dominance. The dominance of the majority is no mere possibility; it is always a danger. And the danger is enhanced by the gregariousness of us all: it is easy to feel infallible when everybody around is of the same mind. Cattle gather in herds in time of danger, and men lose the curse of insecurity when banded together in great numbers. There is little doubt that Hitler had at times, if not usually, a majority back of him. This was also true of Mussolini and is now of Stalin. A majority can even vote a dictatorship which, in putting down the enemies of the "state," puts the majority itself in a condition of vassalage.

The Minority Right in the Democratic Way

What is required to be added to the state of mind of and toward the majority, then, in order to constitute properly the democratic way? There are two formulations now to be added to our characterization.

The first is a state of mind toward and of the minority. The second is a state of mind toward the minority on the part of the majority. This is indispensable: indispensable that the majority in addition to accepting rule as its right and duty should maintain an attitude of *noblesse oblige* toward the minority, toward any and every law-obeying group less than itself. This will be most manifest with reference to the political minority which represents the open opposition, in parliament or in legislative assembly. In our British background it has developed and is called: "His Majesty's Loyal Opposition."

Every word in the title is significant. "Opposition" it is, both in the sense of working to prevent majority measures from becoming laws, and in seeking to get itself accepted as lawmaker instead of the prevailing majority. "Loyal" it is, because it itself is, as we have said, of the state of mind to accept the majority as constituted until it can supplant it. "His Majesty's" indicates that the minority is of a mind, in opposing the majority and in becoming a majority, to obey the rules of the game, both in its opposing and in its aspiring.

It is because of the minority's state of mind toward the majority, as described, that the majority can have toward the minority the state of mind here indicated. Minority groups that submit to majority rule only out of fear will excite fear in the majority. Those that express hostility, in subterfuge to begin with and in sabotage to end with, invite upon themselves a majority attitude that is as undemocratic as it is

natural. Minorities that arm themselves, as Hitler's early minions did, or enrobe themselves, as the American Ku Klux Klan sometimes does, and seek to supplant the majority by force, disquiet the majority's state of mind, and invite its wrath upon them. A proper attitude on their part toward the majority alone makes possible a continued democratic attitude toward the minority on the part of the majority. So interrelated, however, are all states of mind in a given society that the opposite is equally true: only a proper attitude on the part of the majority makes possible, in the first place, that the opposition furnished by the minority will be "loyal," indicating through its very opposition the democratic spirit.

The proper state of mind of the minority is, however, not only *toward* but *of*. Its attitude is toward itself. It accepts itself as legitimate and as fruitful. Democratic minorities are above all self-respecting. The only way to maintain self-respect in the long run is to be worthy of respect. Democratic minorities see themselves as useful as well as rightful. The exercise of their right is involved in the discharge of their duty. This duty is to clarify alternative courses of public policy so that the people will not become narrow-minded and so shut themselves off from their own good. As long as honest men differ as to what is right to be done, or just to be endured, so long somebody has to make clear other courses and to recommend them persuasively. Moreover, continuous criticism of the proposals and the application of these proposals to practice keeps the majority more alive to its own meanings and more alert to its own prospective pitfalls. This state of mind of the "ruling" minority is as necessary as, and is no less helpful than, that of the "ruling" majority in a democratic society.

By inserting the word "ruling," we can pass properly from the over-simplification thus far indulged to a more extensive survey of the minority enterprise in a democracy. The role of the minority is not confined to the function of "ruling." There are many, many minorities; not merely the political one.

It is necessary to have this multiplicity of groupings in a democratic society, and it is necessary to respect it. To have it is necessary, for there are many and sundry human purposes. Any purpose that is shared, even by two, can become the nucleus for prosperous grouping. Born of liberty, such grouping fructifies liberty. Men discover their capacities in trying them out upon those likeminded enough to be forbearing. Free human groupings are but the ways of seeing the full reach of our talents: how many things we can feel, think, and do. By this token all learn that men can share what they

have, can freely associate for the sharing, and can organize to promote whatever ends the sharing recommends as useful.

Beginning with marriage, the most common form of human association, and ending with the United Nations, we have, in between, literally millions of organizations larger than the family but smaller than the national state. Fidelity is the bond of the smallest organization and sovereignty the bond of the largest. The nature of the bond, like the size of the unit, varies greatly in free societies. From mere friendliness to coercion the gamut of human groupings runs. A certain degree of likemindedness must be prevalent, the state having the thinnest degree and friendship or family having the highest degree of common purpose.

How many there are, who can say?—more than a million in the United States of the business type, formally organized and legally recognized. The number is not important, but the existence of diverse purpose and the right to organize around any and every purpose is of the last consequence in the democratic way. The denial of this right, or the hampering of the privilege, marks the absence, or the decadence of the democratic spirit. In societies where one State, or even one Church, is both jealous of other organizations and possesses power, or even ambition, to implement the jealousy against minority groups—there, to that extent, the democratic state of mind is lacking.

To summarize: a forbearing attitude *toward* the minority on the part of the majority which wields the secular power or commands sacerdotal influence is indispensable for the democratic way. This follows from the fact that the purposes of men vary and that many purpose are not fulfilled apart from organization. It is not too much to say, with Aristotle, that men are both social and political animals; that indeed one of the dominant purposes of life is to associate, even apart from fulfilling other purposes through the association. The right to organize into groups arises from the fact that men's capacities are not fulfilled, or even disclosed, apart from these social necessities. Men have a right to organize, and the recognition and protection of this right on the part of a controlling majority is bed-rock foundation for democracy. The indulgence of this right by the performance of this duty goes not without its rewards. Majorities get their strength from the flexibility of diverse purpose and the implementation of the diversity. A loyal state of mind on the part of each and every minority nursed on forbearance is itself sinewy in strength. In free societies, they also serve who only sit and criticize, provided they do it with the spirit of improvement and with willingness to turn to common account

any power that may come to them. It is a dangerous sign in democracy for the "average citizen" ensconced in his safe minorities to think, as Margaret Mead says he now thinks, "of power as wielded by *THEM*." Minorities must be responsible in order to remain safe.

The Finality of the Individual in the Democratic Way

The majority is made up of individuals. So what we have said of that state of mind, is said of the individual. Minorities are made up of individuals. So what we have said of those states of mind, is said of individuals. Because both sets of sayings are of "states of mind," they involve and concern the individual peculiarly, since he alone of all our entities *has* a mind. A state of mind is dependent upon there being a mind; and the individual, metaphor apart, is alone possessor of a mind. From this fact all things flow, and to its depreciation all adverse things contribute. There is indeed loose talk about group-minds. Before crediting such talk beyond the purposes of poetry we would be well advised to find the individual or individuals who stand to profit personally from the attribution of mind to groups. This caution is a counsel of basic prudence to begin with, and may well be a matter of scientific integrity to end with.

Not only is the individual the only unit with a mind, he is also the only political unit that has a heart. Groups do not feel any more than they think, though they facilitate less thinking and more feeling on the part of members. When we attribute feeling to groups as such, we scale down the fineness of individual feeling to the level of what is well enough described as the mob-spirit, though this but denominates the inferiority of feelings which individuals have in groups. Individuals who can hide behind groups, attributing to the groups rather than to themselves the feelings operative, can thus evade responsibility for the most sadistic impulses known to man.

All that Adolf Hitler did, he did in the name and for the professed sake of "the German people." That he was a sickened soul the world knew and now fully realizes. But it was not enough for him to be sick. His malaise had to be attributed to the collectivity, and in its name the sad malady had to work itself out to nausea world-wide. It was not Hitler, the individual, who purged his "friends"; it was the German People. It was not Hitler who made himself an anti-Jewish devil; it was the German People. It was not Hitler who made a beast of himself in the concentration camps; it was the German People. It was not Hitler who plunged the entire world into war, with its wrecked national economies, its millions

of dead, its ten millions of crippled or impaired, and its debasement of the impulses of men everywhere—not Hitler; this was the German People.

So it goes. So it went with Mussolini also. So it went with Stalin as well. Not until in millions of individual minds, however, is a purpose common, can a leader effect that purpose, though it be his purpose originally and though he planted it in their minds. Not until in millions of breasts, where the heart is supposed to be, is heartlessness, can the horrid infliction of pain proceed in police headquarters and the merciless abuse of human dignity and rights proceed as it does in every government not founded upon both the rights and the duty of the majority, upon both the duty and the rights of minorities.

Neither of these circumspections, however, is possible without a third: *the finality of the individual.* No majority will be of the democratic state of mind with reference to minorities until it sees through the group miasma to the individuals who make up the minorities. No minority will be of the democratic state of mind with reference to the majority, or indeed with reference to other minorities, until it sees through the group miasmas to the individuals who constitute the majority and who make up all minority groups. It is the individual who stands always at the heart of the entire enterprise. He alone can invest anything with a state of mind, because he alone has a mind. He alone can invest anybody with tenderness, wistfulness, pathos; because he alone has a heart.

What any tyrant does to an individual is secondary to, and consequent upon, the deeper wrong he has already done to individuality: he has already ignored the individual as the final source of all value. That is the ultimate ignominy, and the wise man will not wonder at, but merely grieve over, any degradation which follows thereupon. As ignominy reaches its nadir in ignoring the ultimate, so glory achieves its zenith in honoring the ultimate. Positively speaking, there flows from the individual all the good that is possible; for in the individual reside all the values there are. Guard well, therefore, individual integrity, for out of it are all the issues of life.

While we have been ascribing democracy to the state of mind, never obscured has been the fact that the way men feel is of more intimate importance to our democratic enterprise than the way they think. We have over-simplified with a shorthand which must not be turned to longhand. Thinking and feeling can never be wholly separated, and "states of mind" cover both, but with over-emphasis upon the cognitive or logical aspect of human nature. This aspect we must now diminish before returning to our final emphasis, the

emotional element in the states of mind here totalized to constitute the democratic way.

We have said, finally, that democracy is a state of mind by and for the individual. Whatever purports to be done for anybody or anything other than the individual has either not been thought through, or is being used as a blind for purposes not well for individuals. Man is the last link, as well as the origination, of all that is of value. All is reversed when the heart deserts the head. But more of that reversion presently.

Meantime, let us remind ourselves that democracy is a state of mind *of* as well as about the individual. Indeed, the "for" has been and must always be inserted merely to spell out the external relations of the self. The state of mind described as "for" is but a part of the general state of mind here marked as "of." Each individual must respect others as well as himself. But he *must* respect himself. In the individual's attitude toward himself is the key to all. To love one's neighbor as himself bodes only ill unless one loves himself. Men who as a matter of fact hate themselves have no positive point of reference. To be an individual a man must have a self, and to achieve individuality one must respect his self.

One social psychologist has indeed described the point at which the human animal achieves a soul: it is when man calls upon himself and finds somebody at home. There is more than clever metaphor here involved. Each is so intimately related to (some) others that he is well conceived as "company," observing to himself the rules of etiquette. There is at least to every man an "I" and a flock of "me's." When we turn inward, we must meet the "I" or be, like the onion, centerless though scentful. When we look outward, we must respect our "me's" because they are the sum total of the interests that proceed from us and return to us their increments.

Among the "me's" are other individuals. It is with friends and lovers, that is, with parents and children, with citizens and soldiers that we most intimately identify ourselves. If we respect ourselves, there are things we cannot do to others for the plain and simple reason that the doing causes us so much pain as to prove unendurable. There are some instinctive reactions after all that cannot be ignored, at the peril of self-mutilation. Having a self and loving that self are, then, fundamentals in the democratic way of life. The state of mind *of* the individual is a recognition of and a concern for all the values of the self. This naturally involves some other people from birth and may come spiritually to involve all other people, as we shall see in our subsequent discussion of the fraternity-motif of the democratic way.

It is just here that there re-enters for its proper emphasis

the emotional element of mentality. Where the emotional aspects are malevolent, as in Communism, there the democratic way is literally impossible. The whole faith in gradualism flows from the possession of a center that is sound with affection. Those who believe that no progress is possible save through the conflict of classes have, in making hate the center, denied to its very roots the democratic way of life.

Since the democrat knows that both war and peace are made in the minds of men, he proceeds from himself as a respected base to generalize the good he finds within, to reform the bad he discerns without, and through patience and strategy to reduce both within and without, the worst to the worse, the worse to the bad, the bad to the neutral, the neutral to the good, the good to the better, and the better toward whatever best does not invalidate the existing better. Just here is the interest on man's emotional investment. If there be conceivable an end which is better than anything yet actualized, the democrat can proceed cautiously checking every step by reference to the standard of value which his self-respect constitutes. Not many men will deliberately desert their most generous impulses; and of those who do, only the crooked minds will expect to create the good by perpetrating pure evil. The Communists do not deny this treason between means and ends; they say, to justify it, that it is only through such present treason that future good may come to be.

Only men could indulge such logic whose ethics has already gone sour. This brings us to the point previously mentioned: that the emotional element of mentality is somehow more basic to the democratic way of life than is the logical. Men who can think they must torture fellow men in order that justice may come, are seeing through eyes emotionally out of focus. Justice is feeling long before it is thought, and generosity is charity before it is clarity. And what goes for justice goes, in a way more vague, for truth itself. Now truth is supposed to be the most logical of all virtues. It is advertised as something objective, hardly touched and therefore little corrupted by emotional factors. This is thought to be so, and indeed is so, provided that positive emotional factors are all the while presupposed. The presence of these things presupposed is not worthy of remark, for it is the normal thing; it is their absence that makes all the difference.

Emasculating themselves of all fellow-feeling at the very beginning, the Communists do to men the most outrageous things in the name of truth. Behold to what narrowness they have debased truth: there is only one thing credible about economics, that private ownership of the means of produc-

tion is the source of all iniquity. There is only one credible belief about politics, that the dictatorship for the proletariat is the only fruitful form of government; that the truth about religion is atheism and dialectical inevitability; and that the truth about art—and even now about science—is what the Party declares, and that alone.

The democratic way recognizes no such abstract truth raised on the ruins of all concrete virtue. No concrete truth is safe for men save that tested publicly (by science) under the most open criticism. No abstract truth is safe for citizens save that arrived at by agreement freely consented to, on the basis of persuasion and proof alone. Under this double precaution, dogma in a democracy usually dies a-borning, and men learn to keep to themselves, in self-respecting privacy, such beliefs as cannot win their way in the competition of unrestricted communication. Certitude is sacred, but it is not paraded as symbol of, or as substitute for, certainty.

Private conscience and public conscience thus come to terms through the reticence of the saint and the modesty of the politician. The saint, that is, will not under the democratic way claim public relevance for private views that have proved unpersuasive to others. The politician, that is, will content himself under the democratic way with actions agreed upon, and will be untempted to supervise belief. The democratic way becomes in this manner the marvelous social technique which maintains maximum competition in ideas alongside a modicum of cooperation in action. The discovery that men do not have to agree on fundamental beliefs in order to cooperate in necessary techniques is the final state of mind which ties all our previous states of mind together into the seamless whole known as the democratic way of life.

Such philosophy of life we shall now pursue through the trilogy of virtues identified with democracy since the French Revolution. We shall pursue them in this order: Fraternity, Liberty, Equality. And to close this first section of our way of life, we shall synthesize these high virtues of theory in the ideal of Sportsmanship, which is the democratic spirit at work in the world.

CHAPTER TWO

The Fraternity Motif

Perennially there arise in the dreams of men these three goals: liberty, equality, fraternity. And the brightest of these

is fraternity. It would be difficult indeed to do justice in words to the glamor that human imagination has thrown over the notion of brotherhood. From time immemorial it has stood like a divine promise to the deeper longings that men have had about themselves and their destiny. Fraternity is a conception to which humanity's greatest religious prophets have turned in their ecstasy. It is a culmination that our finest poets have envisaged in their moments of keenest insight. A lonely Hebrew seer long ago glimpsed through the din of his contemporary strife the inspiriting spectacle of a united humanity journeying on a way which in his enraptured vision conducted men unto a perfect order. And a social prophet in America has declared, with similar import, that *"Real* defeat will overtake humanity only in so far as men themselves, forgetting that they are comrades in doom and agents of each other's woe or weal, go down the years estranged from the one friend they have—each other."

The persistence amid age-old defeat of the longing for a closer tie of man with man suggests that human life cannot reach its highest level except in a world with fewer barriers to friendliness. This challenging ideal will bear inspection both as to depth and breadth.

On its intensive side, fraternity reduces in its essence to something closely resembling love. But the word itself means a relation between brothers. Fraternity is thus a family ideal, with all the intimacy and feeling involved in that most closed of social unions. It is that merely at the beginning. Historically, man has insisted upon a closed family organization, exclusive and intimate, partly at least by way of compensation for the failure of friendship on a larger scale. If the family must stand alone, then of course must it stand four square.

Plato had noticed the tendency of the family to squander loyalty upon itself. Because his heart was set upon making the fraternal unit as wise as the whole city-state, he felt it necessary to abolish the family as far as possible, since it was proving an enemy of the larger loyalty. If a man cannot lose himself to the heart of the whole herd, then he will insist upon having exclusive right to one or to a few hearts in which he may shuffle off his coil of individual loneliness. For some deep-lying reason, to be considered later, human life is not good if detached. But man, who is completely cowed if he feels that he is really alone, will brave the whole universe when he knows that he is reinforced unequivocally by a few loving hearts. The brave song of the Mermaid Tavern, as represented by Alfred Noyes, is a fitting hymn for

all humanity in challenging even the right of deity to violate friendliness.

> Well, if God saved me alone of the seven,
> Telling me *you* must be damned, or *you,*
> "This," I would say, "this is hell, not heaven!
> Give me the fire and a friend or two!" *

Still the fact that a man will find satisfaction in life with a very few comrades does not necessarily mean that his deeper nature does not crave the indefinite enlargement of friendly contacts. Families have grown into clans, clans expanded to tribes, and tribes have grown into nations. The human touch tends to grow from more to more. The intrinsic good of intimate kindliness, when objectified, furnishes a goal in terms of which to conceive an ideal community where all would not only have friends, but be friends.

The never dying dream of men for a warless world is testimonial to the unlimited extension that the ideal of brotherhood claims for itself. In whatever conditions men must actually live as regards strife and dissension, they cannot demand of their ideal less than the cessation of wholesale hostility. Even communism, with its present stridency, has peace and comradeship as its declared, if far off, goal. The indigenous human longing gets its meaning not so much from the negative emphasis on the abolition of war as from the positive content of friendly association that seems to be implied by perpetual peace. Isaiah became the spokesman of all humanity when he foresaw through the vagueness of the years, men beating their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks.

Men desire, more deeply than success or glory, a social accord which is forbidden them by the specter of war. When long brooding over the end seems to bring to our hand the means thereof, we find ourselves willing to wage world-wide war, once yea twice, and to do it with curious gladness because we let ourselves believe that each struggle will be the last lethal one. The faith that men, in spite of differences, can dwell together in amity incarnates a human hope that no disillusion seems able to dim.

Schisms in spiritual bodies lead to many churches rather than to none. The road from the divorce court leads past the office where marriage licenses are issued. Out of the debris of a universal holocaust there rises as on the wings of magic

morning the dream of a League of Nations, and then of a United Nations, each of which will in turn spell the end of war, even as out of its dead ashes rose the phoenix to a new life perennially renewed. To further this vision, rise disarmament conferences and projected pacts of nations which, even though they too should wither before the bud turn to fruit, would be followed by other plans clothed out of the habiliments of human hopes, and they in turn by others—on to the end of the unending process. Though it is hard for man, the unsocial social animal, to live with men, nothing is more clear than that he cannot live happily without them.

By looking very closely at the stages through which the human being passes on the way from infancy to maturity, the utter centrality of brotherhood among the natural ends of human hopes and endeavors can be reinforced and somewhat clarified. Perhaps the most significant thing about every man is that he was at one time a child, and that, furthermore, in becoming a man he did not so much *out*grow as just *over*grow the child nature. Probing psychology is succeeding slowly in helping us understand more clearly what we have always assumed, that the child is father to the man. The deeper into childhood one probes, the more does friendliness appear both the warp and woof of life. The infant is not really born into the world at all; he is born merely into a family. And there is here a vast difference in the expectations aroused. The harsher physical environment that would bring the helpless infant death in a day is so mediated to him by parental tenderness as to turn what otherwise were an inevitable doom into a heaven of love fairer than the most enchanting phantasy of poets. He awakes to consciousness, his human heritage.

> Fretted by sallies of his mother's kisses,
> With light upon him from his father's eyes.

Even the inhumanities that man shows man are themselves left also, with the harsher sandals of physical fact, at the threshold of the human nursery. As the infant sees no gruff lineament of nature that can possibly be concealed from him, so also he discovers only the smiling, caressing moods of the Janus-faced human world. His food is warmed and sweetened for him, his clothing is softened, and his random movements are constituted a repertoire on a royal stage where every gesture is enthusiastically encored. In his world, fire is hot but never burns, winter is cold but never freezes, want is pinching but seldom pinches. His facts are tamed down with fancy, and his beliefs are toned up to thrilling story.

Born thus into a mediating, comforting group and sustained

by it through helpless years, man would not be the animal he is if, when later confronted by the sterner side of his human world and disillusioned by the gruff demands of his physical environment, he did not turn back in pained surprise upon his early fairy godmother for confirmation of his rosy expectations. It is indeed a surprise greater perhaps than ever comes to an adult when the all-sufficient friendliness that has surrounded the infant begins to fail the growing child, when he first discovers that he cannot have everything he wants; it involves the utter reversal of that order of nature which his small group's solicitude had led him to expect. Typical is the perplexity of the four-year-old who imperiously demanded *why* the cupboard was bare, since Mother Hubbard would be kind to the dog. Human life is indeed started on its course, overwhelmed with the benedictions of what seems a complete fraternity.

This heaven that lies about us in our infancy is of inestimable influence throughout the whole of human life. Whether the first great disillusion leads to rebellion against one's group, or to a developing cynicism, or to an understanding cooperation with one's family in buffeting common hardships, the dream of the blessedness that preceded the awakening does not wholly depart. Dimly remembered and oftentimes utterly unrecognized images from this forgotten Elysium of infancy are projected to form our later social utopias. For its reinstatement we unknowingly strive in our quest for romantic love. In conventional religious devotion we flee reality to reconstruct in a timeless, painless clime what we realized in all its mystic fulness ere shades of the prison house began to close upon us. According to the fruits of friendliness that we have known in early years, the nature of our seeking throughout life is largely determined. We cannot be content without at least vaguely striving to reinstate on a genuinely universal scale what in our initial experience was complete and beatific. Thus does love forever radiate among men its comforting afterglow.

Brotherhood becomes a necessary and natural end of human endeavor not merely because we passed through it and learned to respond to its sweetness in infancy and childhood. To put the matter in terms that imply that we started life with a definite personal equipment and then were deeply influenced by our first experiences would be merely to observe the periphery but to fail to see the very heart of the powerful impetus toward fraternity.

We start life with a body; a soul appears in the stages through which our body grows. Our first experiences lay the cornerstone of our personality and thus largely determine

the kind of full-grown soul we shall have. But our first experiences, as we have seen, are constituted by intimate contacts with a group, and that too with a group that generally displays only kindness. Our very individuality rises thus in the sunlight of brotherhood and breathes the exhilarating air of unreserved friendliness. However much clouds of distrust may later obscure the sun, or gases of discord stagnate our spiritual air, our birthright is sunshine, and pure air is our legacy. Of these we shall dream even when dark night overtakes us, and we shall refuse to be fully contented except in the glad confidence that morning cometh again.

The fact that our helplessness in infancy renders it quite necessary that if we are to survive at all we must be surrounded by ministering hands, makes it equally necessary, as already suggested, that we shall later discover the limitations of love. The deepest irony of life lies precisely here: we survive in infancy and childhood only by getting such treatment as foredooms us to disillusion. The inability of our group later to fulfil the expectations raised in us leads to distrust and even at times to alienation. Only the subtle technique of psychoanalysis can show us how genuinely blessed is the personality that escapes from the family group into the larger social world without deep scars left by well-intentioned love.

This is, however, but a special case of the general form the irony of living takes when it plants in achievement the seeds of contentment, making thus the goal of every stage of growth spell the doom of further growing; or when it makes warfare between all our means and all our ends. While no one wholly escapes the travail of this second birth, men differ greatly in their adaptive and recuperative ability.

Those who suffer least often content themselves with loyalty to the smaller group that has nourished them in comforting love, sublimating in one way or another the call of the wider brotherhood, which is waiting to be built after the pattern of the smaller one. Those who suffer most may become misanthropic and lose faith in the attempt to universalize fraternity, or they may in impotence devote themselves to some ethical provincialism or religious abstraction, and thus defeat their ideal potentiality through the confusion of a symbol with its substance.

Between the wasting of loyalty upon some group smaller than the human whole and the squandering of one's energy upon some symbolic desiccation of the whole, enough human benevolence has been lost in our era to have built Jerusalem in this green and sunny land. One must, out of the best of motives emphasize this leakage; for the shortness of the

distance that we have come in progress toward a world-wide community is discouraging in the light of our love for family and friends on the one side, and our devotion on the other side to the ideal of human brotherhood.

We may perhaps further consider this anomalous situation for a moment without seeming to overstress the point. There can hardly be any doubt but that in family love and daily friendships we have the leaven which needs only proper culture to leaven the whole human lump. Alfred E. Zimmern well expresses this faith in his *Greek Commonwealth:*

> The early Greeks went down to levels that reason had not yet plumbed and embodied the elemental unselfishness—the sense of one human being's natural relation to another—which was the germ of Greek citizenship as of all good citizenship since. . . . There is no true fraternity which does not grow, as it grew in Greece, out of the plain primeval emotions of friendship or family.

Still we have not been able to speed its growth on this larger scale. Nor were the Greeks able to consummate the promise. Their tolerance and friendly treatment of men never reached farther than the Greek race, and that far only intermittently under the excitement of sport or the intimidation of external invasion. The Greek failure, however, does not present the same problem as does our own failure. They did not set themselves the goal. We have. Indeed we have tied up the brotherhood of man with the very center of our religion, with the fatherhood of God.

Could it be that our impotence is rooted in that very fact? In connecting these two great ideals so indissolubly we but symbolize the fact that we have tended to turn over to religion and to religious men the guardianship and future of fraternity, at least in so far as the ideal outruns family affection and personal friendship. Representing all too accurately our general disposition, Adam Smith, speaking for earlier economic theory, intrusted to a mysterious "invisible hand" all interests looking toward cooperation, and then left each individual free to seek his own economic advantage wherever he thought he could find it. This is but of a piece with our making basic the fatherhood of God, and then thinking to deduce from it the brotherhood of man. Sunday can never be sacred enough to compensate for all the days of the week. In commenting upon this oversight we may also indicate more clearly just what democracy can expect of religion.

There can by little doubt, psychologically speaking, that

we are guilty of serious inversion in basing human brotherhood upon the fatherhood of God. Indeed, this was glimpsed long ago by a deeply religious man: "He that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?" Historically and psychologically alike, the fatherhood of God is the derivative, rather than the source, of human brotherhood. The conception of a loving, fatherly deity has arisen out of human fraternizing. God has progressively escaped provincialism only as men's sympathies have enlarged beyond their clan. As the tribe in social organization gave way slowly to the nation, God was also liberalized. Only in so far as human needs and interests and friendships have overrun national boundaries has God himself been seen to escape from the limitations of nationalism.

Just as any effect is enlarged or accelerated by strengthening its cause, the concept of God grows with the growth of human brotherhood. To attempt to make brothers indirectly by appealing to the artificial premise of a common divine fatherhood of those who are not directly lovable does not make them in fact more lovable. It does, however, often result in smearing over the relationship a pious barrage whose effect may well be to obscure from one himself the malevolent interests served under cover of a comforting pietism. "Infidelity," observed a Founding Father of America, "consists in professing to believe what (one) does not believe." Such inversion may make one feel righteous, for instance, in taking up "the white man's burden"—that watchword of imperialism both in politics and in morals which stimulates one's business as much as it does his religiosity. At least, to seek for a stimulus of conduct outside the field where the response is to function, is to take the initial step toward social inefficiency.

There is no royal road to ethical achievement. We must first build our city of man, trusting that the guardian genius necessary to rule it wisely will arise with the building, rather than hypostatize a ruler, enthrone him on the pinnacle of our imagination, and then count upon appeals to an eidolon magically to rear the walls of our fair city. Where two or three are gathered together in friendship, there, something divine-like arises among them; if they add to their number, deity is expanded; and if they can include all men in the charmed circle of their friendliness, they have created a world symbol for citizens of the world.

> Of old men wrought strange gods for mystery,
> Implored miraculous tokens in the skies,
> And lips that most were strange in prophecy
> Were most accounted wise.

And so they built them altars of retreat,
Where life's familiar use was overthrown,
And left the shining world about their feet,
To travel worlds unknown.

We hunger still. But wonder has come down
From alien skies upon the midst of us;
The sparkling hedgerow and the clamorous town
Have grown miraculous.

And man from his far traveling returns
To find yet stranger wisdom than he sought,
Where in the habit of his threshold burns
Unfathomable thought.*

We are now prepared to see more clearly than before the true relation between religion and democracy. Men do not require religion to furnish them with the ideal of fraternity. The intrinsic value of the fraternal experience is laid too deeply in their very nature to necessitate its introduction from without. Brotherhood is not founded upon the fatherhood of God; it is not even founded upon religion at all. It is quite the other way around. Religion is founded upon the experience of brotherhood. As fraternity is its true basis, cultivation and extension of brotherhood is its central function. Even when religion seeks to monopolize salvation, the real function it performs is to re-connect detached men with some source of concrete human cooperation and friendliness.

It may well be that it is always an impoverishing business for religion to institutionalize itself. Certain it is, historically, that the formation of the Christian church—to take an outstanding example—encouraged the provincial attempt to constitute a certain set of values as peculiarly religious ones and thus tended to detach religion more and more from indigenous spirituality, until eventually it was thought not to be concerned with this world at all. If once that false trail could be fully renounced, then it would become clear to all, as now it is to a few religious men, that there are no religious values that are not at the same time also some other sort of values. With this recognition firmly in mind, two functions would remain in a democracy that might be called religious under whatever auspices performed; and both of them have to do with the ideal of fraternity.

The first function would be to see that no human beings remain for long detached from some friendly functional group. To be "lost" physically means to be socially out of

*From *The New Miracle*, copyright 1919 by John Drinkwater. Reprinted by permission of the Author's Estate.

touch. To be "saved" means to "belong": to have duties to perform, to know how to perform them, and to have somebody to care whether they are properly performed. The first religious function in a democracy is illustrated in the care of orphan children, in the rehabilitation of criminals, in the re-establishment of people otherwise so unfortunate as temporarily to be isolated from their most promising small group. The man without a friendly group to sustain him cannot be a good citizen in a democracy; for it is this living experience of intimate brotherhood, needing no further justification than its own felt intrinsic value, from which alone can be derived the vision of good that, when projected on a larger scale, forms the objective for which democracy works.

The second function in a democracy that might be called religious would be the enlarging of men's nature, the making of their souls more roomy, so that loyalty to the small group would not militate against loyalty to the human group as such. Education and training whose end is tolerance and cooperation are religious in nature. And such faith as knows no discouragement is needed for this task. There is no shortcut to a brotherhood which far outruns our kin. Quite to the contrary, here is the knottiest problem that social minded men have; and its solution no one as yet knows infallibly. Sociology has arisen to help in the answer; and the social sciences in general join in the task as they become more aware that they are no less social than scientific.

Not deduction, however, from divine fatherhood, as religion has thought, but induction from an enlarged understanding of human nature—this alone can help us here. Until this humble constructive approach raises brick by brick the splendid temple of fraternity, no persistence in sectarian asseveration, no warmth of piety, will conjure up its walls. Increased knowledge will prove more fruitful than any resort to holy names. Historical religions, professing inspiration and therefore confessing little need for increasing basic knowledge, have tended to remain impotent in dogmatism. But this stupendous task of cultivating brotherliness from the bottom to the top of our social structure is religious in its genius. It constitutes a major function for whatever type of organization can best perform it in a democracy.

If only this whole matter could once be brought home to the deeper consciousness of religious men, organized religion itself might become the real ally of those who actually are working to enlarge the borders of human brotherhood. But there is here no desire, not even willingness, to invest the democratic way of life with any adventitious halo. Dogma has little to contribute toward the initiation of a genuinely

democratic order; this is so primarily because dogma has too often misconceived its task. It has thought its task was to prove something pre-existing, to call men to the worship of an hypostatization, and to help them divest themselves of all carnal incumbrances.

The task, however, that vital religion is all the while actually performing—though slowly because of indirection—is to construct out of friendship's will-to-become-incarnate a constantly enlarging brotherhood, the guardian genius of which would be some dynamic conception of deity. Conceived in any other way religion can become the enemy of the democratic way of life. For the democratic way is the genuinely religious way of life; only, it does not need, and cannot accept with impunity, Trojan-horse sanctions. To make democracy institutionally religious would be to endanger democracy; but to render religion humbly democratic would be to save religion. And so today from widely scattered religious sources is going up the most hopeful cry that organized Christianity has uttered since the Galilean elevated man above the sabbath—the cry that all souls are sacred and that sacredness demands that each soul should count for one and no soul for more than one. This does not demand an entirely new spirit for religion, since it has never wholly lost its instinct for brotherhood; but it does demand a new orientation on earth and an alignment with those who are really its friends rather than with those who merely assert allegiance. Abou Ben Adhem, may thy tribe increase!

> We consider bibles and religions divine—I do not say they are not divine,
> I say they have all grown out of you, and may grow out of you still,
> It is not they who give the life, it is you who give the life,
> Leaves are not more shed from the trees, or trees from the earth, than they are shed out of you.*

If the enthusiasm and initiative that men, in the name of religion, have frequently diverted from concrete human processes could be turned into a task-force against the bases of antipathy and strife and into a positive study of the conditions for creating and maintaining and disseminating the practice of cooperation, the democratic way of life might slowly begin to be realized on earth as religion has heretofore dreamed that it would be fulfilled in heaven. Comradeship might begin to take root *now*. If brotherhood does not grow gradually thus from earthly soil, it can but prove at least an-

* From *A Song for Occupations* by Walt Whitman.

other dear illusion. The deity of dogma cannot do men much good so long as they remain alienated from one another. Men may as well leave their gifts upon the altar to some unknown God—like the honest Athenians of St. Paul's day—until they become reconciled on a universal scale with one another.

When men learn to cooperate in full friendliness, the true God will then be so near them that they need no longer seek him. When men dwell together in amity, they already live and move and have their being in the essence of what our fathers thought, to await the godly beyond the stars. Gilbert Murray has somewhere suggested that the cry of men for a friend behind phenomena is but a misdirected yearning for what only earthly friends can give: and certain it is that religion cannot be a valuable ally of democracy until it has come to terms with what Walt Whitman, the poet of American democracy, has so beautifully called, "The Base of All Metaphysics." His poem of that title is the natural conclusion to this section of our discussion.

> And now, gentlemen,
> A word I give to remain in your memories and minds,
> As base, and finale too, for all metaphysics.
>
> . . . . .
>
> Having studied the new and antique, the Greek and Germanic systems,
> Kant having studied and stated—Fichte and Schelling and Hegel,
> Stated the lore of Plato—and Socrates, greater than Plato,
> And greater than Socrates sought and stated—Christ divine having studied long,
> I see reminiscent today those Greek and Germanic systems,
> See the philosophies all—Christian churches and tenets see,
> Yet underneath Socrates clearly see—and underneath Christ the divine I see,
> The dear love of man for his comrade—the attraction of friend to friend,
> Of the well-married husband and wife—of children and parents,
> Of city for city, and land for land.*

In the foregoing discussion we have seen fraternity as a natural and necessary ethical end for men. Religion has testified to this, in its failures as well as in its success; and democracy aims fundamentally at the progressive attainment of this objective. We have seen that, were there no other

* From *The Base of all Metaphysics* by Walt Whitman.

reason for the persistence of this beacon light, the experiences of infancy and childhood would themselves incline our hearts to brotherhood. During those periods we not only pass through influences that incline us in that direction, but we ourselves are actually created in these processes of social concord. Brotherhood is an ideal of something intrinsic. Therefore, we not only will not, but we cannot escape from universal intimations to friendliness.

When me they fly I am the wings.

There are other cogent reasons for regarding fraternity as a primary human good, more extrinsic, but hardly less compelling, than the ones already discussed. They would indeed be felt by a race that lacked the inner urge of humans to sociality. As over and against the conditions of the good life that we project for ourselves as ideal, there are certain conditions that nature prescribes for any life at all. It is an established fact that an animal like man not only cannot live well without his fellows, but cannot live at all. The utter helplessness of the human infant is the elemental proof of this assertion. What is true of the infant is true in only less measure of the mature man. As Walter Bagehot remarks:

> The rudest sort of cooperative society, the lowest tribe and the feeblest government, is so much stronger than isolated man, that isolated man (if he ever existed in any shape which could be called man), might very easily have ceased to exist. The first principle . . . is that man can only make progress in "cooperative groups."

Indeed, despite the utmost measure of cooperation attained by man historically, in the sweat of his brow has he even until now eaten his bread. Malthus thought that man, voyaging forever between the Scylla of a geometrically increasing population and the Charybdis of an arithmetically increasing food production, must forever be broken upon the shallows of misery. The fear of such an irremediable fate, with basis perhaps real enough in Malthus' time, has been gradually lifting since his day, but lifting because of the growing areas over which fraternity has spread. As far as it goes, there is wisdom in Blackstone's remark that "it is the sense of their weakness and imperfection that keeps mankind together." In a world hardly made for man, it has been only through the priceless gift of an associative heart, furnished in Plato's myth by the pitying gods, that man has survived.

Now what has been true of his journey thus far remains as

a healthy moral for the way ahead. It is not prudent to discard that by which alone we have arrived. This is a lesson very easy to forget with our growing urbanization; for no longer does our daily living seem to depend upon our constant working together. What is difficult to see in the small appears clearer, however, when written large. We have our bread for today and even for tomorrow, come what may. But what of next year? Failure of harvest for a single season over a large area imperils a nation; and two general crop failures in succession would darken every human door with the gaunt shadow of primeval hunger. If such a failure is unlikely, then it is so only because of the advances in scientific agriculture made possible by a growing intellectual cooperation of men friendly disposed toward one another and one another's work. Crops or no crops, a complete tie-up of our transportation system would in three months' time bring our proudest metropolis to its knees.

Oil is no more necessary to a locomotive than is a practical measure of fraternity necessary now, as always, to the continuation of our social life and indeed of any life at all. We can neither enjoy peace nor wage war without allies. The helplessness of men if detached from the strengthening hand of each other, furnishes cogent proof of the centrality of the fraternity motif in our human enterprise.

Such a way of life as that here envisaged remains confessedly in large part an ideal, but it is the major part of the end that moved men to institute democratic government as a means. If men had not seen through the haze of popular legislatures and administrative bureaus the shining ideal of a closer human contact, it is certain that they would not have troubled themselves to set up the democratic machinery.

Now that we have at last succeeded in establishing in favored regions the political means, we must not lose sight of the moral end that inspired us to the effort, the long last effort. No generation can afford to forget that where men's hearts are there is humanity's treasure. There are those who would gladly have us forget that we wanted a universal friendliness as reward for the labor spent in building popular government. It is not that they themselves do not feel the longing for fraternity in some obscure fashion. It is oftentimes they that have suffered the deepest scars in trying to transfer their loyalty from some exclusive to a universal community. Interests that are callously selfish on the periphery are not always so at heart. In a large sense every man wills only his own good, but in ignorance of what his good is he commits himself all too often to ways of living

that progressively shut out what, following attainment, he himself would treasure as his greater good.

We dare not forget the intrinsic meaning of brotherhood; it must be remembered in the interest of those who oppose it as well as in our own interest. This conviction itself breeds tolerance and friendliness. Here, then, is the first objective, ethically as well as historically, of the democratic way of life: fraternity.

Democracy is a state of mind—*about Brotherhood.*

CHAPTER THREE

The Liberty Motif

Though central to the good life as men have conceived it, fraternity cannot come to its full richness without associating with it certain other virtues. First among these others in the history of civilization must be mentioned liberty. One might have a fraternity of slaves, a fraternity of the poverty-stricken, or even a fraternity of fools. But none of these would be the meaningful brotherhood that men have dreamed in the hours of their utopia-building.

The one condition that underlies all ideal brotherhoods is that their members shall themselves be free. Otherwise fraternity would become only a fatuous mausoleum. Men must be free in order to constitute a worthy brotherhood, eventually if not initially. This indispensability of freedom to meaningful fraternity bears repeated emphasis. When the motivation toward fraternalism is hot upon a human being, he will liquidate those whom he professed to love but yesterday. The method of military conquerors testifies to the haste—and waste—by which men seek to set up likemindedness, and end only with the "unanimity of the graveyard." Even in the field of theory, where indeed all is more pliable, we can see the same self-frustrating forces at work. Three examples from gifted prophets of human brotherhood—Plato and Rousseau now, with Karl Marx to come—will serve forcibly to illustrate the way liberty fares when fraternity is the dominant theme.

Plato saw that an idyllic society must be active in order to survive, but he did not see that it must be free. He espoused, therefore, so rigorous a distribution of labor as drowned liberty in a dead calm of economic orderliness. Each

citizen was to work at a task assigned him from above. Nor was any man to have more than one job. Voting and sitting on the jury, for instance, would constitute for workers, he thought, a suicidal distraction from duty. Lest those who drew the fated balls in this industrial lottery should rebel, he insinuated the external sanctions into their very souls by loading their early education with the virtue of temperance, and thus taught conscience to shame aspiration with the cry of sin.

Anticipating the likely objection that in such a society no one would be happy, the Greek declared that not individual, but general happiness was his aim. And nerving his really humane spirit for the stern measures that would surely be necessary to maintain so repressive an order, he excused in his rulers the use of "some gentle violence for the subjects' good"; and then, as it were, offered a prize for a name soft enough to befit the gentility of benevolent coercion. So insistent was he that men cannot be happy and good until they are brothers that he would set up by military force and maintain by educational fraud the glorious goal of fraternity.

If there be those who would lay this paradox to the fact that Plato lived after all in an early age, was aristocratic rather than democratic in motivation, and was doctrinaire rather than pragmatic in temper, let them reflect upon the example of the Frenchman, Rousseau, whose substantial insight became a cornerstone of modern democracy, and whose eloquent voice still reverberates in the structure that we have built.

Finding it largely absent from the colossal inequalities of his society, Rousseau, also enamoured of brotherhood, pursued its shadow from antiquity to antiquity more remote until at last he came, or thought he came, upon the human tribe eating its bread in friendliness and enjoying the salubrious air of "the state of nature." Fortified by his vision, he called upon men to claim their long-lost patrimony. How they had lost it, he could not say; but say he could, and say he would, how to regain fraternity.

His problem, as he conceived it, resolved itself into the possibility of having both fraternity and liberty. Brotherhood he achieved by proving that men can be happier cooperating, can get more for themselves by being fraternal, than is otherwise possible. Uniting thus, as he says, utility and justice, he makes brotherhood plausible. But what becomes of liberty? It is certainly lost for common mortals by Rousseau. Men are free when they obey themselves; but they must recognize their own voice, however unfamiliar

it may sound, in the echo of some metaphysical "general will." In actual practice this hypostatized will of the generality must be represented, if not by a majority, then by something less than a majority. Of course, the upshot of this line of reasoning is, as Rousseau himself admits, that in crucial cases men must "be forced to be free." Thus does modern theory shake hands with ancient tyranny in taking the easy way with dissenters. The path of liberty is strewn with the blood of martyrs when "Big Brother" is the guide.

So it appears that the secular prophets of brotherhood have dealt little less rigorously with liberty than have the sacred ones. The sacerdotal seers, despairing of brotherhood on earth, have all but uniformly laid its preserves in heaven; but there, as an ancient legend went, aspiration for freedom was ignominiously crushed by stern omnipotence. That is, the liberty envisaged by most sacred and secular crusaders is the liberty to agree; and the sinews of their fraternity have been fed by the force available for the repression of dissent. Such liberty is, of course, liberty's liquidation; and fraternity that is not safe for liberty is not safe for men.

John Milton knew the score, the score for freedom. Not from heaven, but out of hell; not from the mouth of deity, nor yet from the soul of saints, but out of the mouth of a sinner, chief of sinners—Beelzebub, in fact—poured these magnificent lines to liberty:

> . . . . . What though the field be lost?
> All is not lost; the unconquerable Will,
> And study of revenge, immortal hate,
> And courage never to submit or yield:
>
> . . . . .
>
> In arms not worse, in foresight much advanc't,
> We may with more successful hope resolve
> To wage by force or guile eternal War
> Irreconcileable, to our grand Foe,
> Who now triumphs, and in th' excess of joy
> Sole reigning holds the Tyranny of Heav'n.

Liberty is a hazardous virtue, close neighbor to license; but its path is the rising curve of courage, of emancipation.

In the light of age-old practice harsher even than the repressive theories of those drunk with gregariousness, it is well that the modern democratic movement elevated liberty to its place in the sun. It is but natural under the circumstances that the ideal should have been interpreted as it was. In pursuing these two lines of emphasis, let us first

note what the ideal meant to the democratic pioneers and then inquire into the nature and sanctions of liberty.

Both in France and in America, where democracy was initiated by violence, the emphasis was upon the negative aspect of freedom, upon independence. Since men had been bound, naturally their first thought was to rid themselves of their bonds. These were not merely oppressive taxation, but also included gross invasion of personal rights, insulting executive neglects, irresponsible hazarding of lives in adventurous war, legislation disdainful of peace and property as well as neglectful of pressing needs. All these there were, to be sure, in measures that would be both astonishing and intolerable to us.

There were also more subtle bonds the extent of which our fathers themselves discerned but vaguely. Where the regulation and restraint by princes left off, there the deeper influence of priests set in. And if any spontaneous tracts of conduct escaped the two, there remained as ally of each, galling custom whose age outran the memories of men. Though for average mortals it was a time in which things were not allowed, doubt could not be wholly stifled. Yet thinking left men uneasy and full of forebodings. Deep tremors from pent-up energy broke the crust of medievalism here and there; but from the rents evil eyes peered out, devils ascended and descended, while divine judgments still rumbled low. Life was a spiritual thraldom; and to support the more external restrictions there stood conscience as a terrifying representative inside the very citadel of the soul.

It is small wonder, therefore, that when the stirrings of self-assertion moved them to protest, the revolutionary fathers in both countries tended to think that the thing most needful was to rid themselves of bonds. Men would be good, it seemed to them, if only they could be left unhampered. Life needed no positive program, except for the moment iconoclasm toward the past. The clutches of its icy hand once broken, would not the future take care of itself? Sweep away the old order, insure against its return by written bills of rights, and, behold, the millennium would already have arrived!

> The loathsome mask . . . fallen, the man remains
> Sceptreless, free, uncircumscribed, but man
> Equal, unclassed, tribeless, and nationless,
> Exempt from awe, worship, degree, the king
> Over himself; just, gentle, wise.*

* From *Prometheus Unbound* by Percy Bysshe Shelley.

We have now lived long enough to experience some of the disillusionment that followed from this negative interpretation of liberty. But no disappointment should blind us to the fact that such negation is indispensable to the ideal of liberty. Liberty must, indeed, mean absence of certain external restraints before it can mean anything better. The very foundation of freedom in every age is effective struggle against tradition and habit and custom. The fear that Count Hermann Keyserling declared drove him on the globe-trotting journey so interestingly described in his *Travel Diary of a Philosopher,* or the flight of Sherwood Anderson from profit and what he thought spiritual perfidy, or the cavalier enunciation of Ayn Rand's hero in *Fountainhead*—these upsurgings make pilgrims of all democrats: the fear of losing the spontaneity that is naturally ours, through habits and customs not genuinely our own. Especially does such a pioneer conception of freedom afford protection, while offering hazards, to every generation of youth. "I say to you in all sadness of conviction," says Justice Holmes, to academic youth, emphasizing the hazards while reaffirming the ideal, "that to think great thoughts you must be heroes as well as idealists."

What habit has made easy and necessary to adults may become genuine restriction to those whose spontaneity is our only hope for discovering better ways of living. The rebellion of youth is, therefore, not only its salvation, but the hope of progress also of those against whom it rebels. If youth and other protestors could not slowly force social change, then nature would do violently what can better be done gradually. "The moral right of rebellion is the life-blood of any community."

The democratic way of life must recognize and inculcate this spirit, as Jefferson long ago affirmed in his doctrine of revolution. Vicarious experience, whether in religion or in politics or in economics or in family life, belongs to an older ideal. The democratic ideal must insist upon fresh experience for every man, and the only way to achieve it is to encourage toward the limitations of every age, the critical attitude taken by our revolutionary forefathers toward the tyranny of their time. This attitude is the minimum demand of the liberty ideal: that "the present," as Justice Holmes generalizes the matter, "has a right to govern itself so far as it can; and," as he adds for emphasis, "it ought always to be remembered that historic continuity with the past is not a duty, it is only a necessity."

This brings us to a discussion of the positive content of

liberty, and to a closer inspection of its sanctions. Life and spontaneity are so nearly synonyms that they may indeed answer for each other. "Life," says Justice Holmes again, this time in artistic mood, "is painting a picture, not doing a sum." From the simplest cell of quivering protoplasm up to the highest activity of life as mind, ceaseless change is the law of the living. To hamper this spontaneous flow is to benumb that whose essence is sensitivity; and to canalize too narrowly the restless goings and comings of vitality is to challenge the very constitution of all living forms. A certain capacity for variation, for growth, in short for freedom, is thus foundational to the whole animate order. At the moral level, if there be any single idea, says the philosopher John Dewey, it is that of "growth."

Over and against this order, social and moral, stands as its first limitation inanimate nature. In the crevices and the oases of the material, the vital mysteriously appeared and has pluckily survived. But it has survived at a price—the price of capitulation. Nature chasteneth her final and fairest child with a call to penance—adaptation to unyielding matter. And yet, starting with fire filched from the jealous gods at forbidden altars, man, imbued with the curious sagacity of all his simpler kin, has now and then outwitted even nature herself. He has caught breath hot from her heaving vitals and hurled it against rolling wheels to carry him fast as the wind. He has harmonized the magnetic clashings of her vast energies and inter-threaded her loves and hates, to make brilliantly illuminated habiliments for nature's colossal frame. He advances now to cool himself in summer with her hidden comfort and to heat himself in winter with the warmth of her own sun. For long he has whispered to his comrades across her ultimate slime, and in these latter days his words, and even now his pictures, have shot unguided through the farthest reaches of earth's illimitable ether. He has split the atom to unleash energy unmeasured by any yardstick save that of fear. And tomorrow he will hurl against cancer and other hidden foes of his cells the swollen plenitude of therapeutic cooperation.

Things that have seemed for many ages such complete barriers to human aspiration as to challenge hardly more than resignation are now, with further knowledge, turning to wings wherewith we fly. And yet we fly only within nature's preserves, subject as yet to final hazards. At our craftiest, our cautious mother does yet set limits to our pride. But modern men find joy in experimenting and even in audaciously challenging nature's most obdurate nays. The creative career that has rendered hopefully uncertain the

ultimate extent of what I have called the first barrier to freedom—natural limitations—has all too clearly revealed the nature and the menace of what we may now call the second barrier—social limitations. Strangely enough, this latter barrier is constituted in no small part, though not wholly, by human fear of human advance.

Here indeed begins what chiefly makes up the problem of freedom for a democratic way of life. Men have adapted themselves easily, and with no little contentment, to natural limitations just because they are natural. Yet how poor a thing have nature's denials often made of human life! Leopardi's fine lines give universal voice to this incidence of fate.

> Noble indeed is he
> Who dares to lift his mortal eyes and gaze
> Full at our common fate,
> And with unfettered tongue,
> Concealing naught of truth,
> Admits the evil given as our lot,
> Our low and frail estate;
> Who ever proves himself,
> In suffering, great and strong,
> Nor sets on man the blame for human grief,
> Adding thereby to all our weight of woe
> A burden heavier still: hatred and wrath
> Of those that should be brothers—
> But gives the blame to her
> Whose is the guilt—to her whom mortals call
> Their "mother" nature, though she is indeed
> Step-mother in her malice.

In moments of social awakening, such as followed the Renaissance and eventuated in the modern democratic movement, common men come to see and feel with poets the pity of exacerbating natural limitations by the added bitterness of man's inhumanity to man. Nerved thus negatively by this pity of seeing human life poorer than it has to be and positively by splendid visions of what life might become if men in human friendliness would make the best of their natural difficulties, they write liberty upon their banner and march against whatever social restraints have aroused their ire.

It is highly interesting and very significant that these two enemies of freedom grow strong together. Indeed they are not so clearly two as the preceding analysis has made them seem. The social milieu is the one, as we have seen in the foregoing chapter, that swathes human life from earliest infancy. So intimate is this mediation of the social

that it easily assumes the guise of the natural. Second nature when well matured is oftentimes as unyielding as nature herself at first hand. Thus have favored men sought to invoke nature's inexorableness at her worst as a sanction for their motivated withdrawal of liberties from less favored men. The borderline between the natural limitation to liberty and the social limitation in all history is a relative one. The former makes so effective a sanction, just because it appears at any given time inexorable, that the latter borrows and capitalizes it. Transgression of old custom everywhere tends to become a violation of the law of nature.

A single example will make this clear as daylight to those who have eyes to see. The voluntary limitation of families by what is now popularly called "birth control" is conceived in certain quarters as a violation of natural law. Moved deeply by inherited inertia, seasoned with fear, and made active by interest only half conscious—such as the need of soldiers for war, or cheap labor for industry, or of merit for grace—men oppose with a desperation supported by blindness what women see with the clarity of pathos. Men oppose mercy in the name of nature, and threaten those more sensitive than themselves with the wrath of God. And so it comes about that many who are dogma-dominated count the high joy of sex a sin and dog with dread the doorway of life. The more men restrict one another's liberties, the less is nature turned to the spiritual needs of men. Indeed when men repress one another nature oppresses them all.

"Not wholly" by human fear, however, we have said, is human peace impeded. There is an evil genius inherent in all human effort, and this we must now remark with natural piety lest the rancor of communism rot the very roots of civilization. Man who is constituted spirit is foredoomed to seek the spirit's high goals through means that are bodily. Because of this, he is fated to a certain order of frustration so far as action is concerned. The best that body knows is ambition; the least that spirit claims is aspiration. From this radical discrepancy springs an internecine strife between the members of our dual nature.

This cosmic blight can be contained, but only through natural piety; and it can be transformed into fruitage, but only through benignancy and patience. "Our human nature is such," says Aldous Huxley in *Ends and Means*, "that if we are to realize the highest ethical ideals, we must do something which automatically makes the realization of those ideals more difficult."

This war between the goals of life and their instrumen-

talities is inexorable but not necessarily lethal to spirit. Aspiration can fulfil itself through ambition, through strategy and patience. To fight against fate is itself the final folly. Fate resisted becomes one's doom; fate accepted may yield a vocation. The Communist foredooms his ends by fighting his means; the democrat furthers his ends by wooing the means. In crossing the cosmic fault, it is the story repeated of the drunken man swearing at the railings which save him. The sane man who must brave the crevice, blesses the bars that shield his passage. He has no time to hate, as the percipient poet declares—

> And life is not so ample
> One could finish enmity.

We have now supplemented our initial reason for holding liberty as a fundamental ideal in our democratic way. We understand that it is the very nature of life to feel its way; protoplasm itself is distinguished by sensitivity and spontaneity. Thus are liberty and fraternity constituted a natural end for life. It begins to be clear to us at this point that since human life cannot be full until a reluctant nature is forced to contribute the means, the keeping of life free from social restraint where possible, or at least free from rancor where restraint is inevitable, becomes an indispensable means to this necessary end. Thus is social liberty extrinsically justified as a human good. Man's effectiveness against nature goes *pari passu* with his relief from constraint, and rancor. It remains now to emphasize what is more important still, i.e., the deep enjoyment of human relations which freedom makes possible.

The burden of our discussion of fraternity was the great utility and the deep joy of human intercourse. That celebration we need not now repeat. It is enough for our present purpose if we but catch its refrain—that men cannot be strong, that they will not be happy, except as they draw their strength and happiness from the fountain of friendliness. But men cannot catch inspiration from the praise, or find correction in the blame, of those who are less free than themselves. So elemental a truth is this that it can become its own proper emphasis.

All aristocratic societies have sought full living in a small group of free men, but have then thought to keep their riches untarnished by the rusty vulgarity of the many. But it is a sort of nemesis that slavery corrupts the master as it degrades the slave. Men can be fully free only as they live among freemen. The adjustment that inexorably goes on

where liberty is graded is always a leveling down of those most free. This is indeed a moral whose every aspect we shall examine when we come to discuss the third of the democratic graces, equality. We insist for the time being only upon the single fact that liberty feeds upon its like: really to be free, men must daily fraternize with freemen.

The extension of liberty from the few to the many that has gone on so steadily in democratic times is thus but a gesture—albeit a dimly conscious one—of self-preservation. Men have learned to guard their freedom by sharing it. As a beneficent, natural response to this socializing process, liberty itself has grown from more to more. Liberty of motion passes over to liberty in property. To these have been added freedom of conscience. They all flower into freedom of thought and of association over the whole field of life. An intelligent modern will fight earnestly for, and be deeply perturbed by the violation of, his right to think as he pleases and to speak as he thinks. It was not always so. Liberty has become so fine a thing only with its growth into a universal right.

At the middle of the twentieth century we have learned the hard, yea the horrible way: that liberty is indivisible. The more tenuous freedom to think is somehow one with the privacy of property. When tyrants over-ride the privacy of property, they are already on their way to riding down the privacy of thought and feeling. When they fanatically brand honest dissent as "deviation," they are already jeopardizing men's tangible possessions. Not only is liberty indivisible as between its own levels; it is also indivisible as between classes and races and regions. When the Nazis attacked the Jews, they were already on their way to attack the Catholics. And when they mistreated Catholics, as time and events revealed, they were without further declaration threatening Protestants. And as the march of events disclosed, when they intimidated free Czechoslovakia in her weakness, they were already threatening America in her strength. Civil rights in America have become a burning public issue, because of these lessons we have learned the hard way. We wish to make their incidence easier at home.

The insight of a holy man of old has been re-written for our domestic instruction in the Nazi concentration centers and in the slave labor camps of Communism: "Inasmuch as ye did it unto the least of these, ye did it unto me." The moral that has become a message, now bids to achieve the dignity of a mission among men. In December, 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed and proclaimed the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights." Following this

historic act the Assembly called upon all member countries to publicize the text of the Declaration and, as its language ran, "to cause it to be disseminated, displayed, read and expounded principally in schools and other educational institutions, without distinction based on political status of countries or territories."

To proclaim thus universally, as the President of the United States had already proclaimed nationally, the indivisibility of freedom, is of course not to establish liberty of Negroes in our South or of other men throughout the world. But it is a first step that looks toward establishment. Men now know, from blood and tears, that tyranny anywhere jeopardizes freedom everywhere. They have in the Assembly of the United Nations declared what they know. As a result freedom is now on the agenda of mankind, as it has long been on the consciences of all sensitive democratic citizens. It is now made a matter of record that if freedom of speech is imperiled, thinking itself cannot remain permanently free; that when thinking is stopped, action grows more restrained until at length man falls victim to natural forces that with free thinking, but only therewith, he had learned to subdue for noble ends. Thought itself, like every manifestation of life, is spontaneous and must be allowed to find its way, limited only by the natural barriers which with every encouragement it still cannot completely control. To tell a man what to think is in every long run the working equivalent of telling him not to think at all.

There will no doubt be many readers of the foregoing discussion of liberty whose chief reaction will be one of perturbation. It will seem to them that the one resultant of all that has been said is that liberty means that one must be allowed to think as he pleases, to speak as he pleases, to act as he pleases—and to do all this *when* he pleases. This, they will say, is anarchy camouflaged with noble words. At least it will appear an impossible ideal—so impossible as to prove self-defeating in any historic context. I am not without understanding of their point of view and not entirely lacking in sympathy for what they say. It has, indeed, been said before. It must, for a fact, have been the first word spoken in the "dim, red dawn of man." The profound and distressing problem that is involved here is one that can be more nearly solved by confidence and frankness than by fear and indirection. So to all such objectors, I reply: "To do as one pleases, this alone is liberty."

Qualifications to the above may now be added; but the qualifications do not, singly or jointly, negate the statement. To define out of fear of what is defined is to corrupt one's

symbolism and to belie one's substance. Shall one, then, give poison to a child who pleases to have it? No; but so long as the child pleases to have it and yet is denied it, so long is he not allowed to be free in this regard. Nor is the case materially different when applied to an adult. To deny alcohol to a man who wants it is to curtail his liberty, however injurious the alcohol. It may not be so pious, but it is surely more ethical, to admit that we violate the liberty ideal when we actually do so.

The justification which we allege for the violation, that is another matter, important in its own right. In terms of the trinity of democratic ideals under discussion, we may say that we restrict liberty only in the name of and for the sake of fraternity. This is an intelligible apologetic and one that historically is highly respectable. "Wherefore, if meat make my brother to offend, I will eat no flesh while the world standeth."

Suppose, however, that "Big Brother" orders you to forego meat in order to break your spirit, and then extends the order to bread? What then? *Then,* Jefferson's brave rejoinder (voiced to Mme. de Stael), "Where wrongs are pressed, because it is believed they will be borne, resistance becomes morality." Idealism in ethics has, on the whole, made fraternity, however, the rightful boundary of liberty. The fact is held to be that society is an organic unity; the imperative, that spiritual unity must be achieved. Individuality arises from the social matrix; self-assertion should not be allowed, even as liberty, to poison the fountain whence it issues. In short, individuality must not be allowed to bankrupt sociality, which is its condition.

In a preceding paragraph we have suggested the fraternity ideal as corrective of the liberty demand. Rather, however, than sacrifice liberty to fraternity, in some all-out mood,—we should on the whole incline to demand that fraternity fulfill itself in liberty, which is its honorific condition. Democracy is, as we have said in Chapter I, a state of mind as touching the individual. This is basic; and if we treat individuality as wholly borrowed from the states of mind about society, we will find ourselves in a circle of determinism rather than on a spiral of aspiration. Social cement tends to harden into tradition that in time defeats the potentialities of sociality, yea of brotherhood itself. Since "all experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed," we must throw the weight of our emphasis upon the side of flexibility. Since men can be brothers on different levels, it is always socially safer to lay

upon them the duty of learning how to be fraternal with the free. To permit a man to disagree with one's opinions and to contradict one's practices and to love him still, enriches fraternity as it also deepens liberty. Explaining his aversion to hold as unconstitutional laws supported by majority opinion, Justice Holmes puts our contention in the historic mode when he says: "Personally I bet the crowd if it knew more wouldn't want what it does—but that is immaterial." It is indeed "immaterial" on the cold solid ground that, as some forgotten stoic has suggested, to save fools from the consequences of their folly is one sure way to fill the world with fools. In mood less strenuous, we may simply say that toleration is the virtuous ensign of growth, which in turn is the fine and fearful privilege of the living.

The limitations made necessary, moreover, by our bold definition of liberty—as the doing what one pleases when one pleases—can be pronounced also in the name of equality. It was in this manner that utilitarian ethics in general has thought to make liberty safe. Each man's liberty extends up to where the other man's liberty begins. My nose marks the limit of your liberty to lay about you. Liberty is intrinsically good, its denial is always bad. Limitation upon liberty can be justified only in the name of the equal right of other men to be free. As between the idealistic and the utilitarian emphasis we incline to the utilitarian.

Indeed, our subsequent treatment of equality will make pivotal this view that as liberty is necessary for a worthy brotherhood, so equality is the only guaranty of liberty for common men. But in addition to a salutary emphasis upon equality as the sanction of liberty, the utilitarians left us also in their debt by making liberty mean something so definite as forever to explode the pious sophism of compelling men to be free. They saw that liberty must be stripped naked if it is to be cleaned of parasites. So they, too, made liberty mean no less than doing as one pleases. The fundamental insight achieved in this is that man's emotional nature is primary. Out of it arises all human values, and from violations of it originate all human woes. If we do not base liberty upon desire, then liberty rests upon a floating foundation that may be transported wherever presumptuous tyranny wills. If another may give the lie to our pleasures and pains, then indeed is the human shrew tamed and thenceforward may thick-skinned Petruchios bloat themselves with meaningless acquiescence, though they flout the decalogue.

Better to bear a thousand outer tyrannies than once to doubt that only one's preferences constitute the warp of his goods. (The woof is constituted by the *persistence* of prefer-

ence.) The integrity of choice itself depends upon the autonomy of preference as between desires. So every man may be more than a hedonist; but hardly any man dare be less. Returning to the conception of liberty that we share with the utilitarians, it does not mean that one is always free when doing as he pleases (for his desires may contradict one another), but it does mean that he is never free when he must go against what he pleases. The utilitarians have served us well in emphasizing the foundational roles of pleasure and pain in the moral life.

We do not, however, follow them without reserve. Liberty must, for a fact, consist in doing as one pleases; but one's pleasure is a very pliable thing, far more flexible than their rigid view of human nature allowed. Because the utilitarians thought, especially Jeremy Bentham thought, that man naturally seeks merely "his own pleasure," liberty was to them a lovely, but a disintegrating, factor. Since the utilitarians insisted that men ought to be free, they had to resort to very harsh measures in order to counteract what they felt to be the divisive trend of liberty. Law with its rigorous penalties darkened the threshold of every individualistic door, and the sulphurous fumes of a hell not too far away opportunely floated in at crucial moments, requiring the supreme unction of "theological sanctions." We can accept all the more gladly their insight since we are prepared to correct their errors. Because we have grown up in a more humane era, we know better than could the early utilitarians that men's inclinations are social as well as selfish. We know, too, that selfish inclinations can by wise nurture be socially inclined, even as they knew by experience that men can be made narrow and self-centered by ill nurture. They blazed the way with their moral empiricism; we may cultivate the land which they have cleared for us.

The agricultural metaphor is not without precision. Our American pioneers thought that they must have spreading acres on which to make a living. To ask them to support their families by cultivation of a few acres would have been curtailing their liberty (as pioneers) to a ridiculous extent. Their conception of liberty, like their conception of tillage, was extensive and provocative. Farm as you please with no neighbors to bother; do as you please and objectors be damned. But by changing the ideal of farming from extensive to intensive and by applying the same good sense to the size of farm families, many not remote descendants of these same wide-spreading, heavy-breeding pioneers are enjoying more liberty on fewer acres of land with two or three

were-cared for children than their forebears realized out of a section of the former and a houseful of the latter.

In discussing the nature of liberty we should emphasize the foregoing suggestion about its nurture. There are not a few serious students of current American life who are alarmed over what they regard as the yearly—and it seems never to let up—encroachment of social control, even of legislative enactment, upon liberty. Some of this solicitude is engendered by economic interests whose complete freedom is not a necessary condition of general welfare. Some of it arises from curtailment of personal appetites whose gratification makes for social inefficiency. As rights are denied that have been found socially injurious, and as opportunities are distributed that have hitherto been monopolized, it is inevitable that the interests involved will cry for liberty when thus summoned to group judgment. Their liberty is no doubt restricted; we take their word for that. So far, so bad.

It is, however, never sufficiently enlightening simply to say that liberty is being curtailed, not until one knows whose liberty and whether it has fattened upon the liberties of others who now deserve a chance. However much exclusive and pernicious interests cry, the courts of democracy must be bold to overrule the claims of liberty when they cut athwart justice, i.e., the equal rights of others. We have seen that the fraternity ideal demands it; we shall see that the equality ideal compels it; and we are now prepared to say that the liberty ideal itself justifies it. For if liberty for some is good, is not liberty for all better?

Prohibition was a case in point, and is a case for the larger point. The national enactment of abstinence from alcohol did no doubt restrict the liberty of many people. If, however, a man did not want liquor, his freedom was not only not infringed by prohibition, but might actually be curtailed by the absence of prohibition. This curtailment was certainly the lot of women and mothers with husbands who drank up their earnings. The majority of the American people believed for a time, rightly or wrongly, that the rights of many—economically and otherwise—were injured by the easy availability of intoxicating liquor; and so they believed that by protecting these even prohibition could show a favorable balance of liberty. Moreover, they thought that more liberty could be found in wants substitutable for the desire to drink; and so they hoped to control the present generation sufficiently, while it was dying off, to train future generations without the desire for alcohol.

Some understanding of such a point of view is perhaps the best way to prepare oneself spiritually for larger issues. It is not improbable that as science uncovers to us new sources of human injury and new methods of exploiting natural resources, we shall each have to content himself with a smaller and smaller sphere of anarchy—as purely personal liberty has been described in America. Liberty does not fall every time a law is passed that one does not like. As one must be resilient as touching interests that conflict, so one may be less than adamant about personal tastes. This is subject, however, to one condition: the temper in which legislation is approached and enforced. Where the tradition is one of lenient leeway, we can afford encroachment without alarm, provided always that room is left for change of mind and time is allowed for accommodation.

It is this larger spirit which the American experiment in prohibition so well illustrates. It was undertaken in good faith, through gradual growth of local option and state outlawry. It failed in full sight of everybody. It was repealed with astonishingly little regret. Its repeal carries an eloquent moral for the final form of freedom for democracy: liberty to change one's mind in the light of evidence—and freedom to get the evidence even through experimentation. It is this larger spirit of change, of growth and of progress, which counts in the end.

Aristotle declared that the chief good philosophy had done him was to enable him to accept willingly what he observed other people to accept but grudgingly. What philosophy can do for some men the pliability of youth makes possible for all. Each generation, while it feels its liberty curtailed in enough respects, does not usually waste tears over what the older generation thought to be its own utter ruin. Men tend to habituate themselves in their nonage to satisfactory living within their preserves. On one side this marks the danger of education. But on the other side it thrills one with the unlimited possibilities of a generation wise enough to train its young for democratic living.

Liberty is indeed doing as one pleases; but all hope for a democratic way of life arises from the fact that through proper training, men may desire increasingly to share their joys with one another in friendly intercourse. This is the meaning of the supreme emphasis that democracies put upon education. It is upon the pliability of human nature that all progress depends, and education is the measure through which men dare to press from democratic government to the democratic way of life. This audacious confidence in the "perfectibility of mankind," as the founding fathers had it, is

conditioned by the nature of education. If it is to regard knowledge as something achieved the transmitting of which is its function, then will the past with its bondage be perpetuated. When light turns to darkness how great is the darkness. Dogma foredooms to defeat.

If, however, educators can come to regard knowledge as an enterprise in which each generation seeks to fit more nearly into its own environment and further to humanize it for the next, then living might become such an experiment as would humanize life itself. The educational situation amid much darkness is not without comforting signs. Adult education has come to banish the notion that education fits one for the future, and the many experiments in liberty education have come to teach the human species while young how to do intensive tillage. Since liberty is doing as one pleases, no one can be permanently free until he learns how to live with his fellows; for above all things else, man pleases to please others. Legal restraints and theological terrors have but symbolized in external grotesquery the sanctions that lie deep within human nature itself. To please themselves most deeply and permanently men must manage somehow to be socially congenial.

Liberty is, therefore, not lessened, but rather increased, by the early development of those desires which are compatible with the desires of others with whom one must live and work. Moreover, since liberty is doing as one pleases, no one can be substantially free who in gratifying one part of his nature outrages another part, or in pleasing himself today humiliates himself tomorrow as he looks back upon the work that he has wrought. "The real sin," as a psychoanalytic poet has declared, "consists in being divided against yourself, in wanting one thing and doing another." Freedom, indeed, demands not only an external brotherhood but it also imperatively demands an inner harmony. On the whole, the two go together. The house divided against itself cannot stand against the world; but the surest way to heal inner discord is to come to terms with one's fellows. A unified personality in a harmonious world—this is a psychological statement of liberty as the democratic objective.

A moral ideal that age finds too difficult, or even too visionary, may have a fair chance with youth. If we could learn how to train our children in such a way that they will not be at outs with their world, so that they will not have constantly to be running away from themselves, or from their families, or from their neighbors, we should have done a thousandfold more for liberty than men have ever done in the past. A man's liberty, in very truth, is not measured by

the abundance of things that he possesses, hoards and guards, but rather by the calmness of spirit and the harmony of soul with which he surveys his own well-cultivated personality patch and the unenvious happiness with which he looks across the equally well-cultivated patches of his neighbors. He who has thus been freed is free indeed.

Democracy is a state of mind—*about Liberty.*

CHAPTER FOUR

The Equality Motif

Nothing is more certain in the realm of human relations than that a substantial measure of equality conditions are what men mean by brotherhood. Equality is, indeed, so close a counterpart of the fraternal ideal that it may almost be said to be a part of it rather than a means to it. If two men have been bosom friends in poverty and one of them becomes wealthy, their friendship is most likely the normal sacrifice exacted by the "God of Things as They Are." If close contact be artificially maintained for a time between those who are grossly unequal economically, a leveling that is both psychological and spiritual goes on. Those who are much and closely together build characters that are in truth joint products. If a slave is raised by association with a superior master, then the master is lowered by association with the inferior slave. The Assyrian conqueror on the bas-relief, as Herbert Spencer was fond of pointing out, is himself tied to the rope by which he leads the prisoners. In a manner that has been regarded as mystic, a new presence seems to arise where two or three are gathered together in any name.

The only way, it would seem, in which fraternity can be maintained along with substantial inequality is by postulating a transempirical equality. This is what humane minds have always done when confronted with the ideal claim of brotherhood on one side, and with the fact of gross inequalities on the other. The Stoic, Seneca, face to face with the vast discrepancy between spiritual aspiration and actual practice, declared:

> He errs who thinks that slavery goes to the heart of man. For the better part of man is unaffected. Bodies are under the power of a master and are counted as his, but the mind is free. It is so untrammelled indeed that it cannot be held down even by those prison walls within which it is shut, but may burst out to great deeds and flee to the infinite as a comrade of the divine.

St. Paul took the same diversionary route to maintain human brotherhood in the face of slavery when he so aptly said: "In Christ there is neither bond nor free." Southern apologists for slavery but yesterday in our own country found a justifying voice that echoed the classic and Christian past when Professor Bledsoe declared that, "the poorest slave on earth possesses the inherent and inalienable right to serve God according to his own conscience; and he possesses it as completely as the proudest monarch on his throne. The master demands no spiritual service of him, he exacts no divine honors."

When equality is thus saved in the face of earthly facts by transporting equality to heaven, let it be noted that fraternity is also laid in other than earthly scenes. If the one is purely ideal, then the other must be ideal. It is only when equality is actual that fraternity abides among men in significant measure. This is a relationship that need not be labored, for in general it is hardly denied. It has been so far emphasized only because some have thought to save spiritual brotherhood by asserting a mystic equality that underlies actual inequality. How indeed can men "be equal before God," who sees things as they are, unless men are as a matter of fact equal? Spiritual brotherhood preserved in any such fashion is insubstantial, like Macbeth's witches or Hamlet's ghost.

When we come to the relation between liberty and equality, however, we find a different story. That there is some relationship between these two members of our democratic trinity has always been observed; but its exact nature has been a matter of long dispute. We shall note the divergent opinions only in so far as such notice will throw light on our present contention: the contention, i. e., that what the equality ideal has stood for is necessary in order to make significant liberty available for the majority of men. Even those who have been most sympathetic with democracy have often felt that the insertion of equality into practice produces an embarrassment. Many professing democrats have in fact declared in every age that liberty and equality cannot dwell together. They never equalize, slyly hazards Edmund Burke, who seek to level.

Thus believing, Burke and others have gone on to argue that equality must therefore go, since to them liberty is the dearest of the democratic graces. The historic explanation of this partiality for liberty has been discussed in the preceding chapter. There is, however, no imperative reason why, circumstances changed, the emphasis may not be shifted, as of course it has been shifted, from liberty to equality.

It is indeed notable that the willingness to surrender equality does not usually imply any desire to undo any of the great equalitarian victories already consummated. Each man to count for one at the ballot and before the law, and nobody to count for more than one at either place—these are everywhere in America, since Alexander Hamilton in the North and John C. Calhoun in the South, regarded as praiseworthy achievements of the democratic impetus. The willingness to surrender equality is indeed more forward than backward looking. Having attained by way of equalization the political and legal means for greater and more concrete opportunities for more and more people, many voices counsel that we should now reap in economic fields the fruits of our earlier political sowing. This is the song of socialism singing itself out everywhere in the world. It is primarily against this tendency that men declaim who fear for liberty. They point out that liberty demands that each is entitled to whatever he can get in a competitive field where no favors are shown. Not only is this principle sound as a principle, they say, but it is an absolutely necessary condition of progressive practice. The fundamental error involved in invading the economic field with an equalitarian program is, according to them, twofold. First, men are economically so different as to be of greatly varying value to the productive process. Second, the only way to marshal the entire economic resource is to let each man profit by his varying gifts. There is no other motive adequate to the high productivity demanded by our modern needs, in a world more and more densely populated. To initiate a program looking toward equalization of either wealth or of income is, they say, to invite disaster.

When it is countered that such a policy as that advocated by the partisans of liberty involves many people in poverty, the apologist for liberty, if he is tough-minded, will reply, that life is no holiday, that men usually deserve about what they get, and that nothing good comes except through sacrifice. If the apologist be somewhat more tender-minded, he will regret the high cost of progress, he will commiserate the victims; he may even insist upon giving alms or bonuses. Beyond this, even if he be tender-minded, what can he do? Born into a social order not largely of his making, he too has but to manage the best he can; and, as for the rest, a stiff upper lip is an indispensable asset.

If one take all this in complete good faith, he may yet concede that our general case regarding the dependence of liberty upon equality is made out. For the unfortunates whose lot is in debate have no substantial liberty, save to suffer their lot. Liberty is good; their lot is not so good. If one

wished to be ironic, he might resurrect the old spiritual palliative and endow the unfortunates with freedom of the will, as inner compensation for outer perpetrations. But all in all we are far enough along to admit that a man who has no other kind of freedom lacks full freedom of the will. The only freedom worth emphasizing is the ability actually to try out one's desires and plans, and the ability to escape unforeseen consequences. The one ability exists only with economic independence, the other only with a liberal education. The only freedom that exists for classes sufficiently submerged is the freedom to resent or to accept their poverty and ignorance, and to get what satisfaction they can from resignation well adapted to protect the more fortunate from malcontency.

If it be replied that the picture is over-drawn; that all is relative; that, in fact, the per capita income has been steadily rising in America, the standard of living even more, and that education that was once impossible is now actual, college education itself passing more and more from the luxury class into widespread democratic availability; if all this be replied, as it is replied, then we may adduce that the reply concedes our general case: that the legitimacy of the liberty demand rests upon the equality ideal, and so that when men demand liberty to the exclusion of operative equality, they mean liberty for the few, dependence for the many. This general admission is required so that the admitted relativity of poverty may be approached remedially rather than fatalistically.

Certain it is, at the historic extreme, that liberty which is compatible with slavery is not liberty, however softly purred by apologists for the *status quo*. To call things by their right names is always salutary. If one will but consider the relation to a competence of the chief non-economic goods that are prized universally, the whole point will appear in its full pathos. Wealth itself is a good no little of the value of which is in the getting. Since it takes capital to make capital, the opportunity of many to this creative aspect of the economic life is diminished. Health, another fundamental good of human life, is possessed precariously by the majority of men, while availability of medical personnel is limited and access thereto is more limited. How are the unpossessed to own objects of beauty or to indulge in their creation or even to enjoy them, without training, in museums or the free galleries of the skies? Friendship, itself the freest of goods, thrives best on leisure, rest, imagination, tolerance, and much else that begins above the poverty-line of life. Variety throughout the whole of experience is another greatly prized human

good. Our poorest industrial or agrarian pay denies travel, vacations, variety of goods, new friends, and the thousand and one other things which economic independence affords to relieve the tedium of life. The whole value-situation is complicated in the case of the industrial poor by the insistent presence of highly monotonous work, and by long hours on the farm. Not merely is the attainment of the separate goods—wealth, health, beauty, friendship, variety—lessened by poverty, but also there is left lacking that which underlies all these, the means to develop personality through the joyous assumption of responsibility in creative processes. Personalities are not handed down, they are grown; and the poor are at a distance from the soil necessary for their nurture.

We put the matter of poverty relatively, as is fit; but the only way it has been kept relative, and may be kept minimal, is by putting on the defensive a doctrine of liberty which would have made, and would yet make, the lot of the poor intolerable.

A touch of irony is added to the deprivation of liberty by the fact that the age-old distinction between material and spiritual goods has actually served largely, whatever may have at various times been the motives of those who capitalized it, to content men with a life that had neither economic nor spiritual plenitude. Spirituality may of course be more than economic activity, but it is certain that it seldom flowers independently of the latter. Any insistence upon a sharp separation of soul and body, or even of body and mind, will do for the poor to challenge. If a man permits his soul to become his exclusive joy, he will be fortunate if he does not some day wake to find that he has neither soul nor joy.

A life externally meager, internally dull—save to the Walter Mittys!—this is the impoverishment suffered by too many of the industrial children of those democratic pioneers who dreamed their way West on hopes of enlarged opportunities instinct with justice. All this ought to make clear what the eventuation is to be, regardless of the motivation back of it, of the tendency to give up equality as a part of the democratic insistence. To yield equality is to renounce fraternity and liberty at the same fell blow. For the prosperous to insist upon this would be a current version of: If they lack bread, let them live on cake.

How far are we to go, nevertheless, in contradiction of the facts as touching equality? Men simply are not equal, and that is the end of all concrete discussion of the matter. Let it be replied that, in the first place, we are not talking about facts alone, but about facts and action. Action implies ideals.

To act at all, as Justice Holmes teaches us, "is to affirm the worth of an end." If men had never mixed with the facts such ideals as gradually reoriented the facts themselves, we should have now but few of the resources that go to make up what the modern man takes for granted. Our present purpose does not, therefore, obligate us to bow in adoration of the facts. But there is no reason on the other side why we should shrink from a consideration of the relation of the facts to the ideal that democracy has insisted upon. What can equality as an ideal mean in the light of the present facts that constitute its setting?

Are we to answer, with Rousseau, that it is because men are unequal by nature that society ought always to aim to make them equal? In a certain sense this represents the democratic spirit. We may admit that we cannot prove that men are equal, but we shall certainly go on to affirm that the case for equality does not depend upon proving that men *are* equal, or even that they *should be made* equal. Even granting the prematurely bold assertion of a modern scientist that "differential psychology utterly blasts the hopes of the older equality theorists," the question remains: How ought we as men to treat other men in order to maximize human goods?

It is true that on the face of it our democratic fathers seemed to be concerned with more than this inquiry. As one critic has said, "In an evil hour for their cause, they took up a position which they thought to be strong because it was so exhaustive, and even by public declaration proclaimed 'equality of men.' " They not only made their declaration universal, but they tied it up with sanctions destined to be discarded. Men were created equal, they said; and now who does not suspect that men were not created at all, but happened and grew? Men are equal by nature, they said; and now "nature" has gone the way of anthropomorphism. But what though gods grow old and die and nature turns inanimate with the passing years? It is to the eternal credit of the democratic pioneers that these myths of the age sat lightly upon their rational shoulders; and yet it compliments their practical sagacity that they used whatever ideational instrument effective action demanded.

Jefferson and Franklin in America and their compatriots in France were deistic in a theistic, yea a calvinistic, age. While others bowed before a king with divine pretensions, they risked their lives for the rights of man. Overstatement can be pardoned when nothing else wins credence; superstitution can be praised when used without deceit to free the superstitious. This is not to proclaim the fathers omniscient or products wholly beyond their time; but it is to do them

the justice of calling attention to what they meant rather than what they said. Their actions made it probable that they meant hardly more by their assertion of universal equality than that the day of the common man had arrived. Kings and nobles and prelates had grown colossal on usurped privileges. Thenceforward other men were to be considered in on the distribution of opportunities and benefits.

If the fathers erred, it was in claiming too little for common men rather than in claiming too much. They were not prepared to travel far the road they had so clearly pointed out. They left the actual work for others, at least some of them harboring the vague hope that other times would produce men as bold to apply, as they had been to declare, equality. We shall certainly establish continuity with them, if we honestly put the question: How ought we to treat one another in order to achieve the good life?

When we try honestly to answer that question, it is clear, as previously indicated, that, quite apart from esoteric questions of metaphysics, we must treat men in some sense as equals. This we may state to ourselves either negatively or positively. Negatively, we may say that men are as a matter of fact unequal. The more obviously unequal they are seen to be, indeed, the more specifically we detail their characteristics. Then our task becomes how to find out what their authentic, rather than their specious, inequalities are. It is as easy as it is unjust to assume inequality on the basis of race, or creed, or color, and then proceed to waste precious human talents. It is not easy but it is fruitful to discover the actual inequalities of men. This discovery enables us to let each man shine where he can and serve where he must. Such award takes the sting of aggression out of any required subordination. On this approach, we must give men equal opportunities in order to discover and to turn to full account their different abilities. There is indeed no way of disclosing inequalities save by giving the breaks to all the children of men, regardless of race, creed or color.

If, however, we elect not to emphasize the differences of men but their similarities, then we come through the positive approach to something like the same emphasis upon equality of consideration, and as far as may be to equality of opportunity. Whose liberty is it, for instance, that we envisage in making liberty the test of the good society? Is liberty to be a doctrine of the right man or of the rights of men? That we must settle for the rights of men is clear, unless we are to welcome the paradox of sacrificing some men in the name of brotherhood. How far in quantitative terms our treatment of

men is continuously to approximate equality of award rather than equality of opportunity, cannot be declared a priori. The way we know, the goal we do not fully know in advance. It is not wise, however, to forget Burke's dictum that those who seek to level never equalize.

Further experimentation alone can tell us precisely what kind of world we want, and further experience motivated by sympathy for common men can alone inform us as to the most effective means thereunto. The profound difference between us and the Communists upon this point we shall presently discuss under the ideal of sportsmanship. Our confession of inability to make completely explicit our general ideals is not weakness, but strength, in the event, if we can but abide the event with patience in magnanimity. It simply means that we must in the democratic process, as in every other enterprise of fallible participants, feel our way—and that in spite of pious asseveration of infallible dogma, neither the generations before us, nor the fanatics around us have pushed the experiment in justice to the pay-off.

Of course, we can say that the equality ideal must mean the further achieving and preserving of the ends already set in politics and law. But that cannot be more than a good beginning. Stated again in general terms, our equalitarian ideal must mean fundamentally that whatever objects or activities are regarded as good must be admitted to be as good when experienced by one person as when experienced by another. This means the belated passing of a certain ethical doctrine of vicarious experience. Certain things are good—and there has been little doubt or disagreement regarding their identity from Plato's day to ours, as may be seen by comparing the platonic list with that of any present-day sociologist—but, according to this aristocratic view, a few persons by experiencing them fully for the many can make on the whole a richer world.

This view has grown pious partly because of the obvious fact that the poor and ignorant are in the nature of the case not always so sensitive to appreciation as are the wealthy and cultured. But the inference from this pietism is almost altogether pernicious. And our equality ideal must mean that our treatment of men is not to be predicated on the capacity for enjoyment or profit which they display at a given time, ignoring their antecedents and opportunities, but, instead, that we must count for a fact the capacity that might be developed through equal opportunity at self-improvement. This means that no practice aiming at greater justice can ignore the fundamental fact that man is a growing animal and that his birthright is fulfilment of his capacities.

Our equalitarian formula must initially mean at least equality of consideration, in order that it may mean something more than this in the end. Only after long sustained treatment of a most humane type—certainly not before—can we pass intelligent judgment upon the more recondite question as to whether men are naturally equal. That is, we must follow Aristotle in preferring to base our judgments concerning men on their highest potentiality, rather than upon any given actuality of attainment, though of course we require to go far beyond Aristotle by applying this dictum to all men rather than to a few. We are not as democrats disturbed by the probable fact that after such indulgence men will still be unequal. What disturbs us is, rather, that without this treating of men as equal, we can never know what their deep and genuine *in*equalities are and so cannot turn them to constructive, rather than aggressive, account.

Moreover, for man to come to his highest and best, he must have more than food and clothing and gregarious indulgence. It is men, not brutes, that we are here considering. The inexpugnable grain of truth in Aristotle's characterization of man as a rational animal is this: man is capable of becoming an end-guided, rather than a mere pressure-propelled animal. Like other animals, he is not only sometimes pushed from behind by impulse or habit; but, in addition he has the capacity of being drawn by visions of the desirable that spring out of his lacks.

Upon the basis of this capacity Immanuel Kant demanded that every human being should be treated as an end, never as a mere means. Now, to treat every man as thus prescribed is to permit him to regulate his conduct by ends that are genuinely his, rather than someone else's handed down to him. This denial of first-hand experience is the most dishonoring form the inequality ideal has taken in the past, and it is largely because of its relation to this that poverty itself must be lessened if democratic ideals are not to be progressively mocked.

In every field of life heretofore, the rule has been for a few men alone to capture the visions of what is to be done and then to direct other men to further their insights. Most of the work of the world has been done without the workers having any adequate notions as to what ultimate purpose their work was to subserve. Not only in manual labor is this true; but social and even religious ideals have been handed down to the majority of men as too sacred for anything except acceptance, adoration, or literal application. The equality ideal must begin by meaning this highly important thing: that every man shall be entitled to understand and progressively

to create the ends for which his energy is expended. If it begins thus, it will not end until it means that every man is entitled to develop the kind of character that can in turn create purposes that outrun the moment and transcend the merely egoistic.

The two greatest enemies of the recognition of this aspect of the equality ideal are war and industrial autocracy. War, whether the acute form of actual strife or the chronic form called militarism or now totalitarianism, makes it practically necessary for most men to become as much alike as possible in order that, like efficient machines, they may be readily massed for any emergency. The routine itself is adequate on the whole to deprive them of the alertness that makes them want to know what it is all about; but apart from this, there must be studied secrecy regarding the aims to be promoted through this or that activity.

Even in the ideological world, in which it is necessary for the sake of morale to let soldiers in on the larger "war aims," every soldier will remember the uncivilian experience of always being busy with projects the use of which was quite unknown to him. The baseless, fabulous rumors that pervade army camps are testimonial to the fact that men cannot wholly abdicate their rational nature to military emergencies. But long apprenticeship to routine could succeed, and in armies does succeed, practically in deadening this one human power that all men have in varying degree. War is, therefore, deeply at strife with the minimum demand of the equality ideal. Its grosser overt offenses against the ideal may be allowed to stand forth as self-evident. This fact of soldiering may indeed be transformed, as by Justice Holmes, into the "faith of the soldier," and celebrated as "obedience to a blindly accepted duty, in a cause which he little understands, in a plan of campaign of which he has no notion, under tactics of which he does not see the use."

Hardly less at variance, however, was the form of industrial organization that early in the industrial revolution gave efficiency to economic production. The ends to be served by the process were left external to most workers. Unideal as industrial conditions are still painted by alarmists, the world has seen improvements of surpassing quality. It is today the most vociferous critics of capitalism, the Communists, who are the worst offenders against the liberty ideal, even in the field of economic production. "Slave labor" is, after all, the labor of slaves. The abc's of their connection are also the xyz's of our perfection. The room that remains

for our improvement may be indicated by a re-statement of the equality ideal: nothing short of the progressive sharing by all men who work in the immediate and remote ends that their energies serve can satisfy the equality demand. Whatever else may be given to or done for men, they are being subjected to indignity if they are left in the dark as to what ideal purposes their lives further. The deadliest essence of undemocracy is the cutting off of human beings from creative participation in the processes they help to promote. Such participation can help to redeem labor from drudgery, as every man of wide experience understands.

No earnest democrat could willingly leave equality with this most general delineation of its bearings. While only dogmatism could be utterly specific regarding the distributions of goods, yet honesty requires something more detailed upon this point.

Few theorists have ever thought for long of giving all persons exactly the same amount of land, income or other property. It is purely for contemplation and certainly too impractical for perpetration. The sheer engineering feat involved would be staggering, especially if the dogmatic socialist included in his aim the keeping of the amounts equal. But capitulation in this regard must not be taken as a rationalized defense of any status quo of distribution. It is highly expedient that if the ideals of democracy are to remain dynamic, as they must, there shall be a steady impetus toward equalization as each generation comes along.

The impetus need never lead to a complete sameness of anything; but it ought not to stop short of at least two general objectives: *no leisure except upon the discharge of productive function;* and *no one to have a superfluity until everyone has enough for healthy life and wholesome growth.*

Let no exception be made as regards the first objective. In a world in which most people have to struggle and many to slave, there is, in justice, no room for mere idlers. Our formula is justified not merely by the fact that toil is intensified to many when many bear no part, but also by the further fact that there is no other way of developing a democratic fellow-feeling save through a live participation in the productive processes of mankind. Otherwise with Carl Sandburg:

> Who can make a poem of the depths of weariness
> bringing meaning to those never in the depths?
> Those who order what they please
> When they choose to have it—

Can they understand the many down under
Who come home to their wives and children at night
And night after night as yet too brave and unbroken
to say, "I ache all over"? *

Since most men must work, there is no other ground so potent for real brotherhood as is economically productive labor. A few outside the process might be brothers to one another, but their fraternity would be so exotic that most men would be forever ineligible. They themselves would be also ineligible for the greater brotherhood; and so the democratic ideal of a cosmopolitan brotherhood is frustrated through preciosity.

As household functions further decline and birth control further increases, the activity of women comes full under this stricture. If yachting and philandering are not forms of masculine productivity, then gossiping and card playing are hardly forms of feminine productivity. The physical and intellectual and moral fiber of "society" women indicates all too familiarly that what deprives society impoverishes the individual also. For the sake of women, therefore, it is well that they be brought gently under our mild formula.

This insistence upon work as the basis of democratic fraternity is not to be interpreted as a resigned acceptance of the lowest level of cooperation in order to have any, but it serves to suggest that we must have such transvaluation of values as to cease to feel that productive work is lowest. That view is a holdover of culture that connected work with slavery and social inferiority. And at that whole *Weltanschauung,* democracy strikes a body blow. In the name, therefore, of equality we must refuse to let any men or women be superior enough to other men or women as to live without participating in some productive work.

We shall not be so inflexible, however, regarding certain exceptions to our other formula, that is, that everyone shall have a wage consistent with growth. Some men's characters have been so warped by early training in the industrial deadening of work that they will prove as recalcitrant to the ideal at the one end of the scale as the idle rich at the other end. Heroic re-education may be necessary for some poor men and for some rich women. To make security universal would probably, in spite of the fact that man is naturally an active animal, be inadequate to guarantee sincere participation in

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the productive process by all the poor. Democracy must not substitute for a small class of rich idlers a much larger class of poor idlers. In our present inequalities we seldom allow men actually to starve. We shall certainly not let them starve in a regimen more democratic than our present society; but we shall use the possibility of quasi-starvation to enlist men in a fair trial of the joy of productive work. Perhaps our equality maxim should go no further than to guarantee unconditionally what Bertrand Russell once called a "vagabond wage," for those who remain recalcitrant to the appeal to productive participation. This small contingency aside, no one who shows a willingness to work and any smouldering desire to grow intellectually, artistically, aesthetically, shall be hopelessly held down by economic lacks when comes the democratic age.

Whether we shall have also under the dictation of the equality ideal to deal concretely with wealth, as we shall with income, remains an open question. This is confessedly a more serious matter than to insist upon a more equal distribution of income. There is perhaps enough sound sense in the talk of those who feel that a strong economic motive is necessary in order to guarantee continued production adequate to our present needs, to give one pause in tampering too stringently, if he could, with the distribution of wealth. But caution need not mean paralysis. Wealth spells power; its absence usually renders income insecure. Were it not for this latter fact, inequality of ownership might even be encouraged in the name of efficiency and variety. If ownership could be taken out of the competitive field, it might well be that rivalry could be enlisted for production rather than for acquisition. The dollar-a-year-men in war time partially illustrate this principle, and the learned professions exemplify it at large.

Assuredly, the noblest objective of modern life is the substitution of a creative impulse for the acquisitive one. Hope of a transition in this direction grows with the belief that even among men of wealth the strongest motive is frequently not *having* but *making* money. It is a wide difference. If this belief be well founded, then the creative impulse is already deeply at work in the acquisitive sector. If its supremacy could be assured, the unequal distribution of wealth could be counted as irrelevant to the processes of democracy. There is certainly no a priori reason for discouraging, indeed there is reason for encouraging, men who get fun out of specializing in economic manipulation. Either through education, through legislation, or through both, the fruits of

wealth must be more widely distributed. Long experience breeds the fear that some measure of social pressure is requisite here to enable democracy to compete positively with Communism for the loyalty of men who must, for a long while, supplement their income with hope.

Use of the term "pressure," however, as an alternative to our steady reliance upon the slower means of education, need not excite undue alarm. Nothing is intended beyond gradualistic means, and that for reasons of sportsmanship, as we shall presently see. There is indeed every hope that we shall be able to make peaceably in America all transition which democratic idealism requires. If anyone will take the trouble to note how far we have gone already through due and peaceful process, this hope will be seen to have a broad historical base, even in this age of revolution. Starting from a philosophy that, as Blackstone observed, made private property more sacred than general welfare (that the law would not "authorize the least violation of [private property;] no, not even for the general good of the whole community"), we have under an ever humanizing interpretation of the Constitution elevated not only life, but the good life above property. Corporations affected with public welfare are now subject to public regulation; and this regulation reaches to hours of labor, to working conditions, and stopping not short of a constitutional floor under wages and a ceiling to profits. Such combinations of monetary interests as endanger public welfare through the destruction of competition are proscribed. And last, though not latest in inception, the money made under conditions prescribed with an eye to general welfare, is taken, in ratios progressively greater as income increases, to run government and to pay for many things which government alone can do under modern conditions.

Supplementing legislative gestures, public opinion has, through a slowly growing friendliness, raised labor unions and like means of collective defense and welfare from a state of earlier outlawry to a station of respectability and of growing, though slowly growing, responsibility for their late-found power. Capitalist autocracy of the early industrial revolution has given way to industrial struggle, and strife is giving way gradually to deliberation, cooperation and adjudication. The lessening of hours of work has in general been accompanied by a rising standard of production per worker, thus indicating that under civilizing conditions, justice can pay its own way. Moreover, the Supreme Court has consolidated all these separate items into a philosophy that looks solid and yet appears resilient as we meet our testing at home, and advance to our

ordeal with Communism throughout the world. We advance with a well integrated set of ideals, rather than with some totalitarian idealism that chokes out the leeway wherein spirit finds its health and home.

Could the revolutionary changes summarized in these few paragraphs have come all at once, the result would have been called stark socialism. Though the transformation has come gradually, it is in aggregate so great that Professor Burgess, nineteenth century dean of American political scientists, once declared in a minor key that the American people through their government may now take what they will from whom they please as fancy dictates. That was said primarily of a graduated income tax.

The democrat who has outgrown the infantile fear of names is likely to look with a quiet eye upon what has happened in America, trusting as before to the continued old reliance upon "free trade in ideas." His calmness will prevent his being too expectant of any millennium yet to come. The remaining journey, if it go through nationalization of wealth, is, as yet, untried through constitutional means; if through public regulation of private ownership and management, it will be long and arduous. The democrat has in his ideals, however, a vision through which he maintains perspective as he renews his courage between the discipline of the past and the discipline of the future.

Moreover, the democratic way of life is faced now with a more fundamental issue than that of private versus public ownership of property. Communism has confronted us with an issue searching deeper by far than that of privacy of property: it is in fact the *property of privacy* itself. In the name of democracy, wryly pronounced, the Communists are denying what we have affirmed, and are affirming what we must deny. Before proceeding in the next chapter to this new issue, let us now interrelate our three democratic ideals.

Fraternity is the great spiritual objective of the democratic way of life; liberty is the indispensable means to a meaningful brotherhood; and equality is but a reminder that if liberty is good for the few, it is also good for all. Thus is fraternity ennobled through liberty, and liberty generalized through equality.

Democracy is a state of mind concerning every individual —a state of mind, therefore, *about Equality*.

CHAPTER FIVE

Democracy As Sportsmanship

Sportsmanship is an ideal that is pervasive enough to synthesize all that we have said about democratic theory and to facilitate the analysis of all that we are to say about democratic practice. It is indeed the very essence of democratic theory and it is that essence projected on the level of practice: of majority practice, of minorities' practices, of individual conduct. It is easier to be a good sport with reference to theoretical differences, but still not easy in matters purely ideological. "It does me no injury," says Thomas Jefferson, "for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods, or no god. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg." But others find harder even such ideological sportsmanship.

Sportsmanlike tolerance of the sheerest ideas indeed requires great discipline, as is demonstrated by the never ceasing war between egalitarians and libertarians, not to mention —Jefferson to the contrary—the ever-present competition of sectarians each of which would define godhead and monopolize brotherhood. One reason for this difficulty, even as to the theoretical, is, as Justice Holmes once said, that "all thought is on the way to action." So the theoretical is invested in advance with some of the urgency of the practical. Theologically, the entertainment of a single heretical idea may endanger "salvation." Aesthetically, moreover, ideas may in themselves be offensive or seductive. Some men find the liberty ideal odious, identifying it upon the slightest pretext with the aesthetically ugly, and the theologically ugly term: "license." Some men find the fraternity ideal spiritually repulsive as implying dominance and aesthetically offensive as reeking of nuzzling in the primeval herd. And many there are, especially today, who would deprecate either liberty or fraternity to avoid the levelling risk involved in equality.

The theological angle is more momentous to us than the aesthetic at the present juncture. It is dangerous not merely because adverse states of mind can, to the eye of faith, be as heretical as overt doings, but because the All-seeing Eye can disclose guilty relations that are not yet open to even the most vigilant thought-police. To dwell for a moment upon this angle will bring us quickly to the lair of the most radical enemy of sportsmanship.

The sad truth is that more often than not, in the history of man, the main justification broached for the possession

of political power has been precisely this: the purification of belief and the correction of intent. "His Christian Majesty," at various times, of Spain, of France, of Germany and of Italy have all shown their "Christianity" by using the majesty inherent in order to purge heretics and thus to forfend the wrath of God from all concerned. The marvelous discovery that men do not have to believe the same thing in order to pool their resources in practice; that, therefore, beliefs can be indulged as lovely luxuries rather than be perpetrated as narrowed necessities—this is the discovery that made democracy profoundly disquieting to religious orthodoxy throughout all its early modern decades. Even the early Greek democracy was disquieting to the custodians of piety in those distant days, as the case of Socrates *vs.* the People of Athens will serve to recall.

There are still lands and religions that are sworn enemies of the democratic way for this very reason. The founders of French Republicanism prompted such a fear reaction by openly espousing atheism. But the American founders, who neither invited nor merited such characterization, were visited with it, and endured it, nevertheless. The account of what Thomas Jefferson suffered throughout life at the hands of the clergy is a story strictly dishonorable to nearly all concerned save Jefferson. For, truth to tell—and this was the head and front of Jefferson's offending—the democratic way of life requires, not with Communism the destruction of religion, but the natural growth of both intelligence and sympathy in all citizens. This in turn implies the continuous reconstruction of religious belief so that religion will celebrate at any given time the most that men know, not the least; and the best that men feel, not the worst. Democracy requires of religion that the God whom citizens worship shall be at least as good as citizens are themselves. It commits us against all forms of

> . . . . . holy war
> With spells and ghouls more dread by far
> Than deadly seas and cities are,
> Or hordes of quarreling kings.*

This dispassionateness seems a modest requirement, but it has been at times profoundly offensive to orthodoxy. Thomas Paine, who was, even more violently than Thomas Jefferson, the victim of pious offensiveness, will illustrate

* From *The Song of Honour* in *POEMS* by Ralph Hodgson, copyright 1917 by The Macmillan Company, and used with their permission.

well the point, and, illustrating it, will disclose the relevance of the whole matter to our present argument. Paine, who for all his concern over an enlightened religion, got dubbed in his day an "infidel" and has remained to our day in dirty minds as "the little atheist," was neither atheistical nor religiously unfaithful (though, like the theologians, he was a man of provocative style and of manners rude in argument). Paine differed little religiously from many other Founding Fathers, save in being more candid and much more articulate. The damage to his reputation arose from his zealously trying to stop the very offense that was charged against him. He saw, or thought he saw, democracy in France skidding into irreligion; and he was concerned with what he saw. So he wrote his most theological tract, *The Age of Reason,* to save the French democracy from atheism, as American democracy had been saved: "lest," as he put it, "in the general wreck of superstition, of false systems of government, and false theology, we lose sight of morality, of humanity, and of the theology that is true." Paine begins his appeal to reason with a sincere and frank avowal of his belief in God, and his hope for immortality. But he had to add, and to add at once, what was his privilege but what was not the most pacific strategy, that he believed in *only* one God. This was added not as a qualification of God but in dispraise of the infallibility of god-monopolizers who had insisted on making a dogma (with persecution in the offing for its denial) of the notion that God was bellicosely three.

Which claim was right about deity, who knows? It remains a moot question, a question so moot that it does not have to be answered merely one way in a democratic society; for diversity of belief need not affect such uniformity of action as is requisite. Paine claimed this moral advantage over his opponents: that he asserted his belief but did not, like them, require that other men should share it. "I do not," as he puts the matter, "mean . . . to condemn those who believe otherwise; they have the same right to their belief as I have to mine."

This brings us again to what was the crux of Paine's offense: he wanted religion to be defined so as to permit, yea so as to encourage, growth. So he said, "My own mind is my own church." There could be much worse religion than that. (Paine's family religion was Quaker.) The safest meaning of religion for democracy is that which identifies religion, on the ideological side, with what men most surely know, not what they most obscurely claim to know; and, on the emotional side, with what men most deeply feel, not what they only feel that they ought to feel. Paine commemorated this

positive emphasis—for which intelligent men have lived to be glad and for which many have been gracious enough to thank him—commemorated it in this immortal saying, near the beginning of *The Age of Reason:* "it is necessary to the happiness of man, that he be mentally faithful to himself. Infidelity does not consist in believing, or in disbelieving; it consists in professing to believe what he does not believe. It is impossible to calculate the moral mischief, if I may so express it, that mental lying has produced in society."

To encourage men to improve their religious ideas as well as other ideas, and to expect men to live up to the best of their feelings so that they may develop even better feelings,—this is of first importance to the democratic way of life. It is precisely because and to the extent that dogma hardens the arteries of growth, mental and moral, that we must take account of it, and make it our concern to put our weight upon the side of flexibility or at least of general tolerance for diverse dogmas. Where we can most clearly see this necessity, and can ourselves most inoffensively as well as most importantly proclaim it, is in those prevailing national religions which make their dogmas of what we may justly call *ir*religion. To these great secular sectarianisms we Americans have our most understanding approach through some of our own fanatical religious organizations. Regardless of previous classification, what calls itself religious but refuses to others rights it claims for itself, represents what as democrats we must be most on guard against, for it represents the denial of *the* democratic virtue of sportsmanship. The poorest sport on earth is the man who, in the name of God or of no-god, denies to others the right of belief, even of dogma, which he arrogates to himself.

Nazism was such a religion as this adverse kind of which we have been speaking. It affirmed dogma and denied sportsmanship. It made a hell (on earth) for heretics. Communism is such a religion; it holds dogmatically to a catechism, teaching it, implementing it and safeguarding it with continuing liquidation of its "infidels." It too makes a hell (on earth) for heretics. The fact that the items in the two dogmas, though different, are at one in that both are antithetical to religion, but illustrates the points we have been making: they show what dogma-in-general becomes when it lacks sportsmanship. It is no worse as secular than when sacerdotal. But hell of "hereafter" is no less hell when perpetrated *here.* Let us now look at the general beliefs, the philosophy of life, if you will, which characterize each of these secular dogmas, so that we may set over against their rotten sportsmanship the good sportsmanship of the democratic way of life. What saves dogma from death, and from death-dealing, will

come straight, along with other matters, in this out-writing of sportsmanship, bad and good. We will discuss first the *Geo-Politics* of the Nazis, then the *Neo-Politics* of the Communists, and finally the *Plain-Politics* of the democratic peoples.

The Negative Sportsmanship of Nazism.

What we Americans know as politics has been most menacingly challenged by the Germans under the symbolism of Geo-Politics. Blood, which has ever been the symbol of life, was made the mark of death by the Nazis, for such as did not participate in what scientific charlatans made out to be their pure race-stream. Land, which has ever been the neutral symbol of support for mankind, was made by them the excuse for onslaught against other peoples. When the paragons of "pure" blood found themselves short of land, it was in the name of these corrupted symbols that the German people cried aloud for "Lebensraum." This cry meant not merely more land. It meant something mystic that included the deserts of blood, vengeance upon despised neighbors, vindication of private intuition, and the high indulgence of mob-gregariousness. It meant, in a single phrase, the substitution of the motif of power for the will-to-perfection. Even *geography,* under geo-political impact, was filled with perverted pride.

Though they be equal in poor sportsmanship, there is one relevant and important difference between the Germans and the Russians, between what we are here calling geo-politics and what we shall call neo-politics. The Nazis, unlike the Communists, wanted to live dangerously, forever. This Nietzschean ideal communism disavows from its longer perspective, though indulges for the shorter yet ever-lengthening perspective. The Nazi ideal is dead, we hope dead for a long time, buried in the shroud which Hitler gave it. But it will pay us to dissect the corpse to inoculate us against the several elements that went into the ideal. Geo-politics was bad not only as a whole but bad also in nearly all its parts. It is to be reprobated both as to its end and its means.

As an end, strife is bad because when one has enough of it, he wants to rest, to rest if for no other reason than to recuperate for further strife. At any rate he cannot be forever at it. As a means, it is bad because it wears men out so that they cannot longer enjoy the fruits of their strident living. Nobody can remain strife-struck all the time. After a decade of self-flagellation, the German people were numb and lethargic. Goebbels, Hitler's whip, complaining about their complacency before "moral" appeals, declared in a radio address,

1944: "It is, therefore, urgently necessary that the obligations of the individual should be laid down clearly and intelligently in statutes and ordinances, and that everyone should know what lies in store for him if he does not fulfill them." The "strenuous life" requires as its intermittent counterpart that men should "take it easy." But in Hitler's Germany there was no season for let-down: the hellions wanted all citizens to be hell-happy all the time.

The hunger for land, natural-sounding to Americans, was with Germans a lust of the spirit which no amount of land could satisfy. So the land required at any given time was merely the land that "jined" the land already snatched from somebody else. Hitler declared a limit again and again, but the limit would not stay fixed. This infinitude of desire, once it is given head without discipline, is such as to constitute the surest defeat known to man: self-defeat. It was this in large part that the sagacious Holmes, high American jurist, meant when he said that "civilization consists of the process of reducing the infinite to the finite." The Germans, under Hitler, ignoring the wisdom deposited by the ages, have nobody but themselves to blame for a second ignominious biting of the dust: they asked for it and they got it. The only relief from the ensuing sadness is that they are being treated by their conquerors, certainly in the West, with better sportsmanship than they treated even one another on their way to conquest.

Deserting the principles of politics which for ages have evolved, nationally and internationally, under sportsman-like rules, the Nazis set out to apply physical principles to cultural matters. The scientists who lent themselves to spreading the poison of geo-politics used an old German phrase to invest it with linguistic dignity: "the transformation of the natural landscape into the cultural landscape." This meant that geography was not Teutonic until the Germans owned the map. Their neighbors' land was theirs if they had the power to take it, the neighbors' rights and needs having really nothing to do with it unless the neighbors were strong enough to say no and to make their nay-saying stick at the point of the sword. The security of others meant nothing to the Germans, if for any reason they wished to disturb the security. The privacy and dignity and even bodily safety of neighbors were all expendable to this buzzard-like sportsmanship. There seemed to be no fellow-feeling at all. All was hard center, stony to the very heart, though there was a professed concern for the we-group, the proffered bloodbond.

We say "professed," with Hitler's case in mind. All that this man perpetrated, of meanness and of infamy, purported

to be done for "das Deutsche Volk," his very own, his infinitely precious people. Now it happens, as all the world knows and knew, that Hitler was not himself a German, in the sense sentimentalized by him: he was an Austrian, whose mission was to take away what liberty the Austrians had, and to use the Germans, already prostituted to his sadism and suborned to his presumption, in order to do that ugly thing and other things more vile. He had adopted the Germans, adopted them with a lust that turned to vengeance. The *idea* of Germanism had somehow got invested with a lurid aureole in his deranged mind; but the people themselves he drove unmercifully to his own vainglorious goals. Ends had become means. Subordination of all men to a few was to be achieved through sadism. Life was always to be like that: blood-drunk and hate-happy.

Aryanism was a sublimation of some corrosive guilt which ate out his own soul and abased all that he professed to love. Men cannot even love others as themselves—when they hate themselves. Hitler hated everybody including himself, because he hated himself to begin with.

But most powerful of all, and worst of all, his dogmas had achieved devotion from an un-self-respecting folk. True, his was a religion of *diabolus*, but no religion can escape that danger which does not rise above the pride of presumption self-obscured in Hitler through the technique of intuition. "By their fruits ye shall know them." Any religion which settles public matters by reference to private sources of insight, without the mediation of public persuasion and criticism and the safeguard of overt consent, is stopped from disavowing diabolism. Presumption is the chief credential of the devil. Hiterlism was an evil religion in every way that a religion can be evil.

The easiest manner in which this condition can occur is reliance upon *intuition* for the settlement of public issues. We must add the qualification about "public issues" because we are all "intuitive" about many things, including public issues. The difference between the wise and the foolish is not that all do not have intuitions, but that the wise ones do not proceed directly from hunches into public action. Things that concern us alone we decide in . . . well, in whatever way we do decide them: we reason them out, letting our private feelings determine the course of "reason"; we make surmises, checking with the way we feel at every stage of the progress; we go on "hunches," hardly looking backward to what reason and experience suggest and barely glancing forward to the consequences that flow from our commitments. We do, to repeat, whatever it is that we do—and that is varied as be-

tween persons and is indeed different at different times in any given person—to reach conclusions as touching commitments that involve ourselves. Privacy is our own personal show after all; and it is we ourselves who must abide by the decisions we have made.

Not so with public affairs, not if we are democrats. Admitting that little is purely private and nothing wholly public, we constantly go, nevertheless, on a distinction that is the oldest among men and certainly the most important. Public questions should be settled publicly. But that implies a sportsmanship that rules no player out and requires a discipline unknown to geo-politicians. Hitler, our present personal example, settled *public* affairs intuitively. That is the root wrong, from which all other wrongs are likely to flow. For that procedure is diabolism, or at least is a procedure stopped from any defence against the charge of diabolism. Certainly it was diabolism in Hitler's case. We have not only his own admission and recurring boast—when he overrode generals, undercut experts, and made a holocaust for "his people"—but also of those closest to him. At the Nürnberg trials, General Guderian summed the situation up: "Hitler," he said, "had a special picture of the world, and every fact had to fit in with that fancied picture. As he believed, so the world must be." That is the *diagnosis* of Hitler's diabolism, of the diabolism of every man who trusts, in whatever name, the resolution of public affairs, military or civil, to purely private discernment. So much for the description of the malady. The post mortem, of General Guderian, follows hard upon, as touching the Battle of the Bulge: "But, in fact, (his intuition) was a picture of another world."

The world of imagination is always a picture of "another" world. The private world adjoins the human ego so neatly, so seamlessly, so inexorably, that intuition is colored by, is even constituted of, the fascination of fear, the iridescence of hope, and the bewitching contradictions of dreams. But we say to ourselves, in our full senses, "How could such a man as Hitler have got by with it? It is one thing to claim that one is god, another thing to have the claim admitted by others, by other men indeed victimized through the admission." Guderian's answer is not adequate in Hitler's case, but perhaps as nearly adequate as our answer in any case, as to why men will suborn themselves to sick souls, yea to charlatans, only upon the presumptuous self-claim of the leader to authority. In Hitler's case Guderian gives this explanation: "He hypnotized his entourage." And this in spite of Guderian's generalized admission as to Hitler's condition. "Even before the assassination," says Guderian, "Hitler had been very nervous,

and not in complete possession of his faculties. . . . His mind was not clear enough to appreciate the real situation of Germany."

Of course Hitler was *never* in complete possession of his faculties. Men disciplined in self-possession do not storm and rage, do not rant and stamp, do not sputter and imprecate. But Hitler claimed to know, *intuitively,* what no man can "know" save politically, and the allowance of the bogus claim generalized and gave effect to the very evil of which we are speaking. It is always so. It is the diabolism in every man which by indulgence creates the giant *diabolus* of the tyrant Devils grow great, of course, on devil-worship.

We have treated Hitler as the single leader whose private intuition corrupted a whole people while preparing all devotees for destruction. Those whom the gods would destroy they first make servile. Wherever intuition is permissible, one man's intuition is as permissible as another's. The corruption of corruptions is the acceptance of another's intuition instead of one's own, which is to say, the acceptance of intuition as a public method of knowledge or adjudication. "A man should learn to detect and watch that gleam of light which flashes across his mind from within," says the canny Emerson, "more than the luster of the firmament of bards and sages. . . . Else, tomorrow a stranger will say with masterly good sense what we have thought and felt all the time, and we shall be forced to take with shame our own opinion from another." Emerson emphasizes the positive side; it is equally true, and fully as fearsome, of the negative. Intuition provides no way of vindicating right judgment or of correcting the wrong.

Hitler was as nearly the single leader as perhaps history affords, certainly since Napoleon (and Napoleon's egocentrism was limited by a sense of fallibility in matters other than military). But the truth is, of course, that no man makes such mighty errors as Hitler without help, without the support of a coterie corrupted through the evolution of servility. Goering had served his apprenticeship even before he met Hitler; Goebbels made marvelous strides in malevolence through a sustained period of personal frustration; Julius Streicher wallowed in a cesspool of bilious race hate; and Alfred Rosenberg became expert in the phantasmagoria of Teutonic imaginings at their most bizarre.

Corporate intuitionism, if the term may be allowed, is indeed worse than individual egocentricity. The roots of the corporate, as the last paragraph suggests, were in Germany; but the worst fruits of it are yet to come. Leaving Hitler, therefore, to represent in the purest form as yet histori-

cally illustrated the individual type of self-ful presumption, we must seek a more self-respecting coterie than was Hitler's entourage to represent what we wish to present as *corporate* diabolism, operating through gregarious intuition. In making such an avowal, we pass from Geo-politics to Neo-politics: from Nazism to Communism.

The Delayed Sportsmanship of Communism.

In both theory and practice Russian Communism would seem to have absolved itself from at least the normal charge of intuitionism, by lifting itself above the individual level, into the enlargement of class-claims. Titularly Stalin, with whose name we associate Soviet designs, was and is primarily but Secretary of the Party; in operation he is but a member of the Politburo. There is, to be sure, a dictatorship in Russia, but it is not in theory, and perhaps not in practice, the intuitive dominance of a single man. It is, rather, "the dictatorship of the proletariat." And this distinction is more than subterfuge, though it is also, as we shall see, a subterfuge. (It is a subterfuge, to begin with, in that it advertises itself to be "*of* the proletariat," whereas at best it is only *for*, and may indeed at the worst prove to be *against*, the proletariat. It is precisely in their presuming to replace "of" by "for" that we see reappear *corporately* the intuitionism we have seen made dogmatic in Hitler *individually*.)

How does the Politburo, with Stalin as its most famed member, *know* that its decisions are right, or even that its decisions express the will of the proletariat? To sharpen the issue, how indeed does it know that its decisions represent the Communist Party? The Party in Russia has in regular membership never reached five per cent of the total population, and is at the present time less numerous than heretofore. The world has only the word of this little corporation that it serves what it presumes to represent. All it has is its own intuition, to settle public affairs not publicly but privately (corporately). It is true, no doubt, that some debate precedes the Politburo's decisions on great issues; but even if fear of liquidation did not suborn debate, the criticism of policies is not open to the proletariat in whose name the decisions are made and for whose sake the decisions are proclaimed.

The simple, transparent truth would seem to be that the Politburo does not *know*. It has no way of knowing. It only dogmatizes. At best it but "thinks," and thinks without having taken the precaution that honest and prudent thought would require. There is, then, presumption in its thinking about Justice, as well as in its claim to knowledge. Presump-

tion in thought is the beginning of injustice in action. For this corporation to presume upon what it cannot prove, but can only perpetuate and make stick by persecution, this is the corporate counterpart of what in Nazism we have seen to be as highly individualized as is likely among men. It is dogma which unites the two types.

In essence the reliance is the same, amounting in both cases to diabolism with the most fearful of all sins at its heart, the sin of presumption. In practice this corporate form is not unlikely worse than is the individual form of presumption. For one thing, it is easier to discover and to disclose individual selfishness for the odious thing it is. We know this from long general experience: the experience, for instance, of the business man who will make respectable practices, pursued for the sake of his family, that would be odious if he did them for himself; of the mother, for instance, who transmutes pettiness, self-indulgence, and jealousy into loyalty to husband or solicitude for children; of politicians, for instance, who do in the name of their constituents what if they did in their own name would lose them self-respect; of priests and preachers, for instance, who perpetuate historic superstition and sanctify fraud for the sake of a church less sensitive than they as individuals, or of a deity less just than they as moral agents.

Not only is naked individualism easier to identify and so to indict, but corporate selfishness is harder to impeach when discerned, because it is the product of, and so it has the defence of, a discipline of the right sort *as far as the discipline reaches*. However inhibited the deliberations may be of a Politburo, they are probably sufficient to guarantee that nobody, not even Stalin, gets all he wants from the decision. He probably has to give in order to get, which is discipline. On the one side, this makes men less open to the correction that comes from a sense of shame; but it also sets them on the path of chastening which in the end destroys intuition as reliance for public policy. It is for this reason, presumably, that great-groupism, culminating in majority rule, always begins in small-groupism. Aristocracy is the normal predecessor of democracy, and the progress from one to the other is through extension to an enlarged group of privileges already belonging to a small group, which can happen only through transcending or correcting intuition as the reliance of public knowing. Jeremy Bentham discovered the hard way that the final method to correct the aristocratic or corporate abuse of intuition was to universalize it: "each to count for one and nobody for more than one." So much said here, to prepare for our subsequent discussion of Plain-

Politics, we now return to a further clarification of Communism as Neo-politics.

Like Nazism, Communism exploits motives of aggression. It need not be, though frequently involves, individual inferiority overcompensating as corporate superiority; but at the least, Communism rests upon the notion that one class is better than another, that its superiority can be demonstrated only through conflict, and that the conflict can be generated and sustained only through hate and its counterpart in mass action—revolution, violence, liquidation. Inflamed at the center with malevolence and yet, like all enlargement, having to progress from the center through extrapolation, Communism is reduced to a series of paradoxes in order to bridge the rationally impossible gulf between its end and its means. We have already made mention of this dualism in discussing Nazism, which is committed to stridency of ends as well as means. Communism is the exact opposite, without any means, short of miracles, to make its better ends come true.

But let us do it full justice in regard to perhaps its one superiority to Nazism. Its ends are good, too good to be true, so good (perfectionistic) in themselves that they are bad in their consequences. The ends are peace, perpetual peace; justice, pure justice; freedom, anarchistic freedom. "Come the Revolution," there will be no conflict there; there will be no classes; there will be unhampered freedom, no government to practice coercion or any policeman to use restraint; the state will have "withered away," and with that romantic riddance, the old order will have passed forever. Behold all things are new!

Such ends are veritably *too good to be true.* To commit men to such romance, to ends, that is, so perfectionistic that there is no way to achieve them, nor any place pure enough from which even to make a start—this is to commit men only to violence as means. Since there is nothing one can do to bring perfection itself nearer, all he can do is to rebel violently against what holds him back from the blessed state of perfection. That is practically *everything,* and everything *altogether.* The family is wrong for that (small loyalties against large loyalties), the church is wrong for that ("opiate of the masses"), the state is wrong for that ("organized violence"), private ownership is wrong for that ("expropriate the expropriators"), industry is wrong for that ("surplus value" in robber hands). Everything is all wrong! It is the *System.* The only means left for improvement, when all the System is altogether wrong, is of course destruction: aggression as

personal motivation, strife as group relation, liquidation as final salvation.

But liquidation grows into habit, suspicion hardens into attitude, and orthodoxy settles into a disease which renders scabby with heresy what yesterday was pure as the "Party line." The loving kindness of brotherly liquidation puts farther and farther away the comradeship that once seemed near enough to be used as the form of daily salutation. Unrestraint breeds unrestraint; prosecution turns slowly into persecution, and what was first, defensively, a phobia becomes, aggressively, a mania—until all ends are drowned in the bloody means that was to have brought them to pass. The means were justified in the first place only by the ends; and so if the ends be lost, then all is lost. The ends, sabotaged by their means, find temporary salvation by indefinite recession into undated futurity. Already the classlessness, on which all hangs, is so far delayed that it is genuinely dateless. Even if it should arrive unannounced, it would have to come out of something other than the means proposed. Class conflict simply does not yield classlessness, nor hate comradeship, *ever*. All things that we know worthwhile come gradually, not from their opposite but from their line operating as leaven in the mixture. Where the processes of gradualism are wholly obverse to the products sought, we must depend upon miracles as our means. Miracles are not named in the Marxist arsenal, and so, caught in the mutual incompatibility of his ends and his means, the Communist is pathetically without any identified recourse save revenge against "the System."

Let us not fail to make transparently clear what is the nature of the ensuing offense against sportsmanship. What is too good for realization and yet will not be acccepted as mere imagination, turns to bad; for it frustrates action and curdles imagination with cupidity. This complete frustration corrupts social relations and corrodes the respect that one must feel for himself. Nobody is good enough to become an agent for perfection, not even oneself.

That brand of Marxism which has led through bolshevism to Leninism and now to Stalinism has been quite as open as it is sensitive to the charge of perfectionism. So intent have all Communists been to show that they are scientific socialists, extra hard-boiled realists, that one who understands the role of compensation in human motivation would have to be suspicious from the beginning. Such suspicion is well founded in this case. Let us look at the matter for a moment historically before finishing it psychologically and biographically.

The doctrine of Marx that the State is in its very nature

violent and unjust, leads not only to the notion that the "expropriators must be expropriated" if mankind is ever to arrive at ethical maturity, but from there conducts us to the most happy aspect of the Marxian dream that when the good day has rolled around, the "State will wither away," i.e., the State which expropriates the expropriators will not live itself to become an expropriator. It will voluntarily, or at least naturally, abolish itself and leave a happy mankind at the portals of justice. The fact that this doctrine of the evanescence of state-power has its own vicissitudes and is now and again repostponed on the calendar of revolution with every shift of the climate of opinion, is insignificant as compared with the steadiness of the vision that really "come the Revolution," all is going to be different, is going to be morally better. A cataclysm must precede any basic improvement in men's lot, but the improvement will follow inevitably and will be indubitably glorious.

The romantic fact of human perfection we may indeed take for granted from the Marxists. This is the most dogmatic of their dogmas. It is necessary that it be so, for men live on hope; and hope will not be forever frustrated. Since all hinges on this hope, we must not miss the designation, even though we have to forego complete knowledge of the date. Come, now, the Revolution, *what* then, comrades; *how*, then, comrades; *why*, then, comrades? Marx has answered the "what"; Stalin has demonstrated the "how"; and we must ourselves supply the "why."

The answer which Marx has given to the "what" is contained in his (by Marxists little quoted) *German Ideology*. It puts simply the question which we have in mind and answers with a forthrightness that is devastating: When the true revolution comes, says he, "society by regulating the common production makes it possible for me to do this today and that tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, to fish in the afternoon, to carry on cattle-breeding [*sic*] in the evening, also to criticize the food—just as I please [*sic semper!*]—without becoming either hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic." One can see at a glance that this is sheer romanticism supervening upon a pattern of pure anarchism. Romantic as anarchism is, we should not perhaps be surprised at the naive ideality that goes with it: nobody's having to have a specialized job but changing work from day to day, and three or four times a day, according to whim—and never having to take responsibility for his choice or his consummation of it! That such romantic irresponsibility might be appealing to tired men is probable, beautiful to children likely, or even seductive to adolescents most plausible. But to mature men and women,

who know both the price and the fruition of the division of labor,—to them one had as well present heaven on a platter, or a circle squared in a box. The trouble is that Marx lacks the circumspection of the other theologians, with whom he competes in both romance and intolerance. They are canny enough to leave heaven to the Hereafter; Marx runs an unnecessary risk by promising it on earth. Mark Twain shows how hard even the heavenly Heaven would go with grown men, when "Captain Stormfield" pays his famous visit thereunto. The picture presented by Marx as to the way it will be, here on earth, yields an amazing contrast between the professed scientist which Marx wished to be and the anarchistic sentimentalist he actually was. And yet it is for the sake of this utterly impossible ending that all the stultifying means are prescribed for every faithful Communist as long as he shall live!

With such a "what" emerging, no wonder that no Marxist can tell just *how* such an undisciplined end can be brought about. "We do not claim," writes the great Lenin, "that Marx or the Marxists know the road . . . in all its completeness. That is nonsense. We know the direction of this road, we know that class forces lead along it, but concretely and practically, it will be learned from the experience of the millions when they take up the task." Again writes Lenin: "The state will be able to wither away completely . . . when people have become accustomed to observe the fundamental principles of social life. . . ." That is to say, heaven will be here when heaven arrives. Clearly enough true, but hardly enlightening as to "how." Since the concrete means are not discernible (but only the knowledge that class conflict is its sign) and since the ends disclosed are impossible of realization by any means we know (and would probably prove unendurable, like so many utopias, if they were possible to effect), is it any wonder that as the time approaches to cash the million-dollar check (all checks are equally good until it comes time to cash them!), the due date is stealthily moved up, the promise becoming more and more glittery as the date gets more and more distant.

And now comes Stalin to allay all doubts upon this business of the state's disappearance within foreseeable time. "Will our state remain in the period of communism?" he pointedly asks of the faithful at the 18th Congress of the Party, in 1939. He asks it in order to prepare them for another (and final) delay. "Yes, it will," he answers, "unless the capitalist encirclement is liquidated and unless the danger of foreign military attack has disappeared." It is a big "unless," a double "unless," indeed a most durable "unless."

We see now the technique of avoiding the date with the cosmic banker. As long as there are any enemies, the state will not wither away. But the Communists make enemies upon demand, so that they can guarantee the continuance of their state-power forever. Moreover, their use of the veto in the UN and other techniques of provocation daily used can, and do, make the second "unless" a continuing contrary-to-fact condition. They can keep the Party forever agitated within by creating "deviations" through the art of definition, and they can keep the world forever preparing defences against them so that they will be justified in never making good the promise that the coming of communism means the cessation of governmental power. We are confronted by a system with idyllic ends done to the death by means kept alive for that very purpose. The Communists, as touching the promises upon which they thrive, are the international analogues of the mythical City Fathers of Podunkville: they resolved to build a new courthouse, but stipulated (1) that it should be built of the material from the old and (2) that the old one should not be torn down until the new one was ready for use. With its odious means made permanent and its idyllic ends delayed perpetually, Communism stands revealed as the wolf of Nazism diguised as the sheep of perfectionism. The Communist is the parricide of Abraham Lincoln's story, who pleaded for mercy on the ground that he was an orphan. We turn now to see that democracy has all the idealism of Communism that can be realized without Nazi brutality.

The Good Sportsmanship of Plain-Politics

As communism slips thus into Nazism, through its own inner contradiction between means and ends, we see how both totalitarian forms of politics—both Geo- and Neo-politics—do to the very death the ideal of sportsmanship. Communism is in this regard all but worse than Nazism, for it raises the hope of sportsmanship-to-come, only to dash it in chronic delay, whereas Nazism never raised any hope above the level of sadism as touching humanity in general.

> No one could blame a snake for crawling,
> Or rotten fruit for dropping apart—
> But who can forgive a star for falling,
> Or a rose for having a worm at her heart? *

* From *Fallen* in *FLOODMARK* by Jamie Sexton Holme, copyright, 1930, by Henry Harrison, and used by permission of Exposition Press, N. Y.

There remains after the nausea of the one and the disillusion of the other, the kind of institutions which arise as slow fruitage of our democractic way of life, in which good sportsmanship is defined, is inculcated, and is perfected by appropriate disciplines. We have had no occasion as yet to analyze this sportsmanlike ideal, but so far only to see that both Nazism and communism clearly outrage all sportsmanship, however it be conceived. Now the democratic way invites us to understand the norms by which it itself is to be judged—and justified. Let us turn then to look full in the face this fair form of progressive ideality.

Sportsmanship, like Caesar's Gaul, is divided into three parts; but, unlike Caesar's treatment of Gaul, democracy is characterized by a double spirit of *noblesse oblige*.

The three parts of sportsmanship, analytically speaking, are: (1) an activity worthwhile for its own sake, (2) an opposition tolerated and even treasured as indispensable to this activity, and (3) a continuous exercise of the will-to-power in striving for victory, but at the same time, an exemplification of the will-to-perfection in acceptance of defeat as both honorable and necessary in human competition. These three elements of the ideal are present in every democratic institution. The final affirmation of sportsmanship is in the field of party politics, just as the final denial of its spirit in totalitarian lands is in disdain of "the game of politics." Totalitarians cannot abide the mediocrity of politics; so they abide the obliquity of something ten thousand times worse.

This hatred of politics and fear of politicians is common to both Nazism and communism. The rejection of the political way we see in the Nazi's substitution of activism for contemplation (the boasted "thinking with the blood" instead of with the brain), and in the preference of violent over peaceful action. The Nazis transformed (1) "an activity worthwhile for its own sake" into something odious through a tonicity so high-tensional that it could not be maintained save through self-flagellation ending in self-annihilation. They made (2) "opposition" into something intolerable and insufferable, and so deprived themselves of any corrective of "intuition" indispensable for their own survival. They made (3) "defeat" so dishonorable that they had to have victory at any price, dooming the whole world through their lack of sportsmanship to be their enemies in peace and to become their betrayers in war. This penalty for poor sportsmanship they suffered alike in their national aspirations and in their individual lives. Even the coterie around Hitler, like the poor sports they were, continuously cut one another's throats

and undercut their *Führer* whenever they thought they could get away with it.

This rejection of politics we have seen in communism's acceptance of a goal—"statelessness"—which though it is the only justification for their brutalitarian means is not an end which can be achieved through the means proffered: their only means is the miraculous, which also they reject. The truth is that what they actually set out to do is to abolish politics altogether. Their pure state of communism is one chiefly characterized by the complete absence of politicians. That is actually what the hypothetical "withering away of the state" means. The romanticism which leads Marx to reject the industrial discipline of training for a job and staying with the job whether it is idyllic or not, this same romanticism leads all Marxists to despise the political discipline of compromise, which requires a patience they do not possess and which implies a sportsmanship which they cannot abide. "Come the Revolution," there might be "administrators," but not a single politician would be left alive—and so of course there would be no politics.

This full eventuation can be further delineated by noting (1) that the "activity worthwhile for its own sake" is in communism made so far off that the activity indulged in meantime in order to effect the distantly delayed is utterly unworthwhile in itself. The Communists admit that conflict, violence, liquidation, "evaporation" are in themselves evil. The activity that is good is an idyllic end, altogether hypothetical end, indefinitely delayed, perpetually postponed. The Communists (2) treat "opposition" as anathema, and know only the unsportsmanship of brutal "liquidation" in dealing with this second indispensable of true sportsmanship. They (3) relegate the "will-to-perfection" to an unattainable future and leave themselves for the present only the evil exercise of the naked will-to-power.

The politics prevailing in contemporary forms of dictatorship is unrelieved by a single element of sportsmanship. The ramified texture of their whole social life is diseased, by infection, because their politics is diseased. So much for the orientation of our three analytic elements of sportsmanship. There are, however, as we have said, not merely three elements but also "the double spirit of *noblesse oblige*" which characterizes this precious ideal.

This "double spirit" is identified by the lexicon in this definition of the word "sportsman": "a good loser," says Webster's dictionary, "and a graceful winner." Around this functional identification of the sportsman, rather than through further analysis of the general idea, let us now present the

role of politics in the pleasant expanse known as the democratic way of life. Because the two-party system of democratic politics does require and treasure an "opposition" which makes defeat for one party inevitable but leaves it honorable, democracy finds in politics, as well as in the variegated life of culture which politics reflects, a continuous "activity worthwhile for its own sake." Politics, we say to our honor, is "the great American game"; its basic value is intrinsic, and it is good fun to practice. The democrat can be "a good loser" because he knows that in a game somebody has to lose—in order that somebody may win. He can be "a graceful winner" because he unconsciously puts himself in the loser's place, where he has been before and where he knows he is likely to be again.

The democrat in contrast to the Nazi or the Communist can be a good sport abroad because he has learned good manners at home: his political practice but reflects his non-political preferences. The institution of "His Majesty's Loyal Opposition," to which we earlier referred, is the key to democratic strength no less than to democratic understanding. The democrat can be, in short, "a good loser and a graceful winner" because he can make life a game intrinsically rewarding, can stomach and can profit from opposition, and can divide the field between the will-to-power and the will-to-perfection, finding an honorable place for both in a division of labor between the private and the public realms of life.

The democrat has learned sportsmanship at home, in the field of privacy; for he has discovered that men do inevitably differ in their thoughts and inexorably differ over interpretation of ideals. "The latent causes of faction," says James Madison, Father of the American Constitution, "are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society." The democrat has learned from kindly democrats and from self-observation that not all good men in any generation have ever agreed on goodness, nor all just men on justice, nor all holy men on holiness. This is a basic fact, which must either be accepted in cooperation with (human) nature or rejected through the (abortive) means of tyrannical infliction. If we seek to eliminate all dissent, we do not succeed save, as Thomas Jefferson said, pyrrhically: "to make one half the world fools, and the other half hypocrites." Why, "so strong," says Madison, "is the propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent con-

flicts." We constantly see this truth exemplified by the Communists defining today something as "deviation" which yesterday was good orthodoxy. We have seen already how the ease of manufacturing dissent—over "the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions"—enables them to justify their perpetual hold on power for the sake of purification through persecution. If, with some natural piety, we accept this fact of differences among men and the resulting fact of inevitable dissent, we may then be able to turn even this fact to magnificent account. Sportsmanship shows itself most elementally in such piety as touching nature and then most fruitfully in the exploitation of the inevitability for the diversified strength of human society. As James Madison further argued (it is all in *Federalist* paper No. 10): since diversity cannot be eliminated without getting at its cause, it cannot be eliminated without excising liberty, because liberty, as Madison shows, *is* its cause. Dissension must be accepted, then, as the effect of a cause itself too precious to dispense with.

Now the Communists find the fact just so, but refuse to accept it. So their first onslaught upon diversity is the destruction of liberty. Ideologically, this is the beginning of their unsportsmanship. In rebellion against the very nature of man, they make ready to hoist themselves with their own petard. Despite their determination not to have it so, they *find* that there are deviations, willy-nilly. They find deviations in economics. Unsportsmanlike, they liquidate those who favor private property. They find deviations in politics. Unsportsmanlike, they liquidate all who believe in any interim government save dictatorship *for*, not *of*, the proletariat. They find deviations in religion. Unsportsmanlike, they liquidate from party membership (and frequently from the privileges of a minimum living) those who believe in God. They find deviations in art, and in literature. Unsportsmanlike, they liquidate all the individualistic as "decadent." At last, they find deviations in science. Unsportsmanlike, they liquidate all geneticists who do not believe in the inheritance of acquired characteristics, *à la* Lysenko. Next to the worst, they create distinctions which *constitute* deviations, in order that they may indulge in liquidation, now grown into such a habit that they do not feel right without daily indulgence. But very worst of all, they try to liquidate all logical sense by reaching to grab sacred terms like democracy, and even the term liberty itself, to cover over the carcass of their craftiness.

The democrat finds the same fact, everywhere deviations. But he accepts the fact; and, through sportsmanship, turns deviations to the account of social strength and personal joy. It is the resiliency of which good sportsmanship is made that

led him in the first place to the profound and great discovery that men can differ in ideals and still unite for necessary action. This discovery of the incommensurability of the life of thought and the life of action enables him now to enlarge the sportsmanship which previously had enabled him to discover the differential ocean of amplitude contained in the realm of thought. Action is narrow, thought is infinite. This blessed discovery emboldens man to contain all ideological differences, enables him to enjoy the leeway of excess ideas, and encourages him to build within, as source and counterpart of outer freedom, a self full of magnanimity and replete with happiness.

From a thousand springs of different cultural groupings, the democrat draws ideas for self- and social improvement, lets them compete with one another in the market place of free thought and open communication, and becomes beneficiary to ideals and institutions fit enough to survive the ordeal of unhampered competition. The multi-sources of democratic progress are thus consummated in the liberty enjoyed by all groups.

This leeway, however, is not more fecund than that which is allowed in free societies between individual privacy and the public life of any and every group. It is this, in turn, which constitutes the greatest glory of sportsmanship: the discovery that the final meaning of life is in the surplusage of ideals over action. To make this discovery leaves a man a sportsman to himself. It means that a man does not have to express every ideal in action, that indeed he cannot express any ideal *fully* in group action. The possession and the enjoyment of ideals has a residue of integrity all its own constituting the spiritual heritage of every man. The fact that ideals move on as they get fulfilled, so that they are always one jump ahead of realization—this is one way, the simplest way, of presenting this precious surplusage of ideality. But that simple presentation is not sufficient.

The truth seems to be that ideals arise and flourish only in privacy, and have their fullest meaning in contemplation rather than in action. This is a hard saying for the young and for the impetuous who are not young. The judgment is a critique upon what passes for "professional" liberalism: the judgment that trigger-happiness is not happiness, and that liberalism is something to *be* before it is anything to *do*. While ideals do unquestionably motivate action, they never seem to get more than partial expression in action, not even in personal action, and only fragmentary expression in collective action. Social action must either be consented to by all or it gets inflicted by some upon others. If inflicted, it is

not ideal to those who suffer it, and its ideality is also impaired for those who must inflict it, unless they have rendered themselves insensitive by previous sadism. If consented to, it is so by everybody's making certain concessions in order to get consensus.

"Men descend to meet," as Emerson epigrammatically described the cost of consensus. If men rebel against such compromise (the inevitable and minimum "cost of consensus"), they then proceed to barbarize themselves through the exercise of coercion upon the others concerned. Either way, there is a recession from full ideality as the cost of collective action. You cannot have it both ways: it is either consensus with its tolerable cost, or coercion with civil condemnation. This inexorable recession is of course greatest with unlikeminded groups (as in politics), amounting to "compromise" which everybody deprecates but accepts as a necessary evil. It is less, naturally, in likeminded groups, and, fortunately, still less in small affection-founded groups. But it is always present, as a reminder of human finitude.

There are no two minds with but a single thought, no two hearts that really beat as one. Sharing points to unanimity as a lovely limit, a limit never reached. Sharing suffers such frustration in politics as to tax the endurance of the most high-minded. Democracy is not easy. It is the hardest way of all, because it is the most disciplined. Democracy is, however, the most precious, because it protects privacy in which perfection thrives. It matures men to such a point that they can actually live with themselves, without being driven to perpetrate even their most sacred ideals upon others.

If a man thus disciplined into democracy wants common action, he knows the concession with which he must buy consent—and has stamina enough to pay the price. That is sportsmanship. If he wants full-bodied ideality, he knows how to get it: luxuriate in the full bloom of his very own conception of the ideal: whether the ideal be of God, Goodness, Truth, Beauty, or Justice. He will find more purity of ideal through introspection than he will ever achieve by submitting its demands to the searing heat of public concern. It is sportsmanship which guarantees this privileged privacy *to* him and exacts *from* him by way of return toleration of the private "absolutes" which other men intuit. Such double sportsmanship we have enshrined in our present ideal and have historically embodied in our democratic institutions. Men who insist upon purity of ideals, have their privacy; and have it well protected behind the wall of our Bill of Rights.

"The right to be let alone"—exclaimed Justice Louis Brandeis—"is the most comprehensive of rights and the right

most valued by civilized men." Men who insist upon action, have the right (it too is well protected in the Bill of Rights) to outline their program—from a new church to another corporation!—to persuade others to join them in purpose, to get legislation enacted that will compel others to certain things, if a majority can be won to their side. The truth is, of course, that with few exceptions all men want both privacy and public participation. It is the over-sportsmanship of our democratic way of life which provides both for all, and arranges a sliding scale from the pure privacy of individual pride or shame too intimate to articulate, down to political compromise so crass that nobody escapes without concessions damaging to his ideals.

Democratic sportsmanship even provides definitions for the distinction between the private and the public realms. Politics becomes the adjudication through public compromise of whatever is in serious dispute. If you are not willing to become party to compromise, then do not get into serious dispute. If things are too sacred to allow you to meet others half way, conceding something of your own as price for their consenting, then keep private your own view of the sacred. Religion, for instance, is not to be compromised; but the price of that privilege is not to get into public dispute about religious matters. The very change of status from conviction to proselytism, converts religious matters from what is democratically tolerable to what is intolerable. Religion in public controversy is already politics: it is then as political as is any disputed economic matter. Men cannot both have their cake and eat it, not even in religion. Either tolerate in the name of God, or find your notion of God become itself intolerable to other godly men. The democratic way of life allows all of freedom that is compatible with order, and all of order that is commensurate with freedom—and provides a sliding scale as to the degree of each that is tolerable at any given time.

This, then, is the outline of democratic sportsmanship. As the key virtue, it requires great discipline, as has been intimated in the first chapter and will be demonstrated in Book II. Sportsmanship is a state of mind, with discipline of and for the majority, of and for the minority, of and for the individual. It implies a mind that is master of itself: a mind that knows its right, acknowledges its duties, and abides its limitations. Such sportsmanship is a state of mind so hard to come by, and so difficult to maintain through all vicissitudes, that it remains an ideal rather than something fully practiced by any. It would be the last achievement as it is the highest imperative of civilization. Anybody can be a

tyrant, if he has power. But for a man to have power without becoming a tyrant, that is a spiritual consummation of the most divine-like complexion. Short of that, the free and equal sharing of power is our fullest mark of sportsmanship.

The creation of such external leeway requires a mind relatively free from inner tensions. The surest mark of inner adequacy is the free operation of a sense of humor. In Hitler's Germany humor had to be clandestine. In Mussolini's Italy it was bootlegged, openly so, but bootlegged. In Russia it operates but must be careful of its object. Only in a democratic society can men be allowed, even encouraged, to relieve themselves at the cost of a quip, letting the chips fall where they may. The open exercise of humor has its inner counterpart in the citizen who can have sport at his own expense. When he calls upon himself he must find somebody at home, as we have said; but the person he finds must not be allowed the disguise of pomposity or presumption. The person whom the democrat meets at home must be able to take it as well as give it, give it as well as take it. From the older Russia, where the tyranny was much more external than, as at present, internal, there comes the perfect proverb for this high quality in question. "Only he who tickles himself may laugh as he likes." Let the grim-faced commissar digest that folk-wisdom from his own older homeland. And let all authoritarians observe what a German secondary student in America writes home about the pervasiveness of the sporting attitude in America.

"The American," writes he primarily of his schoolmates, "is a sports fan; the foreigner who has not seen a baseball game does not know Americans. They like gambling. At meals it was very amusing for me to see boys and girls—and teachers—raffle to decide which of them was to have the extra piece of butter or cake. When I dared to suggest letting the girls have it, the boys refused most indignantly: 'But don't you know that there is equality between the sexes?' "

The sportsman can smile at his own foibles, can suffer and even inflict a joke at his own expense; he is so at home with himself that he does not have always to be obtrusive with his seriousness or defensive of his honor; nor is he trigger-happy to make easy simplicity of other men's actions or beliefs. This is indeed the democratic man, matching his outer opportunities of freedom with inner resources of enjoyment.

Such democratic character is at once condition and fruition of sportsmanship.

BOOK TWO by Eduard C. Lindeman

Introduction

In this collaboration Professor Smith represents the classical mood. He speaks of the democratic way of life as consisting of ideals, exalted and audacious conceptions of human relations. It seems clear that these ideals—liberty, equality and fraternity—will never be realized in any perfect sense. Perhaps, it is not the function of an ideal to be realized but rather to serve as an organizing principle for guiding our propulsive lives. At any rate, I conceive of ideals as playing this important role: we are informed by our ideals with respect to each step we take in the daily round of life; if these successive steps are consistent, they will carry us toward our ideals. If we desire freedom, then we must move in the direction of freedom-giving experiences. Otherwise we may say freedom is our goal and yet behave in such manner as to make its ultimate defeat inevitable.

What I am attempting to say is that those who aspire to a democratic way of life as expounded by Professor Smith will never realize this aspiration even in an imperfect sense unless they are disciplined by the ideals themselves. To accept the democratic ideal is to incur a responsibility, namely the responsibility of imposing an internal discipline upon one's self. The teacher who repeats the ideals—liberty, equality, fraternity—has not by this act promoted the democratic way of life unless he is at the same time providing his students with opportunities for demonstrating those varieties of conduct which, when followed, produce tendencies of liberalizing, equalizing, and fraternizing. Indeed, the continued incantation of ideals may become a genuine barrier to the very realization of those ideals: we may be deluded into thinking we have performed the act when we have merely repeated the word.

In short, ideals require empirical counterparts. If ideals are soundly conceived and are within the general scope of human capacities, it should be feasible to support such ideals with experimental ways of living which have been validated, at least in part, by science and in part by tested experience.

When people say, "Oh, but that isn't democratic," what tests are they invoking? Observation leads me to the conclusion that this remark is most frequently applied to certain forms of social mechanics. It isn't considered democratic if,

for example, the rule of the majority is thwarted, or if the principle of representativeness is negated, or if rotation in office is denied. But beyond and beneath these obvious violations of democratic procedures lies a deeper, a more fundamental question, namely this: by what processes of conditioning has a person become susceptible to the temptation of violating majority rule? What habit-patterns have evolved to produce his undemocratic character?

In the present temper of our national life, this question becomes both relevant and pertinent with respect to the ideal of freedom. How does it happen, for example, that many good Americans who insist upon their devotion to the ideal of liberty have now been maneuvered into the position of favoring suppressions or limitations of certain freedoms already guaranteed by the Bill of Rights of the Constitution? The answer appears to be that these persons have come to regard all liberties as relative and not absolute. But, relative to what? Relative to varying situations? But what renders a situation one in which freedom is likely to become a liability rather than an asset? The moment one raises questions of this order it becomes evident that the "behavior" content of democracy has been left largely unexplored. We simply do not know how to appraise the day-by-day conduct of a given person in terms of the democratic ideal, and it is on this account that our teaching of democracy is so ineffective.

My task, therefore, in this joint publication is to attempt at least an exploratory examination of certain democratic disciplines which seem to have emerged as correlates of democratic idealism. This is obviously an undertaking which calls for a much wider collaboration. What is needed is an accumulation of experience which illustrates the actual operation of these disciplines in real situations. I earnestly hope that this preliminary examination of a selected list of disciplines will serve as an invitation to others to join Professor Smith and me in this venture of bringing democratic idealism and practice into a working relationship.

Since my contribution to this cooperative venture is of the nature of a prospective program for democratic thinking and acting I have departed from the usual formula for collaboration on a book. Professor Smith has been engaged in a ringing re-affirmation of democratic idealism. My addition to his book, although written in an affirmative mood, is in essence an inquiry. I have hence chosen to name the various sections which follow propositions rather than chapters. My use of the word "proposition" is based on the assumption that what is proposed is action.

PROPOSITION ONE: Persons striving to adapt themselves to the democratic way of life are required to discipline themselves to one variety of unity, namely unity which is achieved through the creative use of diversity. A society which is by affirmation democratic is expected to provide and protect a wide range of diversities.

E Pluribus Unum is both a naturalistic and a humane rule of conduct. Diversity belongs to the order of Nature. Those organisms which display a margin of difference will more readily survive than those which have a tendency toward uniformity. Survival of the unlike is Nature's procedure.

Multiformity when applied to human affairs is one of the conditions of freedom. Where conformity is imposed as an external discipline, liberty is by definition excluded. The right to differ is the *sine qua non* of freedom and hence the symbol of humaneness in personal relations. The moment one person demands the privilege of shaping others to his image, kindness, generosity and tolerance remove themselves from the equation. Monolithic societies, by the same token, must perforce become cruel. The inhumaneness of uniformity was clearly and graphically set forth in a recently published essay entitled *The Ethics of the Golden Mean* in which these words appear: "The world has been continually tormented by the people who thought they had the one secret, the one God, the one political party that gives salvation. So they determine to force everybody inside their tabernacle, burning, racking, imprisoning, killing all objectors, closing the mind, denying the use of body and brain. This is my idea of sin, and the history of the world as well as of its politics are full of that sin of persecutions. The fanatic is always a pest. The one-track mind is always a dangerous guide."* One need merely to observe what happens to one's friends in these weird days of ideological dispute to learn how quickly generosity and forgiveness are eliminated from the character of persons who have taken hold of an absolute belief. Communists who are completely certain that they have found the one way to salvation become at that point inhumane. This is also true of their enemies who are equally certain that the whole right rests with them.

How then does it happen that a rule of conduct which is compatible with natural processes, and is also on the side of love and kindness, is both natural and humane, should so frequently be violated in human affairs? To ask this question

* Ivor Brown in *The Listener*, July 24, 1947.

is tantamount to asking why Democracy is the most difficult of all ways of life. If we assume that our forefathers were both right and wise in adopting *E Pluribus Unum* as the motto of the new democratic experiment in politics, it becomes also logical to ask why they chose a rule which presents so many difficulties. Totalitarianism is obviously a simpler conception and asks very little of the mind. It requires merely a renunciation of freedom and an acceptance of the rule of absolute obedience to authority. To become a loyal citizen in a totalitarian state begins with a simple act: one is required merely to deny that he possesses any traits which differ from those of other citizens. Such loyalty is, of course, founded upon falsehood as any scientist could readily demonstrate by taking measurements. It alters radically the natural concept of what is normal. To be normal is to be different, not average. But at this very point we begin to discover one of the disturbing paradoxes of human nature. As so often happens, Nature reveals some of her deeper secrets through the abnormal.

The individual who violates the rule of Nature and strives to make others conform to his will and pattern is a sick person. If a nation follows the same pathway, it becomes a sick society. Diversity is the rule of health but we are not all healthy persons. Now and then this latent sickness in Man appears as an outward malady, a malformation, vivid and repugnant, as for example in the persons of Torquemada or Adolf Hitler. We then recognize the pathological features of bigoted personalities but it is far more difficult to recognize these same symptoms in ourselves. But, until we are able to see and admit those latent abnormalities which exclude difference in ourselves, we shall not be able to teach the democratic way of life as a mode of health. The desire to hurt and to hate lies dormant in each of us. We become healthy not by denying this fact but, rather, by developing contrary habits.

Diversity in politics implies in the first instance that powers are distributed. The process of transforming a democratic state into a dictatorship begins by gathering these distributed powers together and depositing them at a single point. We have seen this happen with striking regularity in Yugoslavia,* Hungary, Czechoslovakia, indeed in all the so-called satellite nations which have now become attached to Soviet Russia

* The recent detachment of Yugoslavia from this new colonial system represents an interesting event, the historical importance of which is not yet clear. It may be a sign of one of the inherent weaknesses of totalitarianism but it may also be taken as a symbol of exaggerated nationalism.

within a new variety of colonialism. The next step leading toward dictatorship is a thorough-going elimination of all competing sources of power. When, for example, the Hitler regime attacked and, wherever possible, outlawed churches, trade unions, cooperative societies and clubs such as Rotary, it was acting in obedience to a fundamental anti-democratic rule. Democracies seek strength through diversity. Dictatorships on the contrary find their strength in uniformity. And where uniformity is practiced, there must be a centralized power tending always in the direction of absolutism.

In this connection, bureaucracies become a threat to the democratic ideal. The legal bureaucrat is obliged to function in a formal manner. He administers his lawful functions in such manner as to reduce difference to a minimum. He becomes a monocrat by reason of the way he operates his bureau. Since the modern state must of necessity undertake enlarging responsibilities, the bureaucratic tendency is inevitable. But a bureaucracy operating under democratic political conditions is far less dangerous than one controlled by a dictator. The important distinction lies in the question: "Who controls the bureaucracies?" Indeed, a large bureaucratic organization functioning within a political democracy may mitigate its monocratic tendencies by allowing for diversity in the local application of its rulings, and we have seen examples of this in more recent American history.

Pluralism in government has become a habit in the United States and is imbedded in the Constitution. Nevertheless, we must be continuously on guard. James Madison foresaw the possibilities of a loss of freedom, not through revolutionary means but rather through a careless centralization of power. "Since the general civilization of mankind," said Madison, "I believe there are more instances of the abridgment of the freedom of the people by gradual and silent encroachments of those in power, than by violent and sudden usurpations."*

Our principal difficulties lie elsewhere, outside the realm of politics. If the diversity rule furnishes a basis for freedom in politics, it should also perform a similar service in other spheres. Some American citizens, alas, have their freedom curtailed in spite of the fact that the Bill of Rights protects them as political units. They lose their freedom because they happen to be Negroes or Mexicans or Orientals. Here stands a perplexing paradox: How could a society dedicated to political pluralism fail to practice the rule of racial or cultural

* These words were uttered by Madison when he was urging the adoption of the Federal Constitution before the Convention of Virginia on June 6, 1788.

pluralism? Why do so many patriotic and loyal American citizens interpret the term "Americanization" as a totalitarian conception? Why do they not see that if diversity in politics produces strength, a parallel strength might be derived from cultural diversity? This is not the appropriate place to examine the historical answers to the above questions. Happily, the American people seem at last to have realized the incongruity of racism in a democracy and the nation is now moving, slowly but surely, in the direction of legal and educational correctives. And it is to be noted that science in the shape of anthropological facts has been one of the chief factors in this forward movement.

Religious diversity was recognized almost from the beginning as a pre-requisite for a democratic society. This nation is forbidden by its Constitution to establish a uniform religion deriving its authority from government. All men are free in the United States to worship according to the dictates of their consciences. The issue of Church versus State, which has for long bedeviled European nations, has not, however, been permanently and definitely resolved. It continues to arise in fresh guises and is at this very moment being debated with respect to proposed federal financial aid to education. Should funds derived from taxation be used to defray any part of the educational costs of parochial schools? Discussion of this issue belongs more properly in another context, but is mentioned here merely for the purpose of denoting some of the persistently difficult problems confronting democratic societies.

Educational diversity is in one sense a reflection of that other form of political diversity which is represented by the doctrine of States' Rights. According to this doctrine Americans live under the dispensation of plural sovereignty. There are forty-eight sovereign commonwealths which through federation produce still another sovereignty to which is ascribed the responsibility of creating unity. Certain jealously guarded powers are specifically vested in these diverse commonwealths and among these has been the right to determine independent systems of education. In recent years, increasing funds for public education have been provided by the Federal Government but only for special purposes such as agriculture, home economics, and varieties of vocational training. A certain amount of federal control accompanies these appropriations but it is only now that demands have been made for federal funds to be applied to general education. The chief argument in favor of this measure is the contention that the wealthier states should help finance the educational institutions of the poorer states in the interest of equalization of educational opportunities. Outright ob-

jections to this principle do not appear to be prominent in the public debates over the issue, but what does appear is an insistence that the states, and to a large degree, local communities, shall not relinquish control over regional educational policies. In this realm, the American people seem to be firmly attached to the rule of diversity.

The situation is quite otherwise in the sphere of economics. Economic thought seems to have been entrapped in a rigid antithesis. Either we are destined to have a system of private free enterprise or we must resign ourselves to a state-controlled collectivism, so runs the popular conception. All intermediate alternatives are excluded. Free enterprise offers freedom but makes no guarantees in behalf of security. Collectivism, on the contrary, guarantees security but at the price of freedom. This dilemma represents an awkward choice, and I believe an unrealistic one. Genuine freedom is always a by-product of diversity. There are sure to be more varieties of freedom in a society maintaining a pluralistic economy than in one in which only one form of economic enterprise is tolerated. This is so because in a plural economy more varieties of motivation would be utilized. Individual private enterprise, corporate enterprise, cooperative enterprise and government-operated enterprise would furnish incentive to a wider cross-section of the population. From such a combination of economic enterprises would also flow a greater number of economic "inventions." When such alternatives are excluded only one type of person can enjoy this economic experience. All others must suffer frustration.

Curiously enough the data of experience seem to contradict popular economic convictions in this realm. As a matter of plain fact, every nation which is still engaged in the struggle to sustain a democratic form of government has already moved in the direction of a plural economy. This includes the United States. A wide variety of economic enterprises are at present functioning in this country but unhappily we do not admit the fact. Exponents of private enterprise consider it their privilege, if not their duty, to attack and if possible destroy cooperative enterprises. So long as this internecine warfare persists we shall not be capable of developing an economic morality suitable to a plural economy. And so long as individuals or groups of individuals are deterred from experimenting with new forms of economic enterprises, one variety of freedom will be curtailed. A mixed or plural economy cannot succeed in a state of perpetual conflict. In this case, as in others, diversity is beneficial so long as it facilitates movement in the direction of unity.

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The democratic discipline permits a wide range of loyalties. In a monocracy only one channel for loyalty is provided, namely loyalty to the all-powerful state. This single-minded form of loyalty produces citizens with a characteristic pattern. The man whose plural loyalties to home, neighborhood, community, church, region, and commonwealth are all subsumed into a single loyalty to the sovereign state of which he is a part inevitably becomes a chauvinist. If, on the other hand, his varied loyalties are not negated and each elicits from him a portion of affection and allegiance, he becomes no less a patriot but is saved from fanaticism.

PROPOSITION TWO: Persons dedicated to the democratic way of life are capable of moving in the direction of that goal if they are prepared to accept and live according to the rule of partial functioning of ideals. Perfectionism and democracy are incompatibles.

The experimental nature of democracy imposes upon its devotees a discipline which is not easy to accept, namely, the discipline of never asking for more than a partial realization of goals and ideals. The all-or-none principle belongs to dictatorships. Dictators are not permitted to make mistakes. They must be right in every instance. Infallibility is their claim. Once a dictator admits of error his prestige begins a fatal decline. Democracies, on the other hand, must of necessity postulate a margin for error.

"The Constitution is an experiment," said Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, "as all life is an experiment." This is another way of saying that outcomes are not completely foreseeable. Under democratic conditions there can be no perfect solutions. It is on this account that perfectionists find themselves so frequently unhappy. They ask for clean-cut, definite resolutions of issues, solutions which are a complete fulfillment of an ideal. But what they get when an issue is submitted to democratic procedures is a compromise, a half-way solution. This leaves them unhappy and not infrequently leads to the suspicion that democracies are fumbling, inefficient and lacking in moral stamina. In such instances they may even look upon dictatorships with admiration for the dictator takes the whole step, insists upon the perfect solution. While democracies are deliberately striving to ascertain the preponderance of majority opinion, dictators move forward without consultation.

Adherence to the discipline of moving toward the ulti-

mately desirable by means of feasibility in the present becomes reasonable only after acceptance of the majority principle. Once the majority principle is rejected, perfectionism becomes reasonable. But this means rejection of minority rights and consequently eliminates difference, thus limiting freedom. In other words, the price to be paid for freedom is allowance for error. Majority opinion is not accepted because we believe the majority to be always right. Indeed, when the majority is followed there is already involved an admission that some of the right may rest with the out-voted minority. Otherwise, the minority would not have been consulted. Majority rule is a useful, almost a mechanical contrivance, the main purpose of which is to find a solution which is at the moment workable. Its function is, not to define the perfect solution but rather, to "keep the game going," to avoid those awkward impasses which in extremity call for arbitrary action. The majority's responsibility is to conduct an experiment under the watchful eye of an alert and critical minority. When majorities arrogate to themselves the right to disregard minorities they become tyrannical. "An intolerant majority, swayed by passion or by fear" might, as Justice Brandeis pointed out, become the means by which democracies lose their liberties.

Under democratic conditions responsibilities are always dispersed. The minority which has been out-voted does not thereby escape responsibility. Indeed, its true function then begins. Minorities are confronted with three alternatives; they may refuse to abide by the majority vote, renounce further responsibility and refuse further participation; or they may agree to continue a negative participation by sabotaging the majority decision; or, finally, they may agree to give the majority decision a fair trial but in the process continue to criticize at every step the means employed by the majority in carrying out its will. In this latter capacity minorities do not admit that they were wrong in the first place. They merely grant that, under existing circumstances, they were not able to secure sufficient numerical support for their position. If they were right in any partial sense, that rightness did not disappear the moment a vote was taken. Consequently, they cannot avoid assumption of some degree of responsibility. The vote has determined who is to take responsibility for carrying out the majority decision but it has not released the minority from obligations. It has merely shifted that responsibility to the critical sphere. In short, creative criticism, particularly with reference to means and methods, is the true function of minorities.

Under majority-minority controls it thus happens that ex-

perimental decisions are of the essence of compromise. Unhappily, this word "compromise" has been given a "bad" name. It is used by many persons as a judgmental symbol, implying a betrayal of principle or moral weakness. But it may also be used as a process term denoting a social act performed under certain circumstances. When majorities and minorities are fairly evenly balanced numerically, a solution which embodies some but not all of the majority's wishes is inevitable. When there is an uneven balance and the majority is able to ride roughshod over the minority, the minority may be forced to assent entirely to the majority's will thus making no contribution to the ultimate decision. Under such conditions the minority is deprived of playing a creative role. It is on this account that a two-party system is most effective in sustaining democratic rule. The activist and the critical roles are thus specifically defined. Where there are numerous parties, no clear-cut majority is possible and responsibility tends to become diffused. When responsibility is diffused it tends also to disappear. At the point of its disappearance some form of dictatorship arises to fill the vacuum.

Training for democratic life, if truth resides in the above contentions, involves training for the constructive use of compromise, that is, for accepting a partial fulfillment of one's objectives and values. Compromise may be viewed in a creative sense only when it is seen in relation to other forms of social action. Perhaps, the lowest form of participation in group decisions is that which is characterized by *acquiescence*. In the act of acquiescing an individual subjugates himself completely to the will of another person or group. He accepts a decision to which he has made no contribution and which he does not understand. His behavior is that of a slave acting in obedience to a master. Slightly above acquiescence is a form of agreement to authority which may be called *assent*. The assenting person (in all of these instances the process engaged in may apply either to individuals or to groups) makes no contribution to the solution proposed but he has given assent to the authority's reasoning. He understands why he is accepting authority. One cannot *compromise* without active participation. By definition it is assumed that both parties have stated their position and that neither is able to secure majority favor. When this is recognized both groups then begin to modify their original positions, asking for a part but not the whole of what they initially claimed. The danger in compromising now appears. One or the other party may be tempted to degrade itself by offering to accept much less than it rightly deserves, or by being driven into a state of guilt-mindedness. When this happens,

the compromising act leads downward and sooner or later degenerates into assent or acquiescence. A healthy compromise is one which conserves some part of each original demand. Thereafter there is no need for either guilt feeling or vindictiveness, since each contending party has enjoyed a measure of success. Moreover, the habit of healthy compromise may lead to an even higher form of agreement, namely, *consent*. The act of consenting arrives only when differences have been sharpened and clarified to such an extent that actual inter-penetration takes place. "A" has now come to such a profound comprehension of "B's" difference that he is now able to make use of it, or of some part of it. "A" and "B" are hence engaged in an enterprise of mutual learning. Their consent is an act of understanding based upon respect for each other's differences. It may be said that, in consenting, individuals attain to truth about themselves. It is this variety of truth which supports good human relations.

"The important thing is," wrote John Morley,* "not that two people should be inspired by the same convictions, but rather that each of them should hold his or her own convictions in a high and worthy spirit. . . . Harmony of aim, not identity of conclusions is the secret of the sympathetic life." This statement is a reminder of the fact that most chronic disputes revolve about means rather than ends. It is comparatively simple to achieve agreement with respect to ends or goals. Most Americans, for example, can readily agree that it should be the aim of our economy to furnish full employment. But how is this aim to be reached? This is the question which causes division. Far from being a source of discouragement, this concentration upon means seems to be one of the healthy signs of democratic life. It is entirely proper that adherents to the democratic ideal should be primarily concerned about means and methods for it is the way a thing is done which defines quality. Experimentalism would languish and disappear if we insisted upon "identity of conclusion," that is, upon a single way for accomplishing an end. Agreement to try an experiment implies that other ways will be sought in case this one does not lead us where we wish to go. The experimental mood excludes perfectionism and finality. Perhaps this principle was never stated more clearly than in a letter written by Salvador deMadariaga to an American friend. He wrote: "Our eyes must be idealistic and our feet realistic. We must walk in the right direction but we must walk step by step. Our tasks are: to define what is desirable; to define what is possible at any time within the scheme of what is

* In his famous essay on *Compromise*.

desirable; to carry out what is possible in the spirit of what is desirable."* This is the discipline which must be learned by citizens of democratic societies, and when it is learned and acted upon "the sympathetic life" is an automatic consequence. Absolutism and its inevitable authoritarian persecution cannot arise nor thrive among people who know that the most they can hope for is a partial operation of their ideals.

PROPOSITION THREE: The democratic way of life rests firmly upon the assumption that means must be consonant with ends. It is this rule which, when practiced, emanates as democratic behavior and constructs a pattern of democratic morality.

Eastern versus Western democracy is a popular subject for current debates. Eastern or Russian democracy is founded upon a simple dictum, namely, any act which aims at satisfaction of the needs or interests of all the people thereby becomes and is a democratic fact. Nothing is required except to give assurance that an inclusive objective is sought. Anything done for the people, no matter by whom or in what manner, automatically becomes democratic. It is this formula which permits apologists for the Soviet regime to equate democracy with dictatorship. The Soviet Union is offering the world a new brand of democracy in which the ends are separated from the means, democracy in which individual liberties are exchanged for the promise of material security.

It has become a habit for authoritarians to appropriate "good" words taken from democratic contexts and then use these words in such manner as to make it appear that these concepts are being given a modern interpretation. Western democracy is thus referred to as "old-fashioned" and the Eastern or Russian brand is labeled twentieth century democracy. This is a well-known propaganda device called transference. If propagandists for totalitarianism wish to attract former adherents of democracy, they must entice them with words

* Robert Browning's well-known verse states the same principle in even simpler language:

"The Common problem—
Yours, mine, everyone's
Is not to fancy what
Were fair in life
Provided it could be
But finding first
What may be, then find
How to make it fair
Up to our means."

to which they have in the past given a positive meaning. It is easier to convert a former democrat to totalitarian beliefs if he is allowed to continue calling his new credo democratic. If Communists can lay claim to being also democratic, they can more readily win support, especially in Western areas, for their programs.

The simplicity of this propaganda device is likely to conceal its sinister intent. To insist that any act becomes democratic merely in relation to its goal and without consideration respecting the means employed is to say that ends justify the means. But this is precisely what an honest believer in democracy cannot say. Why he is not permitted to commit this error and still continue to label himself a democrat will be the theme of this section. Before entering upon this discussion, it seems appropriate to add a further word regarding the propaganda device mentioned above, that weird verbal trick which allows otherwise sensible men to identify dictatorships with democracy. What is sinister about this verbal legerdemain is the experienced fact that it destroys the moral character of every person who uses it or is used by it. It marks the point at which persons who in the past may have sought to achieve reforms by legal methods now begin careers of corruption. Humane persons may shudder when they reflect upon the number of lives which have been and will continue to be lost on behalf of the Communist cause; we may be certain that its special "inquisition" has not yet reached its limits of fury. But what is even more terrifying is the amount and depth of moral corruption which the Communist movement will leave in its train. Wherever Communists have operated there will be left the stain of persons who have either for a short or longer period of their lives acted upon the belief that good ends condone evil means. This is a stain which cannot be easily removed. And it is also in this respect that Communism and Fascism finally become confluent. Both movements accepted the same philosophy and operated as though ends and ends only justified the means. Consequently these two movements which at one moment of history appeared to be antithetical ultimately coalesced. The present assumed conflict between Fascism and Communism is a sham battle.

The doctrine which holds that ends justify means is not merely immoral but also unscientific. If the problem were submitted to a psychologist, for example, and he were asked to furnish a scientific explanation of the opposite doctrine, namely, the assumption that desirable goals cannot be achieved through the use of undesirable methods, what answer could he give? In the light of experimental knowledge

regarding the behavior of organisms he would be obliged to reply: "An organism becomes what it does. Or, a person's character finally takes on the pattern of his acts, not his wishes." If the same question were put to a psychiatrist, he too would be obliged to respond by saying: "Yes, of course, when actions fail to correspond to values, the end-result is a divided personality, and a chronically divided person ultimately becomes a sick person."

We become what we do. From a scientific viewpoint there is no escape from this law, no escape save moral betrayal. How unreasonable and unscientific is the notion that persons who tell lies, who perpetuate dishonest conspiracies and circumvent laws will ever succeed in creating a better world! And how absurd is the accompanying pretext that persons who suppress freedom will thereby conserve it! "The ends pre-exist in the means," said Emerson and so also says science. If humane and liberal ends are desired, we must behave humanely and liberally. The citizen who strives for democratic goals must discipline himself in the use of democratic means.

Of all the democratic disciplines, this is, alas, the most difficult to teach and apply. Temptations to violate the principle of compatibility between ends and means meet us on every hand. In sports, the aim is to win the game. In litigations, the goal is vindication for your client. In politics, the purpose is victory for your party. In these and manifold other connections we are all tempted to become end-gainers and in so far as we concentrate attention upon ends we tend to become careless with respect to means.

Educators must bear a large share of guilt if children become end-gainers in and through the educational process. It is deplorable that school authorities continue the use of examinations in every type of subject and thus lead pupils to believe that the chief aim of education is to pass examinations and receive grades, but what is even more grievous is the fact that many teachers still think it pardonable to ask "trick" questions thus rendering the end even more difficult of achievement. Under these circumstances it seems reasonable that more and more pupils might seek a "trick" means to this artificial end. The principal difficulty here, as well as in other contexts, is that end-gainers sooner or later lose the capacity to enjoy their means. They become so pre-occupied in attaining ends that they regard the means as a boring compulsion, something to be endured but not enjoyed. In this manner the entire educational process becomes perverted. Ultimately, learning itself comes to be regarded as a necessary "evil" and on this account the status of scholars tends to deteriorate.

Since ends and means are not functionally separable, it appears that the most effective way of teaching the young how to avoid the fatal error is to introduce them to a world in which ends and means are interwoven.

> "Show us not the aim without the way.
> For ends and means on earth are so entangled
> That changing one, you change the other too;
> Each different path brings other ends in view." *

Viewing life in this organic manner allows for an important substitution: instead of centering effort upon transitory and specified goals, which so often lose their lustre in the very moment of attainment, it then becomes feasible to use all experiences for the purposes of the one goal which can never betray, namely growth. There is, obviously, excitement in finding the right answer for an algebraic equation, but not of the same high quality as that which derives from the sense that having solved this problem, one is now able to move on to more difficult ones. Education cannot come to our rescue in relation to the ends-means dilemma until less stress is placed upon the past and the future and more upon the present. Over-anxiety about the future is something we now learn in school. Education is presented as a discipline which may not offer much enjoyment or adventure now but will surely help us solve the problems of our futures. We are thus asked to bear the present because of the promises of the future. This is not the pathway of growth. A person who lives in this manner will sooner or later lose interest in the process and the moment he loses interest in the process he becomes an end-gainer, a person who exerts effort *now* only because of the prize he anticipates *then.* In striving for ends he postpones growth and ultimately, of course, loses the "habit" of growth. Such a person lives an unhappy life under democratic conditions.

History appears to consist of a series of cyclical movements in which separate eras are distinguished by emphasis upon either ends or means. We seem to be passing through one of these Machiavellian periods in which the struggle for power has led rulers to engage in an overrationalized and deceptive separation of means from ends. Unhappily, this mood of deceptiveness has invaded the ranks of contemporary liberals. Some latter-day liberals actually seem to believe that they can wage a successful fight against totalitarianism by behaving like totalitarians. Their favorite slogan is, "Fire must be fought with fire," forgetting that when this

* Ferdinand LaSalle.

device is utilized both areas involved are scorched. Liberals who forget that their entire tradition is founded upon fidelity to the means-ends equation soon cease to be functional liberals. To act as a liberal, means to carry on an unending search for humane methods for achieving humane goals, and to place more emphasis upon the search than upon the consummation. In fact, it is a sign of liberalism to be dissatisfied with terminations.

Both from scientific and moral points of view, it is important to protect the democratic doctrine of "maximum consistency between means and ends" from the dangers of perfectionism. It is, perhaps, impossible to find *the* perfect means for each valid goal. To believe this were possible would be tantamount to believing that the Earth had been especially created as the habitat for specially-created human beings. Since this remains an undemonstrable and unlikely assumption, we are compelled to believe that human beings are living on a planet which affords them a rather slight margin of safety. We are imperfect organisms striving to adapt ourselves to an environment which offers many resistances. Our principal mode of adaptation is trial and error. Insofar as we are capable of reducing the amount of error in any adaptive situation, we succeed in bringing our means into relative harmony with our goals. To the extent that this is possible we achieve a certain amount of freedom. We are not always free to pursue a straight pathway towards freedom since we live in a world in which our reactions are frequently caused by the precedent actions of others.

War is a case in point. War and democracy are incompatible. Liberal democracies should be forever on the side of peace, but how can they adhere to this doctrine in a world in which aggressor nations exist? Passive resistance may be an ideal answer to the aggressor, but it is a form of resistance and in the end it engenders violence. War is a test of survival. When a democratic nation becomes involved in warfare it is compelled to suspend some of the democratic rules. Its diversity is now overshadowed by the urgent need for unity. War substitutes, for the continuing and fluctuating ends of organic life, the single and mechanical end of survival. This is, of course, a harmful experience and a nation constantly on the alert for warlike possibilities, a military nation, cannot long remain democratic. If a nation remains militarized long enough, its democratic habits will wither and die. Here as elsewhere the means will finally determine the ends. The American people have instinctively recognized this incompatibility in the past and have invariably liquidated military establishments as quickly as possible after the termination

of wars. Even now they seem to retain an instinctive hope that compulsory military training may be transmuted into a partially democratic experience and in this awkward instance are striving for a "maximum consistency between means and ends." So long as they know when and why the principle is being partially violated they may still cling to their democratic inheritance.

PROPOSITION FOUR: Genuine consent, a vital ingredient of the democratic way of life, is the end-product of discussion or conference. Citizens of democratic societies are equipped for their role when they have acquired the skills and the arts of conferring.

When Pericles was called upon to defend the Athenian democracy of his time he included in his famous oration these words: ". . . and instead of looking upon discussion as a stumbling-block in the way of action, we think it an indispensable preliminary to any wise action at all." It will be noted that he did not exclude the possibility of action without discussion but merely "wise" action. What variety of wisdom emanates from discussion? And why should democracies make use of this particular form of wisdom? Why, in other words, should persons living under democratic conditions learn the arts and skills of conference or discussion?

To be able to extract wisdom from discussion implies a prior capacity for communication. Social wisdom does not come into existence by a mere addition of the separate wisdoms of a number of individuals. A glorified synthesizer could perform such an act and thereafter transmit this additive wisdom to administrators and to the people. There are intuitive persons who seem to possess this synthesizing skill and Plato may have had them in mind when he proposed to vest authority in philosophers. But Plato was not seeking a democratic solution. He sought a perfectionist formula which would insure good government, regardless of who made the decisions. But if then we are to move in the direction of democracy's ideal values—liberty, equality, fraternity—it makes a great deal of difference who makes the decisions and also how decisions are reached.

To confer means to communicate in a special manner. Parents, teachers, administrators and foremen in factories who issue orders are communicating but not conferring. What they say travels in one direction and upon a single plane. A meeting at which speakers address an audience and make assertions should not be called a conference. The verb "to confer" applies only when two or more persons contribute to a common understanding. We make a serious error if

we assume that understanding is purely an intellectual process. Knowledge is, of course, involved but, in genuine communication, feelings and experiences also are an integral part of the interaction. In this manner we arrive at truth in human relations. When "A" communicates with "B," "B" knows what "A" has said so thoroughly that he can repeat it in language which is considered satisfactory to "A," it may be said that "B" has understood "A" in an intellectual sense. If, in addition, "B" has become aware of the experiences from which "A's" reasoning was derived, his understanding is broadened; he can then sympathize with "A" and understand him in an experimental manner. If then "B" can also come to appreciate the feeling-tone which accompanies "A's" communication, he has then reached an almost complete understanding. In other words, understanding involves exchange of knowledge, experience and emotion. It is this product which may be called social wisdom, and it can come into existence only when individuals have acquired the skills of discussion.

Discussion is not a form of debate. Neither is it a series of questions and answers. Discussion is a circular, not a linear, mode of communication. Linear, or one-way, communication is suitable to dictatorships. It calls for an exceedingly simple kind of understanding. When "A" commands "B" and "B" does what "A" asks, "B" has understood "A." This is elementary understanding and persists only when "A" has complete power over "B" and thus deprives "B" of freedom. In a democracy it is important that understanding should reach higher levels since "A" and "B" are partners in joint power and both have received guarantees of freedom. It is for this reason that one so often hears the expression "free discussion" in democratic societies. The purpose of discussion is to exercise one's freedom in arriving at conclusions in collaboration with other free persons.

If it were possible to peer through the roofs of business buildings in a large city at say ten o'clock in the morning, the scene would reveal thousands of persons engaged in "conference." To hold a conference has become one of the symbols of democratic behavior. But are these thousands actually conferring? Are they aware that mere talk is not conferring? Are they aware that certain skills are required if true conferring is to take place? Obviously, the answer to these questions is negative. Most persons believe that they know how to confer or that there is nothing important to be known except to be able to talk. Because of these easy-going assumptions, democracy is betrayed on every hand. We entrust to committees most important issues, assuming

that these delegated individuals will somehow or other represent us and will arrive at just decisions. But if these ubiquitous committees are controlled by the dominating will of chairmen, it would be as well to seek an arbitrary decision in the first place. The mere fact of the existence of a committee is no guarantee that democratic procedures will be safeguarded. A committee serves democracy only when its chairman and its members are capable of utilizing a valid form of discussion.

The first step in learning the skills of discussion is to appreciate that various goals and purposes call for different methods of discussion. Administrative, executive, advisory, consultative, or coordinating committees perform diverse functions. Each variety of committe requires an appropriate method, a method suitable to its purposes. An advisory committee, for example, which is not responsible for carrying out any action but is merely used for purposes of guiding those who must act, should use a discussion method which is likely to yield a variety of alternatives arranged in some order of priority. Its task is not to determine precisely what action is preferable but rather to furnish executives with diversity of choices. When advisory committees limit their alternatives to two and then divide into majority and minority units, they are using a method appropriate for administrative bodies.

It requires a great deal of patience and confidence in one's fellows to acquire the essential skills of discussion. Functional and ideological (democratic) reasons for making the effort may be readily stated. But there is still another motivation which is frequently overlooked, namely, discussion's contribution to mental health.

Experience appears to register certain definitely hygienic results which accrue to those who learn the arts and skills of discussion. The person who may have regarded his confusions and frustrations as unique soon learns that others suffer from the same or similar causes. In striving to understand the frustrations of others, the discussant achieves insights with respect to his own difficulties. These understandings of self remove barriers to communication, release energies and add to self-confidence. The person who is already over-confident and conceited soon learns in a discussion group that the meek may also be wise, wiser indeed than those who are aggressive and talk too well or too much.

One of the "sicknesses" of our time is revealed in the tendency to fall into the trap of false antitheses. We are driven to accept one of only two alternatives: communism or fascism, science or the humanities, free enterprise or

collectivism, laissez faire or planning. These are all false antitheses and do not belong to the order of nature. These "either-ors" are the result of dialectical trickery and those who follow their dictates soon lose the sense of reality. In order to accept an "either-or" of this variety, it becomes necessary to exclude large sectors of reality. Whoever engages in this type of reflection finally builds a rationalized fantasy world. I know of no more efficacious cure for this "disease" than to participate in group discussions in company with persons differing widely in interests and backgrounds.*

One pathway leading towards mental health is to gain assurance respecting moral values. To know right from wrong is the mark of a healthy mentality. It is often assumed, erroneously I believe, that such assurance can be gained by studying ethics in the abstract. Others assume that moral values may be learned by transference, that is, by leaving the discovery of values to others, specialists perhaps, and then taking these ready-made and finished, much as food is taken from a larder. Neither of these methods seems to me effective or trustworthy. A surer way of learning morality is to inject the moral factor into a problem-solving equation. If, for example, a responsible group of citizens should choose as a discussion topic the question of housing, they would soon discover that hidden away among the elements of politics, land values, taxation, building materials, et cetera, lies a moral issue. If they were candid in this discussion, they would be forced to admit that the principal reason responsible for sub-standard housing in this rich land of ours is not to be found in our poverty, our lack of suitable materials, or in fact, in any material source. They would come to the conclusion that the chief barrier lies in the moral realm. If thereafter they arrived at a decision, their choice would be in essence a moral one. Learning morality in this manner brings the whole matter of values into the sphere of practicality. A candid discussion of morals in a group furnishes an antidote for hypocrisy. A single moral principle hammered out in discussion and applied to real situations is worth tons of affirmed values which are never put to an actual test.

Healthy-mindedness is not a function of suspicion, aggres-

* In a recent discussion experiment all participants expressed their convictions with regard to the issues which they were later to discuss. The groups fell into typical "either-or" divisions. At the end of the ten weeks of discussion they were tested again and it was then discovered that all groups had moved to some point near the center, that is, away from extremes.

siveness, hostility, anger or hatred. Persons driven by forces which they do not comprehend and maneuvered into convictions which they do not fully understand are bound to fall into these negative attitudes. If they become chronically negativistic, they will, of course, become mentally ill. Positive motivations will disappear and they will not be able to attach themselves to movements in which new experience arises as a natural continuation of previous experience. Discussion cannot "cure" all persons thus afflicted. It can and does furnish a channel for releasing these negativisms for many, and for others it serves as a preventive measure.

A discussion group which takes on the pattern of a friendship configuration thus becomes the modern empirical expression of fraternity. Equality without liberty produces monotony. Liberty without fraternity leads to isolation. These three classical values of democracy present a fascinating inter-relation, a mutual dependency. Constitutions and statutes may aid us in attaining and conserving equality and liberty, but the act of fraternity is an exercise of free and independent choice. In simpler times our friendships arose naturally and almost automatically. Our friends were our neighbors and our colleagues. This is no longer true. If we are to have friends in a complicated and specialized world, we are obliged to lay conscious plans with this end in view. What better opportunities exist for the development of friendships than those provided by a group whose members have learned the arts of orderly communication? All able conferees are potential friends. A healthy democratic society is one in which there is a constant tendency to widen and deepen the feeling, the experience and the spirit of fraternity. Only healthy-minded individuals find joy in this democratic venture.

PROPOSITION FIVE: Economic, social and cultural planning are modern requisites for survival. Citizens of democratic societies are thus required to learn the skills and arts of planning and to give assurance that the methods employed will remain consistent with democratic ideals and practices.

An actor in preparing for his role in a drama subjects himself to a rigorous discipline. He makes himself ready by rehearsing his part in company with other members of the cast. He cannot become an actor merely by memorizing the script nor by reading books on acting. In order to act he must *en*act.

Learning is, from one point of view at least, a process of adjustment to a present situation which is on the way to

becoming a future situation. There is always a futuristic factor in true learning. Perhaps it is more appropriate to say that the learning process embodies all three time components: exploring the past, living the present and preparing for future contingencies. The accelerated tempo of modern life demands more and more concentration upon future contingencies. While we are engaged in solving the contemporary problem, one "eye" is lifted in the direction of the imminent situation. What we do in the present is one of the causal factors in the approaching circumstance. In other words, we are engaged in a continuing rehearsal for a drama in which we know we are destined to play a part, but a drama which has not yet been written. To the extent that a bare outline of the "plot" is discernible, we can conduct our rehearsal in an atmosphere of realism.

One phase of the coming "plot" of all societies in which science and technology are increasingly utilized as instruments of adaptation has already become fairly clear: Each succeeding thrust of technology tends to diminish the effectiveness of automatic controls. Nature's ecological balance produces controls which operate automatically. When for one reason or another food supply is lessened, an inevitable adjustment follows: the number of animals dependent upon the food supply will decrease. This is what is meant by Nature's automatic controls. When, however, Man interferes with Nature's balance and thus alters the environment, he thereby creates a situation which he must learn to control. Otherwise, the very instruments which he uses for his adaptation will become agencies of destruction. We have already witnessed the fateful effects of this process in relation to our diminishing soil fertility, the lowering of the water table and the costly increase of river floods caused by deforestation. Technical methods applied to agriculture may lead to the production of large cereal crops grown on light top soils; however, the eventual consequence may be that the fertility of the soil will erode into the ocean or blow away in dust storms. It is no longer necessary to cite illustrations of the damage done to Man's environment by technological advances which are not accompanied with foresight and planning. The basic lesson to be learned is that the need for planning is precipitated by Man's use of science and technology.

Manifest needs are not always met with suitable responses. We may know that planning is essential for our survival and yet be unable to take the necessary steps leading to adjustment. At present the planning compulsion is confronted with two psychological barriers. In the first place, an un-

reasonable optimism prevents us from taking seriously the imbalance which is steadily being created by our increased use of technology. We are still emotionally, if not intellectually, attached to the notion that the earth is ours for whatever uses we wish to make of it. If we can see an immediate gain in any form of exploitation, we are inclined to take that gain regardless of future consequences. The future, in other words, is left to take care of itself. In the second place, the very word "planning" has come to have a negative meaning. We associate the word with bureaucracy and loss of freedom. So far has this misconception gone that many otherwise reasonable citizens regard planning to be a polarized concept, its antithesis being democracy. Publicists tell us that we may have planning or democracy but that it is impossible to have both. This curious language impediment has become a slogan for dictatorships. Communism and Fascism have both captured the word and since we abhor both Communism and Fascism we impulsively also reject planning. So long as this awkward error persists it will be impossible for us to acquire the disciplines necessary to achieve planning under democratic conditions.

The manner in which the concept of planning is now used by most American citizens implies that planning can be done in only one way, namely, by dividing the population into two groups: those who do the planning and hence issue commands, and those who carry out the plans and hence obey. The latter, obviously, abandon their freedom. If this formula were reversed and we began by imagining a planning technique which would place planners within the concepts of the people's sovereignty, rendering them, as well as all government officials, subject to the people's will, how would this conception clash with democratic ideals? If planning were used as a means for bringing more and more citizens into a participant enterprise, would not this procedure harmonize with democratic aspirations?

I have already suggested that a plural economy is most suitable for democratic society. Democratic planning might begin at this very point, namely, by instituting a national economic council composed of representatives of private, corporate, cooperative, and governmental enterprises. The first task of this council would be to propose moral principles which would permit these various forms of economic enterprises to collaborate in the interest of maximum production. Its next responsibility might be to explore methods which would permit of the widest possible participation in local, county, state, regional and national planning projects, that is, to set forth a planning scheme which would be democratic from the

ground up, one that could not be captured by either a private or public bureaucracy.

What I am actually suggesting is reclamation of the concept of planning. It belongs to democracies, not to dictatorships. The process which totalitarians call planning is nothing more than an extension of political and cultural dictatorship. It is a form of ordering, despotism expanded into the economic sphere. But no other type of planning can exist under a totalitarian system. To reason from this fact that no variety of planning can exist under democratic conditions is to commit a serious logical error, and those who indulge this fallacy finally come to be barriers to the future progress of democratic societies. They make it difficult for democracies to achieve that internal security and confidence which is their chief defense against totalitarians. So long as communism offers security at the price of freedom, and so long as democracy offers freedom at the price of security, the citizen has no real choice save one which barters moral value for a material gain. My claim is that democracies can furnish both security and freedom and that this goal may be reached in one way only: by planning the use of our natural resources and technological equipment for the purpose of meeting expanding human needs. If democratic peoples cannot accomplish this end through the use of democratic procedures, the democratic dream will ultimately fade and disappear. In extremity, human beings will choose security.

What disciplines of mind and heart would be required to adapt planning to democratic requirements? We should first of all need to remind ourselves again of the principle which insists that under democratic conditions there cannot be a complete realization of an ideal. We cannot offer complete security nor absolute freedom. We can promise only so much security as will be compatible with certain degrees of liberty. Consequently, democratic planning must be limited, restricted to those features of the economy which can meet increasing human needs more effectively through foresight and coordination than through heedlessness and insulation. There will always be left a margin for error, a zone within which economic enterprise will suffer no constraints. In this process freedom will also be limited. A plan for the conservation of natural resources, for example, would no longer permit an individual owner to cut timber recklessly and thus leave wasteland, floods and erosion as the inheritance of the next generation. He, the private owner, would still be permitted to cut his timber provided he does so with the welfare of the nation in mind. He will henceforth be required to operate within a plan, within a context of or-

derliness. This is precisely what happens now when a farmer signs a contract which brings pecuniary benefits to him provided he agrees to till his soil in such manner as to prevent erosion and conserve the soil's fertility. He thus loses a slight amount of freedom on one hand but in return receives an extension of freedom on the other: by operating his farm within a plan, he increases its productivity, enhances his standard of living and moves in the direction of security. We can have security if we do not ask for too much freedom. We can have freedom if we refrain from demands for completely guaranteed security. Planning reduces risks on both counts but it does not promise utopia.

Rehearsal for planning implies another intellectual and professional discipline, namely, acceptance of the principle that experts must give up some of their cherished individualism and thenceforth learn how to collaborate. Experts who insist upon insulating themselves from both the knowledge and methods of other specialists and take pride in their isolationism will be of little use to planning bodies. They may regard their unrelatedness, their detachment, as a variety of freedom but it is in fact, under modern conditions, a form of bondage. Specialists who learn the art of collaboration will also discover outlets for a much broader usefulness. They will taste a new freedom in expanding appreciations and a more grateful public acceptance. They will become better specialists since their outlook will become more generous. Freedom *with* is far more important than freedom *from.*

The habit of foresight, of appraising the probable consequences of each successive line of action, may be developed in at least two ways. By imagining a perfect culmination and ideal consummation, and thereafter becoming a propagandist for this belief. This is the choice made by doctrinaire ideologists. But there is a more realistic and a more humane way: to strive for a fractional test of an ideal in relation to a specific, concrete problem. This is the way of modern pragmatism: one step at a time but each step appraised in the light of certain posited exerimental values. "Not perfection as the final goal, but the ever enduring process of perfecting, maturing, refining, is the aim in living."*

It is not difficult to foresee the time when general education may become the focus of a new kind of patriotism, when pupils from childhood onward will be steadily preparing themselves for contributions to national and international welfare. Schools which might consider themselves to be an

* John Dewey in *Reconstruction in Philosophy.*

integral part of an unfolding plan the aim of which is to make efficient use of human and natural resources on behalf of human needs, would experience no difficulties in relating education to life. No longer would pupils be asked to accept the obscurantist plea that a subject must be learned as mental discipline for its own sake. They would be involved in a new discipline, namely, that of putting subject-matter to work in real situations. Emotional biases against certain subjects would disappear, if knowledge were assimilated through use. Subject-matter examinations would no longer be necessary since each individual pupil's progress would be measured according to his capacity to contribute to the solution of problems arising from his life and experience. Pupils of such schools would come to love their land—which is what patriotism means—because they had become involved in it, had contributed to its improvement. In a democratic society, moving towards social and economic planning, the public school would have a rational "whole" to which all of its parts would lend meaning and purpose.

PROPOSITION SIX: Efficiency for democratic institutions is derived from a high level of functional correlation. Fragmented and insulated institutions are not merely ineffective within their own spheres but also tend to produce patterns of behavior which are inimical to democratic success.

The democratic conception is based upon the assumption that conflicts between indivduals and groups will always exist. This assumption in turn derives from the principle of diversity. In nature, and hence in Man who is part of nature, difference is a given fact. Important differences will inevitably lead to conflict.

If the democratic theory were left at this point, those who follow its precepts would soon find themselves living in chaos. Differences would lead to increasingly chronic conflicts which, if unresolved, would weaken and destroy the capacity to achieve common goals. A democracy without a sense of direction would be like a ship with sails and no rudder. The right to be different is the basis of freedom and where this right is not respected and protected, democracy cannot flourish. If, however, there is no corresponding responsibility to utilize differences in the interest of common goals, there can be no orderly society, and anarchy will be the consequence. A functional democracy, if it succeeds, becomes therefore a method for utilizing differences for common ends. One of the rules of conduct to which citizens of democracies must subject themselves is, then, the dis-

cipline of finding experimental methods for dealing with conflict.

The democratic rhythm is analogous to certain physiological functions. The muscular system of man's forearm, for example, consists of two opposing sets of muscles. One set is capable of pulling the arm upward and another of pulling it downward. The two sets of muscles are, in other words, in conflict. No orderly movement of the arm would be possible unless there existed a method for resolving these two opposing forces. The human body has developed a method for this purpose and hence man can use his arm for directed purposes. Democratic societies move from one set of conflicts to another in unending sequence. When suitable methods for resolving conflicts are discovered these societies are capable of performing their essential functions. A partial solution for the existing conflict is found, energies are released and goals are pursued. Soon thereafter other conflicts arise. This constitutes democracy's rhythm and those who cannot adapt themselves to its demands are to that extent undisciplined.

Federalism as a mode of government has proved to be an excellent device for resolving most of the political conflicts which have thus far arisen in American life. The great exception which led to our disastrous domestic or civil war must stand as an historical warning that no system is infallible. We have not yet discovered a workable method for dealing with racial conflict and this flaw represents one of the weakest links in American democracy. These two examples remind us that in a free society conflicts exist on various planes of solubility. They also remind us that there can be no surcease from the obligation to seek new social inventions. Where conflict is accepted as natural fact, dynamic situations are precipitated, calling for dynamic solutions.

The health of a democratic society may be measured according to its ability to invent new methods for dealing with varieties of conflict. This test may be applied to family, neighborhood, community and national affairs. Among the multitudinous conflicts which beset contemporary American society, I choose to illustrate my thesis in relation to one which offers every citizen an opportunity for experimentation.

In an earlier chapter, I referred to the need for collaboration among specialists, experts. In reality, specialists are not in and of themselves free to function cooperatively since they work through institutions and in conformity to policies which they have not inaugurated. Before experts can be re-conditioned and thus learn how to collaborate, something needs to be done about the institutions through which they function. All organized bodies brought into exist-

ence for the purpose of meeting specific human needs seem to fall prey to the same "disease." They ultimately regard their institution's survival as being more important than the need which brought the institution into existence. Perhaps, this "sickness" might be called "institutionalism," a form of perversion which confuses means with ends, places structures ahead of functions, and finally substitutes institutional pride for humane interest in people. This happens to churches, schools, courts, hospitals, social agencies, settlement houses—in short, all organized instruments designed to enhance human welfare. We all live in and through this growing configuration of institutions and hence are affected by this malformation.

Institutionalism represents a growing threat to the survival of democracy. Its anti-democratic effects are threefold: first, it frustrates all attempts to create unity through diversity; second, it weakens democratic societies by making it difficult to find effective solutions for chronic problems; and third, it tends to develop influential persons who become fractionalized in their civic functions and their loyalties. All of these defects are especially noticeable and harmful in a society such as ours where the freedom to engage in private enterprises is deeply embedded in the cultural tradition.

Diversity "gone wild," uncoordinated and divisive, leads to chaos. Difference carries value only when viewed in the light of probable unity. Where there is no prospect of functional unity, diversity becomes a liability, not an asset. The freedom which results from this unrelated type of diversity is a sham and a delusion. Disrelation, in a civilization which constantly produces more and more inter-dependence, furnishes the freedom to be ineffective, a pseudo-freedom. The free man is one who is traveling in the direction of growing relatedness. Isolation is a form of evasion which in the end defeats the fraternity principle which is one of democracy's ideal goals. Human relations will not yield to improvement in a society bedeviled by institutionalism. Individuals caught in the web of institutionalism shut themselves off from new, broadening experiences. The range of their friendships becomes limited, restricted. In short, institutions, no matter how worthy their goals, become enemies of democracy to the extent that they impede the processes of unity. They thus create the eventual probability of imposed uniformity.

Fragmented institutions, each dealing with a small fraction of human requirements, cannot, in a modern society, succeed in solving the problems to which they are dedicated. A single illustration taken from American life should

suffice to demonstrate the truth of this assertion. The United States suffers grievously from the fact that it seems impossible to reduce its incidence of crime and delinquency. Long ago, Horace Mann promised that if the citizens would provide schools for all the children of all the people, the ultimate result would be an end of crime. Since he was at the time imploring citizens to tax themselves for the support of public schools, he added still another promise, namely, that if they would pay for schools it would finally become unnecessary to pay for prisons, jails and reformatories. We now have the schools but not nearly enough prisons and reformatories. Why? Surely the answer cannot be that Americans are by nature and as individuals endowed with more criminal intent than other persons living in other cultures. Observation leads to quite another conclusion, namely, the uncorrelated performance of institutions within which Americans live and which are designed to meet their needs. Institutional insulation finally leads to functional inefficiency. No matter how high professional standards go in independent institutions, no gains can be made unless the various specialized agencies function in relation to the whole. If churches, schools, courts, clinics, recreational and social agencies cannot merge their fractional services and bring these to focus upon the organic whole of human personality, no progress can be expected. Where there exists a functional disrelation in the web of a society's institutional life, social maladjustments will increase. Costs for services will also increase and the time will inevitably come when the financial burden will be too great to bear. Increased costs without a corresponding increase in effectiveness weaken a democracy's social and economic "health." If this process continues indefinitely, the demand for eliminating private institutions entirely is thereby given its most powerful argument. But, when private institutions disappear and diversity is exchanged for uniformity, democracy will be well on the road to its final decline.

What happens to well-meaning individuals who are contaminated by institutionalism has already been mentioned. They become less fraternal; their human relations are impaired; they become sectarians, not full-fledged citizens. They become zealous over fractions and lazy with respect to wholes. The range of their associations is restricted and those with whom they no longer communicate become objects of suspicion. Aldous Huxley once described this process in quite another context, but nevertheless so poignantly that its meaning here becomes clear and obvious:

"For one can work hard, as I've done, and yet wallow in sloth; be industrious about one's job, but scandalously lazy about all that isn't job. Because, of course, the job is fun. Whereas the non-job . . . personal relations, in my case . . . is disagreeable and laborious. More and more disagreeable as the habit of avoiding personal relations ingrains itself with the passage of time. Indifference is a form of sloth, and sloth is in turn one of the symptoms of lovelessness. One isn't lazy about what one loves." *

Democracy is an adventure in the realm of human relations. Anything that impairs human relations tends to defeat democracy. Institutionalism has become such an enemy. The citizen who cherishes the freedom which democracy gives and wishes to retain it, will need to come to grips with this anti-democratic force.

Many earnest citizens have recognized the contradiction involved in disrelated diversities and have sought remedies in varieties of federations, and councils, all aiming at institutional coordination. The success of these co-ordinative efforts has been strictly limited, and on the whole discouraging. Their chief fallacy is the assumption that coordination of principles and theoretical agreements will lead automatically to functional collaboration. In obedience to this erroneous belief, these federations and councils spend endless hours in discussing what might be provided if their respective institutions were coordinated. The need for a complementary relationship between private and public agencies, both operating on behalf of the multiple needs of persons living under democratic conditions has become a favorite topic for discussion, but the desired end does not appear. The opposite approach is much more likely to yield positive results, namely, to begin with actual projects in which the functions of the various institutions are correlated in connection with a concrete problem. Experience in functional correlation will produce sound enough principles, provided the will to cooperate is valid. Modest functional enterprises of this type will do much more to bring about correlation than years of discussion of principles.

It is a sad commentary upon contemporary American life to admit that federations and councils have until now succeeded primarily in one type of cooperation, namely, in mutualizing their fund-raising efforts. They find it possible to conduct successful community fund-raising campaigns; thereafter the funds are channeled off into the coffers of specialized agencies operating in neat little cubicles of isolation. Community fund-raising is a democratic gesture. It re-

* From *Eyeless in Gaza.*

mains nothing more than a gesture so long as the institutions which profit financially fail to take the next logical step, namely, functional correlation.

PROPOSITION SEVEN: The modern democratic way of life can be realized in this age of self-conciousness only if its precepts and ways of living are incorporated in the educational system.

The general proposition with which these latter essays were initiated may now be restated: Democracy's classical ideals can never be satisfactorily realized unless supported by a set of evolving empirical rules which, because of their partial derivation from experience, may be readily incorporated in the learning process.

Schools and colleges are being urged to teach democracy and to teach it more effectively. But what does "teaching democracy" mean? In the past, it meant, for the most part, the introduction of certain stereotyped materials *about* democracy in history, civics, social studies or political science courses. In this manner democracy is extolled, its virtues elaborated, its enemies castigated and its ideal values reaffirmed. But the democratic way of life cannot be taught merely through the introduction of various items about democracy in the curriculum. It is, of course, important to inform children and youth regarding democracy's origins and ideals but this provides no assurance that students thus informed will automatically acquire democratic habits and loyalties.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to be faithful to an idea or an ideal which has not been experienced. No necessary correlation exists between knowledge *about* goodness and good behavior. Socrates is supposed to have said that knowledge *is* goodness. I am not sufficiently clairvoyant to know what he actually meant. However, in the light of more recent facts about human behavior, it would be preferable to say that knowledge gained through experience in goodness is likely to produce good persons. Or, to translate this maxim for our present context: Knowledge of democracy acquired in democratic experiences is likely to produce democratic habits. The democratic way of life, in other words, does not consist of a system of beliefs but rather a cluster of habits which in combination define one's character. In short, mere democratic indoctrination will not produce democratic citizens.

Participation, as Aristotle foresaw long ago, is the *sine qua non* of democratic behavior. The democratic ideal does not impose upon its adherents the necessity of agreement. In-

deed, as has already been said above, too high a degree of agreement is unhealthy in democratic societies. But it is precisely because democracy admits of difference and disagreement that it requires participation. Participation in arriving at decisions is the method through which citizens of democracies learn the democratic way of life.

How is this lesson to be exemplified in education? A theoretical answer to this question is simple enough but both educational administrators and teachers find it extremely difficult to make the participant principle a regular and consistent rule of practice. School authorities in one of our larger cities recently sought to establish student self-government in its secondary schools. Students of one high school, after considerable discussion, decided they did not want self-government. It appeared later that their refusal to accept self-government was based upon two assumptions. In the first place, they assumed that self-government would impose upon them new responsibilities and new tasks. They were not prepared to do more work or to accept added obligations. In the second place, they assumed that school authorities were not wholly sincere in making this proposal. Briefly, they did not trust the democratic professions of their elders. Their refusal to try an experiment in the democratic way of life was obviously founded upon their previous lack of participant experience. These same students could, probably, pass a theoretical examination on democracy to the full satisfaction of their teachers.

Participation, if it is to become a positive habit, must be genuine. Children should participate in proportion to their ability to understand the basic factors of the situation in which they are involved. Their understanding is in turn conditioned by the degree of interest which the given situation holds for them. If their true interests are involved, they should be allowed to participate. Adults are frequently deterred from conducting experiments in youth participation on the ground that mistakes will be made. These timid adults are, of course, right. Mistakes will be made. Mistakes are a part of the learning process, as these same adults would admit if they were capable of honest self-analysis.

Community youth councils have recently become popular in certain regions. Young people in these organizations are given the privilege of discussing such community problems as delinquency, recreation, et cetera, and are encouraged to make proposals upon which authorities are expected to act. These youth councils seem to be excellent laboratories for learning democracy through experience. They provide for participation which is commensurate with interest. Adults

cooperating in these ventures must, however, be continually on guard with respect to genuineness. I know of one instance in which the concerned adults invariably formulate a community policy and then ask the local youth council to implement the ensuing program. If the program involves the interests of young people, they should also participate in policy-making. Otherwise, the lesson is only half-learned.

Are students capable of participating in decisions regarding courses of study? Or, is this a realm of complete adult responsibility? I recently discovered an interesting illustration of the principle involved in this question. In a group of some forty high school students I learned that these students held more than a hundred memberships in extra-curricular clubs or organizations. Some of these organizations were, of course, frivolous or merely sociable in purpose, but more than half represented intellectual interests of the students which were not being satisfied by the current curriculum. Is it not likely that this school's curriculum might have been enriched if these students had been consulted? I am not insisting that high school students are capable of devising a satisfactory curriculum for secondary education in America, but I am insisting that they should have some opportunity to participate in curriculum changes. A few years after graduation from high school we expect students to be mysteriously transformed into citizens. When they reach the magic age of twenty-one they are expected to participate. But the sad truth is that in our last national elections only slightly more than one-half of the legal voters took the trouble to cast their ballots. They had not acquired the habit of participation.

I may have over-stressed the participant aspect of democratic behavior but it seems to me that it is in this area that schools and colleges will find the most promising ways of teaching democracy. This holds for families as well, and for all institutions which serve the needs of children and youth. The habit of participation is the most precious possession of democracy's citizens.

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We may now turn to some of the democratic disciplines dealt with in previous sections and in each instance conduct inquiries regarding their educational meaning.

How, for example, may the diversity principle be utilized in education? The moment one attempts to utilize any of the democratic disciplines in action it becomes apparent that flexibility is necessary. Not all school experiences lend them-

selves to diversity, nor is it important that the rule should be applied in all situations. A problem in mathematics permits of but one correct solution although it may be feasible to arrive at this solution by different pathways. When, however, a student is asked to write a composition it is important to avoid imitations and uniformities. Rules of grammar tend toward uniformity. On the contrary, styles of writing allow for wide ranges of difference. What is, patently, of highest importance is to allow pupils to understand that their significant individual differences will be respected and utilized in appropriate settings.

Teachers often destroy the pupil's initial interest by insisting upon standards of perfection. This is more likely than not to be true with respect to the various arts. Music, for example, is invariably taught with a perfectionist bias. As a result, many Americans are taught to play the piano in childhood but few continue to enjoy playing piano as adults. There is plainly a right and a wrong way to play a piano and if all pupils were determined to become professional musicians, it would, probably, be advisable to insist upon learning the right way. But, the truth of the matter is that very few ever become professionals while all might continue to enjoy musical participation. What is true of musical education is likewise true of the pictorial arts. The impulse to create form, to make designs, is fairly generally distributed among human beings but only a fraction will ever become professional artists. Hence, individual deviations in these spheres are highly desirable and not merely from the standpoint of the pupils' interest and growth, but also on behalf of the arts themselves. It is these very individual deviations which give rise to new methods and perspectives and thus keep the arts creatively alive. These two first principles—diversity and the partial functioning of ideals—are thus seen to be complementary. The teacher who practices the rule of diversity in relevant situations will of necessity become a non-perfectionist. Diversity leads to inventiveness and where invention is prized, rules of uniformity are discounted.

The democratic way of life demands of its adherents a variety of integrity which is not derived from abstract rules of conduct but rather from that extremely practical and humane doctrine which my colleague, Professor Smith, has called the fraternity principle. If we can only attain freedom through equality and if equality in turn implies a fraternal feeling toward others, it then appears that democracy eventuates as a formula for human relations. The basic feature of that formula is the doctrine which holds that human beings are the ends and institutions are the means. From this doc-

trine may be derived an unending list of social virtues: Human beings may not be utilized as means for ulterior ends; dignity inheres in individuals; ends may never be used for purposes of justifying the means; self-government means government of, by and for the people. The mere mention of these familiar democratic principles should be enough to lead sincere teachers to appropriate experiments. The doctrine of maximum compatibility between means and ends is the source of democratic morality. It is this morality which needs to be taught and exemplified in education.

On a recent visit to a foreign land, I had the opportunity of observing a mission school which had been operating for years under the auspices of an American religious denomination. Pupils of this school were compelled to repeat a religious ritual a half dozen times. Pictures were taken and these were to be used for publicity and fund-raising purposes. When the children had finally performed their religious ceremony to the satisfaction of the principal, each pupil was rewarded with a piece of candy. In this instance, and with no doubt the best of intentions, the essential ethics of the democratic way of life were being flagrantly denied. Children were being exploited for ends which they had not created; a religious exercise was used as a means toward other ends; and the children were given an extraneous reward for an act which by its very nature could be honest only if divorced from external rewards. This was an American-sponsored school operating in Asia where demonstrations of democratic behavior were sorely needed. I cite this instance merely as a reminder of how easy it is for otherwise well-intentioned people to violate democracy's fundamental code.

Democratic habits (Professor John Dewey once spoke of having democracy in one's bones!) when acquired in the learning process and when demonstrated in a wide range of contexts finally become a way of life. Children thus reared will not easily be tempted to betray democracy since it will have become incorporated within their organisms.

Now that we have become highly self-conscious about democracy as a culture, as a way of life and as an ideology it seems to me unavoidable that our entire educational system will need to adapt itself to democratic goals and methods. I have indicated a few ways in which this may be done but only in general terms. The actual task of transmuting democratic theory into school practice belongs to teachers and school officials and I trust the obligation to do so will not be long postponed. Democracy may be defended on battlefields but it can become a way of life worth defending only through intelligent practice.

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